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1IN THE MINDS OF MEN: A THEORY OF COMPLIANCE
 WITH THE LAWS OF WAR
William Bradford1
 Introduction
Does international law matter, or is it but a “fairy ship upon a fairy sea: a beautiful construct of 
the legal imagination floating upon a sea of false assumptions[?]”2  For many scholars the international 
system has matured since the end of the Cold War and international law, no longer a primitive legal 
system constantly obligated to prove its existence and utterly dependent upon politics for its 
enforcement,3 now significantly constrains and shapes the behavior of states.4  Some go so far as to posit 
that the diffusion of the international rule of law is so advanced that the demise of state sovereignty as 
traditionally conceived is nigh.5  For these observers, the famous aphorism—that “it is probably the case 
that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations 
almost all of the time”6—waxes ever more descriptive of the political universe with each successive wave 
of legalization, for on those increasingly rare instances when states violate international law they are 
compelled to justify their conduct in the face of vigorous denunciations and recriminations.7  Convinced 
that history has released them from the tiresome obligation to prove that international law is really law,8
legalization theorists conclude that solutions to contemporary transnational problems are to be found in 
more, or at least better-tempered, legal regulation,9 for if international law does not per se dictate state 
behavior, compliance10 is the rule and not the exception.
 See UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, at Preamble (“Since wars 
begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.”), available at 
<http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=6206&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>.
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HARV. INTL L.J. 139, 139-40 (characterizing international law thusly a decade ago); cf. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT 
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Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 583, 583 
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5 See Jose E. Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303, 303 (1998) (predicting that increasing international legal 
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 “Compliance” refers to adherence to and conformance by relevant actors with the prescriptions and proscriptions of the legal 
regime established in respect to a particular issue-area.  See ORAN R. YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY 3 
(1979); see also Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 8, at 539 (defining “compliance” as “a state of conformity between an actor’s 
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2Skeptics have subjected this argument to post-ontological inquires such as why, and under what 
conditions, states choose to create and comply with international law.11  Empirical observation suggests 
that noncompliance is common, particularly in issue-areas such as human rights12 and ethnic conflicts that 
challenge state sovereignty,13 and states appear to accept legal obligations without intending to honor 
them.14  Some suggest that international legal regimes are little more than aspirational ventures; others 
wonder whether increased formalization actually inversely correlates with compliance with the normative 
principles underlying regimes.15  For skeptics, if perfect compliance is not necessary to establish the 
significance of law to international relations, a clear and consistent pattern of compliance is sine qua non, 
and legalization theorists have abjectly failed to carry their burden of proving that states consistently obey 
legal rules contrary to their parochial interests.16
Whether, and, if so, why states elect to comply with international law are now the most central 
questions within the international legal academy, and the answers are laden with implications for the role 
of law in the ordering of international relations.17  The former question alone bifurcates the field.  
Uncertainty as to the meaning of ambiguous treaty terms, along with contestation over the parameters of 
customary international law, erode consensus as to precisely what rules apply to a given issue-area,18 and 
thus the very process of operationalizing “compliance” requires subjective judgments.   Investigators 
must decide how to interpret partial or unintentional compliance,19 and information is not always readily 
available and reliable.20  Moreover, because they are more likely to self-report compliance accurately than 
authoritarian states, liberal democracies may spuriously appear less compliant than their counterparts.21
Finally, certain issue-areas, including armed conflict and weapons development, are more closely 
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12 See generally Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); see also Kahler, 
supra note 9, at 677 (noting that despite a formal legal regime prohibiting torture, many states, including a number of 
democracies, engage in the practice).
13 See generally Steven R. Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
591 (2000).  Some observers query whether certain issue-areas in international relations, such as the use of force, may be 
unregulable inasmuch as they trench in subject matter considered central to state survival, national security, or other issues of 
high politics.  See, e.g., John Norton Moore, Enhancing Compliance with International Law: A Neglected Remedy, 39 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 881, 884 (1999) (“[T]he greatest challenge for the future of the rule of law internationally is to enhance rates of 
compliance, even in areas traditionally considered by the Realists as unregulable by law[.]”).
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15 See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 171 
(2002) (“It is a radical critique of international law to suggest that international legal regimes actually worsen the problems they 
were created to address.”).
16 See generally MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS (1947) (contending that 
the test of compliance is whether legal rules are obeyed irrespective of personal gains or losses incurred in doing so).
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 Guzman, supra note 4, at 1826.  Nearly all theories accept that the question of compliance is theoretically significant only to 
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18 See MICHAEL BYERS & GEORG NOLTE, UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 428-29 (2003) (“The compliance concept is closely related to a positivist understanding of law which 
assumes a clear divide between legal and illegal behavior . . . [and] the difficulty of unequivocally distinguishing a ‘legal’ action 
from one that is ‘illegal’ is made only more difficult by the increasing number of contradictions and conflicts emerging within 
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3shrouded in secrecy and thus less amenable to investigation.22  In subjecting the question of whether states 
comply with international law to empirical examination, and in redesigning legal regimes to enhance 
compliance, epistemological problems abound.
Moreover, in regard to the “Why?” question, a skein of theories has been woven over the last 
decade to explain and predict state compliance, and a number of factors, including, inter alia, a desire to 
generate reciprocity, an interest in reducing transaction costs, normative commitments, domestic 
considerations, the degree of domestic incorporation, reputational concerns, and fear of punishment, are 
purported to be causally linked.23  However, as the study of international legal compliance [“ILC”] has 
matured, intramural divisions have been compounded by a gathering suspicion that many states are prone 
to accept only those legal obligations that do not significantly impose real constraints24 and that the 
concept “compliance” may thus not be an adequate framework within which to evaluate whether 
international legal regimes further their normative policy objectives.25  A high level of compliance with a 
given regime may simply reflect the failure to require states to undertake anything more than “modest 
departures from what they would have done in the absence of an agreement.”26  Many treaties may in fact 
be mere codifications of the lowest common denominator achievable across an array of states none of 
whom have internalized norms obligating conduct contrary to their independent preferences, and thus a 
high rate of observed compliance is not necessarily an objective indicator of a normative commitment to 
cooperate.  By the same token, certain agreements that impose significant constraints may meet with 
relatively low levels of compliance without sabotaging the norms states-parties seek to advance.27 In 
short, the development of compliance theories requires that causal relationships between the normative 
fabric from which international legal obligations are woven and state behavior be clearly established.28
However, further complicating resolution of the debate between champions of the causal 
significance of international law and those who view law as epiphenomenal to state practice is the relative 
paucity of empirical studies testing general propositions regarding relationships between rules and 
behaviors.29  Although all social science theories are “indirect, presumptive, [and] obliquely and 
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8 (2000).  For an extended discussion of existing theories of compliance, see infra at pp._.
24 See Daniel E. Ho, Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?, J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 647, 650 (intimating that states are chary of accepting legal obligations that significantly constrain behavior).
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Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 380 (1996).  Much of international law may in fact be of this “self-enforcing” variety in that 
it obligates states to do nothing more than continue on as if unregulated by law.  See ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 128-147 (1981).
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(2000).
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 “[E]ffectiveness,” or the degree to which a legal regime induces changes in behavior that lead directly to improvement in the 
state of the underlying problem within a given issue-area, has been offered as the conceptual successor to compliance.  
Effectiveness studies assume that the rules of a regime can be effective even when compliance is low provided the regime 
imposes demanding behavioral transformations and correlations can be identified between the rules and such transformations.  
On the other hand, where compliance is high, yet a regime enshrines rules that simply mimic ongoing patterns of state practice, 
effectiveness is low.  For a detailed discussion, see Raustiala, supra note 27.  Although compliance and effectiveness are 
differentiable conceptually, the distinction is not theoretically significant to this Article.
29 See Peter M. Haas, Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations and Comparative Politics, in DINAH 
SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE 44 (2000) (“Very little is known about the degree to which states comply 
with international commitments and empirical studies suggest that national compliance is uneven at best.”); Jacobson, supra note 
4incompletely corroborated at best[,]”30 the field organized around the concept of international legal 
compliance is undernourished with insights from other disciplines: the few studies that describe patterns 
of compliance without tracing these relationships and establishing their effectiveness are insufficiently 
rigorous and too under-specified to offer many useful insights.31 To be sure, international law and 
international relations theorists have catalogued and described patterns of compliance.  However, no ILC 
scholar has offered anything like the list of nomothetic propositions that one expects from a theory.
Moreover, insufficient rigor is not all that bedevils the field of ILC: the tacit assumption central to 
the discipline of international law that regards international relations as uniformly susceptible to legal 
regulation may well be false.  A hierarchy of issue-areas32 orders the international legal system, and 
patterns of cooperation have been far easier to generate and sustain in respect to “low politics,” generally 
understood as economic, cultural, and social issues, than in questions of “high politics,” defined narrowly 
as matters of war and peace.33  Because empirical evidence suggests that the obligations most breached 
are those trenching in questions of high politics,34 the ultimate test of whether international law matters 
may well be whether it can be crafted to regulate the “muscular aspects of international life.”35  If 
international relations are inevitably little more than a Hobbesian state of nature, and if war is inescapably 
the negation of the rule of law, then international law is and will always be epiphenomenal.  If, on the 
other hand, states can be induced to comply with meaningful normative limitations on their conduct even 
in issue-areas that profoundly implicate their sovereignty, the long-deferred dream of a functioning civil 
society is no longer fanciful.  Thus, if the laws of war, or international humanitarian law [“IHL”],36 are the 
soft underbelly of global legalization,37 developing a theory that can explain and predict IHL compliance 
and suggest ways in which it can be re-engineered to enhance its effectiveness is of great moment to the 
broader venture of making international law matter.
To note that this is no small undertaking is an understatement.  Whether the gap between 
international law and state practice is closing, as legalization theorists believe, or widening, as their critics 
18, at 571 (“Systematic knowledge about the extent of compliance of nations with the many international obligations they have 
accepted is relatively limited.”); Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 8, at 548 (“[E]mpirical testing of compliance theories is 
limited.  The lack of systematic, multi-case comparative studies has restricted the nature of the claims and prescriptions that 
compliance theorists can offer.”).
30
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31 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (2004) (concluding that the “first generation” of empirical international legal studies “has not adequately accounted for the 
regime design implications of this research” because it has left “unexamined or undefended empirical assumptions about 
foundational matters[.]”); Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 959984 (2000) (“international law scholarship suffers from . .  . methodological unsophistication.”).
32 See R.B. FARRELL, APPROACHES TO CONTEMPORARY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 81 (defining “issue-area” 
as a cluster of interests and values in international relations organized around territory, status, resources, or norms). 
33 See STEPHEN KRASNER, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 8, 173-76 (1983).  For a discussion of the “high politics-low 
politics” distinction, see ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 23-29 (1979).
34 See Downs et al, supra note 26, at 379 (making this claim); see also David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights 
Compliance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 879, 879 (2003) (“noncompliance is common . . . [and] the assumption of compliance may be 
the farthest from the truth” in issue-areas that challenge state sovereignty, such as human rights).
35
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36
 IHL is a set of “articulated norms, customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious and philosophical principles, and 
reciprocal arrangements” that serves as the normative and positive structure of legal relations during armed conflict.  MICHAEL 
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 44 (1979).
37 See HAZEL FOX & MICHAEL MEYER, EDS., EFFECTING COMPLIANCE xiii (“[E]ffecting compliance with the law of 
armed conflict is . . . a major contemporary challenge, a test of the so-called new world order[.]”); see also Steven R. Ratner, 
Overcoming Temptations to Violate Human Dignity in Times of Crisis: On the Possibilities for Meaningful Self-Restraint, 5 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 81, 83 (2004) (noting that the IHL regime “seem[s] the least effective of all international rules[.]”).
5insist, a great many scholars of diverse theoretical commitments agree that a “striking contrast [remains] 
between the richness of the normative order and the behaviour [sic] of men[.]”38  This contrast is most 
marked in the issue-area of IHL, where the record of compliance is, at best, mixed.39  It is thus especially 
regrettable that if the field of ILC is still a “primitive science,”40 our ability to explain and predict the 
effectiveness of IHL is even more protean.41  While the relative youth of the broader field accounts for 
some of this theoretical underdevelopment, and the desire to retain parsimony for still more,42 the inability 
to explain and predict IHL compliance is primarily the result of a failure to specify the variables most 
closely associated with compliance decisions.  That compliance studies designed by scholars of 
international law, a discipline that for centuries has reified states atop the hierarchy of subjects 
responsible for the generation, application, and interpretation of rules and norms, has paid short shrift to 
the causal significance of non-state levels of analysis, and particularly to the individual heads-of-state 
whose decisions are ultimately responsible for committing states to compliance with or violation of IHL, 
is unsurprising.  However, IHL compliance, and compliance with international law more generally, will 
remain idiopathic phenomena so long as scholars fail to render a coherent body of testable hypotheses 
that permit empirical investigation of the entities directly and ultimately responsible for compliance.
In other words, the discipline of ILC must recognize that states are an abstraction utterly lacking 
in the capacity to exercise a choice between alternatives and that those who would answer the question, 
“Why do states choose to comply with or violate IHL?,” must first ask and answer the prior, yet much 
more impenetrable, question: “Why do the individuals who exercise decisional authority commit their 
states to comply with or violate IHL?”  States do not make decisions; people do.  Any theory of IHL 
compliance that aspires to sufficient determinacy to guide practitioners and scholars alike must account 
for the individual level of analysis and in particular the microfoundations of personality that frame 
decisions and yield variation across the range of decisionmakers.   Accordingly, Part I will briefly survey 
and critique existing pretheories of ILC generally and particularly with respect to IHL.43  Part II will 
present an alternative theory that draws from the insights of personality theory to trace the causal 
processes whereby the personalities of individual decisionmakers associate with decisions to comply with 
or violate obligations arising under the IHL regime governing the resort to anticipatory self-defense 
38
 Hans-Peter Gasser, Ensuring Respect for the Geneva Conventions and Protocols: The Role of Third States and the United 
Nations, in FOX & MEYERS, supra note 37, at 16.
39 See James D. Morrow, The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in International Politics, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 
41 (surveying IHL compliance); Posner, supra note 7, at 297 (“States frequently violate the laws of war[.]”).
40 See T. Millon, Normality: What May We Learn from Evolutionary Theory?, in The Diversity of Normal Behavior: Further 
Contributions to Normatology (D. Offer & M. Sabshin eds., 1991), at 358 (“unrelated knowledge and techniques . . . are a sign of 
a primitive science.”).
41 See George H. Aldrich, Compliance with the Law: Problems and Prospects, in FOX & MEYERS, supra note 37, at 3 (stating 
that the failure to develop an effective legal regime is “the central problem confronting [IHL] today[.]”).  Prediction in the social 
sciences may be a fool’s errand, particularly when one sets sights on a highly contingent, rapidly evolving, and case-specific 
issue- area wherein we must “account for unique details that cannot, both by laws of probability and time’s arrow of 
irreversibility, occur together again.” STEPHEN JAY GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE AND THE 
NATURE OF HISTORY 278 (1989).  Nevertheless, to offer explanations without predictions would relegate the venture to mere 
post-hoc analysis rather than to the affirmative engineering of outcomes.
42
 A “parsimonious” theory is one that employs the fewest variables necessary to capture the underlying relationship between 
variables and expresses its hypotheses and findings in such a manner as to be readily understood and replicated.
43
 Any survey of existing literature in a burgeoning field is bound to merely skim the surface and to collapse some distinctions 
between theories while artificially creating others.  The clusters surveyed are more complex than can be presented in the context 
of this Article, and there are points of intersection.
6[“ASD”].  Part III will survey historical data to heuristically test the proffered theory, and Part IV, 
followed by a Conclusion, will anticipate criticisms and propose directions for further research.
I. Theories of IHL Compliance: A Survey and A Critique
ILC theories can be organized into six clusters: realism, enforcement theory, rational choice, 
institutionalism, liberalism, and normativism.44
A. Theoretical Survey
1. Realism
Realism assumes that the international system is immutably anarchic, that states will always be 
the sole relevant actors, and that a perpetual struggle for power obligates states, if they wish to preserve 
their territory and their existence, to maximize their relative power.45  Realists assert that international 
cooperation is possible only inasmuch as it reinforces the interests of states in maximizing their power 
and prospects for survival.46  Because state behavior is determined solely by structural factors—i.e., the 
relative balance of power—states will not pursue cooperation on the basis of normative commitments. 
The role of norms is, therefore, much abridged in an account that purports to explain all state behaviors as 
caused by transformation in the relative power distribution, and many realist scholars treat norms as 
entirely epiphenomenal.
Neither the role of the individuals that exercise command of the foreign policy apparatus of states 
nor their unique psychologies are of any theoretical interest to realism: even if they were not unknowable, 
motives and preferences would exert no causal influence on the behavior of decisionmakers who are 
presumed rational calculators of the relationship between state decisions and national power and 
committed to the singular pursuit of the latter.47  Moreover, regardless of their idiosyncracies, all 
decisionmakers choose identically, or nearly so, in response to external stimuli, and changes in the 
international system account for variations in foreign policy decisionmaking.48
Predictably, the role of international law is narrowly circumscribed in realist accounts of 
international relations.  Although states may create international law as a pretext for decisions that in 
actuality serve their relentless pursuit of power49 or the subordination of weaker states,50 there are no 
norms capable of inducing states to voluntarily abridge their sovereign prerogatives, and those legal 
agreements into which states enter will be carefully and purposefully limited to peripheral matters that do 
not implicate their power or meaningfully limit their autonomy.51  Moreover, for realists compliance with 
international law is to a large degree a function of power: the more powerful a state, the less likely it will 
44
 For a taxonomy of the various compliance pretheories, see Anthony Clark Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law 
and International Politics, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 107, 114-19 (1998).
45 See, e.g., HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (1948).
46 See generally Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT’L L. 260 (1940).
47 See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR 231-32 (1959) (dismissing “accidental causes” such as 
“irrationalities in men” or norms or ideologies as of no consequence to theories of international relations).
48 See generally JOHN MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001).
49
 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 105 (1932).
50
 A number of scholars have suggested that the Western project of promoting the rule of law in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, 
and Iraq has become a fundamentally imperialist enterprise in which foreign administrators backed by large armies govern 
societies pronounced unready to take on the task of self-governance, and that as such law serves realist ends. (note).
51
 Although realists accept that the existence of norms can alter the calculations of costs and benefits associated with policy 
choices, they reject the argument that norms have independent causal effects on state preferences and foreign policy decisions. 
See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements, 1998 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 75.
7suffer punishment from other states for its legal transgressions and the less likely it is, therefore, to 
comply with law or to agree in the first instance to be bound.  Furthermore, because state survival is the 
superordinate value in the international system, realism predicts that compliance will correlate inversely 
with the degree to which the substantive rules place the territorial integrity, and thus the survival, of states 
at risk.52  Finally, realism maintains that should state self-interest ever militate in favor of breaching legal 
obligations—in other words, should state self-interest ever cease to coincide with governing norms—
states, which as realists remind us are nothing more than “legally sovereign unit[s] in a tenuous net of 
breakable obligations[,]”53 will invariably violate the law.
For realists, the strength of the general proposition that law exerts no independent causal 
influence on international relations54 is at a zenith in the context of IHL.  Realism predicts that states will 
voluntarily accept only those constraints on their freedom to employ force that either enhance their 
relative power or that they intend to violate deliberately to their advantage.55  To the extent that it imposes 
restrictions on the methods and means states may employ in prosecuting their interests, particularly when 
rules distribute burdens asymmetrically or deny certain weapons or tactics that are likely to ensure 
survival, and to the degree that it limits the lawfulness of the resort to force in the first instance, especially 
when only the resort to force is likely to prevent political extinction at the hand of a stronger state, IHL is 
inimical to self-preservation.56
In sum, for realists it is axiomatic that armed conflict is a decidedly unfruitful arena in which to 
foster normative cooperation, and IHL cannot surmount the fact that it is an aspirational regime tangential 
at best to explanations of state behavior.  Strong states do what they can, and weak states accept what they 
must.  If law has a role in regulating armed conflict, it is through the extension of the domestic law of a 
powerful state, and this act itself is the assertion of power rather than of the power of a universal norm.57
Inter armes, silent leges.58
2. Enforcement Theory
Enforcement theory [“ET”] shares the core realist assumption that legalization is largely 
epiphenomenal to state behavior, particularly “when the [legal regime] tries to address issues for which an 
agreement is probably not enforceable.”59  ET thus joins with realism in its skepticism toward the capacity 
to regulate high politics.  However, ET departs from realism, principally on the questions of whether 
systematic cooperation is possible and whether measures short of the direct application of force or the 
52 See SHELTON, supra note 29, at 51 (noting that realism predicts that compliance will correlate with the degree to which a 
given legal regime challenges territorial integrity and will thus be strongest in the human rights issue area, followed by 
environmental issues, trade, and arms control in that order).
53
 STANLEY HOFFMAN, CONDITIONS OF WORLD ORDER 364 (1956).
54 See Francis Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Politics, 10 
CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 193 (1980) (summarizing realist position on relationship between law and power).
55 See JEFFREY LEGRO, COOPERATION UNDER FIRE 10 (1999) (“States will desire mutual restraint when the balance of 
power implies relative disadvantage to first use (of a particular mode) of force.  They will prefer escalation when the balance 
indicates relative advantage can be gained by first use.”); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of State 
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1766 (2003) (restating a realist tenet that states will “resist the influence of exogenously 
defined institutional constraints” that inhibit their power).
56 See, e.g., Hans J. Morgenthau, The Twilight of International Morality, 58 ETHICS 79 (1948) (advocating the use of 
assassination as consistent with maximization of state interests).
57
 Alvarez, supra note 5, at 316 (describing utility of law in realism as limited to extraterritorial enforcement of domestic law).
58
 “In time of war, the laws are silent.”  Attributed to Cicero, circa 50 B.C.
59
 Morrow, supra note 39, at 59-60.
8naked threat thereof can impel states toward compliance.  Although it accepts that military sanctions may 
ultimately be necessary to hold states to their obligations,60 ET envisions the potential for a well-designed 
legal regime—even in IHL—to publicize clear rules, enhance monitoring,61 and institutionalize collective 
procedures for punishing violations, thereby enhancing the deterrent and coercive effects of a stable 
balance of power.62  Failures in compliance are thus, for ET theorists, failures to impose adequate 
punishment on prior violators.63
Still, while it is more optimistic as regards the possibility for international cooperation, ET theory 
clings fast to core realist assumptions: the greater the depth of intended cooperation in any given issue-
area, and the greater the degree to which the territorial integrity or political independence is implicated by 
a contemplated legal regime, the harsher must be the consequences for violation of the primary rules.64
Consequently, ET regards as dubious the prospect that legal engineers can ever muster more than the 
shallowest of regimes in IHL without constant and vigilant monitoring65 and, even more vitally, a stalwart 
commitment from powerful states to swiftly punish violations.
3. Liberalism
Liberalism shifts the inquiry from the systemic balance of power to the domestic level of analysis 
and posits that the key actors in international relations, and thus the primary independent variables in 
regard to compliance, are not states but rather individuals, institutions, organizations, and other 
components of civil society.66  Rather than accept the realist presumption that states are unitary actors 
consumed by the pursuit of power, liberalism contends that it is the nature of the domestic politics that 
predominate within state borders that determines the composition of representative governments and in 
turn the willingness of states to subordinate sovereignty to normative regulation.67  Rather than attribute 
causation to exogenous factors, liberalism regards state behaviors as a function of the manner in which 
60 See Moore, supra note 13, at 887 (“In a system lacking adequate centralized mechanisms . . . , permitting the parties to . . . take 
responsive countermeasures may be one of the most important mechanisms . . . for encouraging compliance[.]”).
61 See SHELTON,  supra note 29, at 5 (stressing the centrality of monitoring measures to ET).
62 See Morrow, supra note 39, at 41-42 (elaborating the preconditions specified by ET for an effective compliance regime); see 
also Richard Baxter, Forces for Compliance with the Law of War, AM. SOC. INT’L L. 82, 82-83 (1964) (stressing that the threat 
of punishment—individual and collective—is a crucial support mechanism to the enforcement of international law generally and 
IHL specifically).  Punishment need not be meted out by international institutions: ET contemplates that domestic prosecution of 
violators of IHL can suffice to deter and prevent future violations.  Id.
63 See, e.g., Robert A. Bailey, Why Do States Violate the Law of War? A Comparison of Iraqi Violations in Two Gulf Wars, 27 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 103, 104 (2000) (linking erosion of deterrence created by the prosecution of Nazi defendants 
at Nuremburg to subsequent failures to enforce IHL).  ET theorists link failures of law more generally to the minimal 
probabilities that violations will be discovered and their authors identified and punished.  See Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with 
International Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 222 (1997) (describing the 
objective risk of detection, apprehension, and prosecution as very low in regard to almost all crimes).
64
 Downs et al., supra note 26, at 379-80; see also Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International 
Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 979 (2000) (stressing that sanctions best promote compliance).
65
 ET theorists reposit some confidence in measures established under relevant IHL treaties to publicize the content of the 
substantive rules, develop information and find facts with regard to allegations of breaches, resolve disputes, and hold individual 
violators legally accountable for their actions.  See, e.g., FOX & MEYER, supra note 37, at xiv-116 (describing “important” 
mechanisms that aid IHL enforcement).  Still, the crucial element of compliance, viewed through the ET prism, is robust 
sanctions, particularly of the military sort.
66 See generally Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 
513 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory and the Future of the United 
Nations, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377, 397-400 (1994).  Liberalism is very much a theory of elite political 
participation: because not all issues resonate uniformly within the polity, maximizing the intensity of individual preferences and 
mobilizing political support, along with stifling dissent, is at least as significant as is creating a political majority. See
SHELTON, supra note 29, at 47 (“Compliance is . . . a matter of choice by the state to discipline civil society, often at the request 
of activist sources in civil society.”).
67
 Moravcsik, supra note 66, at 513 (“Societal ideas, interests, and institutions . . . shap[e] state preferences[.]”).
9states are internally constituted.  Because it theorizes democracies as inherently more committed to the 
“rule of law,”68 more prone to absorb international legal obligations into their domestic legal orders and to 
diffuse these obligations through foreign policy bureaucracies, and more willing to permit interest groups 
to mobilize mass electoral support for international legal norms than non-democratic states, liberalism 
predicts that democracies are more likely to accept and honor international legal obligations69 and less 
likely to engage in armed conflict in the first instance.70
Moreover, because it regards compliance as a function of the degree to which the aggregation of 
the preferences of key domestic individuals and groups directs the representative state toward norm-
following and legal regulation, liberalism predicts that IHL compliance is likely to be maximized by 
programs that alter domestic preferences in favor of democratization independently of the substantive 
norms at the heart of the IHL regime.71  Foremost among such measures are packages of domestic 
legislation that internalize international legal norms, “blur” the distinction between international and 
domestic,72 and obligate officials to observe universal normative prescriptions as a matter of domestic 
law.73  Thus, by inducing democratic commitments to IHL norms, such programs encourage elected 
leaders to translate domestic preferences into official policies limiting the resort to force74 and 
constraining methods and means75 while compelling them to conform their conduct in battle to the rules 
these norms reflect.  
4. Rational Choice
Although no universally accepted definition of “rationality” has yet been propounded,76 various 
“rational choice” theories [“RCT”] converge around a core set of assumptions and premises: (1) 
individuals pursue their material self-interests by the means they calculate as most likely to attain 
objectives at the lowest costs; (2) individuals search for information, evaluate outcomes and probabilities, 
and make purposive choices as to means, but not as to ends, for welfare maximization is the 
68 See Philip Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 842 (1990) (“Some 
societies [i.e., liberal democracies] are more dedicated to legalism and the ‘rule of  law’ than others.).
69 See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 6, at 62 (contending that liberal states are more likely to honor international legal obligations 
than are illiberal states); Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, Yale Law School, Working Paper Series 274 (April 1, 2003), at 
116 (contending that even where there are few external incentives, such as sanctions, for states to comply with international legal 
obligations, many democracies will comply because domestic constituencies will impose internal (i.e., electoral) sanctions if they 
do not).  For a critique of liberalism as a “culture of law,” see Jose E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of 
Slaughter’s Liberal Theory, EUR. J. INT’L L. 183, 184 (2001).
70
 For an analysis of research suggesting that democracies are less war-prone than non-democracies, along with an explanation for 
this phenomenon, see generally JOHN NORTON MOORE, SOLVING THE WAR PUZZLE (2004).
71 See Posner, supra note 7, at 314 (analyzing state ratifications of IHL treaties and concluding that democracies are “more 
enthusiastic” about IHL than non-democracies).  In the liberalist account, nongovernmental organizations marshal domestic 
support for IHL compliance and deploy that pressure against governments.  ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE 
NEW SOVEREIGNTY 21 (1995).
72
 FISHER, supra note 26, at 142 (describing this process as securing “first-order compliance”).
73
 Williamson, supra note 20, at 80-81.
74 See generally Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett, Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 87 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 624 (1993) (contending that the type of regime has a dampening effect on participation in armed conflict and that 
democracies are inherently more peaceful). 
75 See Kahler, supra note 9, at 677 (2000) (illustrating connections asserted by liberalists between domestic opinion and state 
military policies).
76 See Amartya Sen, Rational Fools, in SCIENTIFIC MODELS AND MAN (H. Harris ed., 1979) at 1, 5.  For a general 
discussion of the origins of rational choice theory, along with an examination of early theoretical divisions within rational choice 
scholarship that continue to bifurcate the theoretical plain, see HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957).
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predetermined preference of each decisionmaker;77 (3) although individuals are not perfect processors of 
information,78 they possess the analytic capacity to choose the alternative most likely to contribute to their 
welfare;79 (4) neither norms nor any other idiosyncratic elements of personality account for individual 
behaviors;80 rather, behavioral regularities that come to be labeled as “norms” are in reality the result of 
individuals pursuing self-interests;81 (6) states act as unitary actors through the decisions of key 
individuals or groups;82 (7) state actions are the product of the decisions of a single individual or a small 
group of crucial individuals who possess the authority, or at least the power, to commit the state;83 and (8) 
state decisions are egoistic choices undertaken to advance the material self-interests of these key 
individuals and groups along with the populations of which they are representative.84
Because the rational pursuit of self-interest is the explanandum of behavior, law is theoretically 
significant within RCT explanations only insomuch as it alters the relative costs of particular means: in 
other words, legal rules alter the payoff structure of certain strategies and decisions, and decisions about 
compliance are evaluated on materialist, rather than normative, grounds.  States will not comply 
altruistically, yet noncompliance may be costly if other states impose economic or military sanctions.85  In 
essence, if legal architects craft a formula that converges state interests with the rules of the regime and 
ensures that effective sanctions are available to deter defections through the imposition of costs that 
exceed the gains to be had through violations,86 an effective regime can be sustained.  RCT thus explains 
compliance with legal rules in starkly instrumental terms: if compliance is the decision strategy most 
likely to yield the greatest benefit, a state will comply; conversely, if violation of the law is the strategy 
77 See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 487, 495 
(“The basic [RCT] heuristic is to attribute observed behavior to the rational pursuit of self-interest.”).
78
 Only a very few RCT scholars regard the individual as homo economicus, an “omniscient calculator who can easily perform all 
cognitive calculations necessary to reach decision.” DAVID O. SEARS, LEONIE HUDDY, & ROBERT JERVIS, EDS., 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 24 (2003).  Most take a more “bounded”  approach and accept that 
imperfect reasoning does not defeat the procedural  rationality of individual decisions.
79
 Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 345, 349 (1998).
80 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 46 (rejecting the causal significance of the “cauldron of instincts, 
passions, and deeply ingrained cultural attitudes” in relation to the generation of social norms or the explanation of behavior).  
For RCT scholars, parsimony and investigability override efforts to build norms into their enterprise, and nonrational sources of 
preference and motivation are considered “just not well enough understood by psychologists to support a theory of social norms, 
and repeated but puzzled acknowledgments of their importance would muddy the exposition of the argument without providing 
any offsetting benefits.”  Id.
81 See KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE, ED., CONTEMPORARY EMPIRICAL POLITICAL THEORY 284 (1997) (describing 
the RCT position that behavior is independent of norms and that the proclivity to engage in norm-neutral patterns of individual 
wealth maximization “constitutes a universal, even a defining, characteristic of humanity.”).  “Thin” versions of RCT, which 
ignore social values, symbols, and normative practices central to theories of social ontology, predominate in the international 
relations and international legal literature; so-called “thick theories,” which make room for detailed descriptions of norms, values, 
cultural assumptions, metaphors, religious beliefs, and personal commitments, have heretofore been either subsumed into other 
paradigms or largely overlooked in the literature.
82 See BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA, THE WAR TRAP (1981) (arguing that top executive decisionmakers represent the 
state).
83 See Peter H. Huang, International Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 237, 241 (2002).
84
 YOUNG, supra note 10, at 18.
85 See POSNER, supra note 80, at 8 (explaining that RCT posits that sanctions alter preferences in the direction of compliance). 
Noncompliance may also trigger indirect costs, as a habit of violation may dissuade other states from joining with the 
noncomplier to resolve collective action problems, such as the establishment of security or environmental regimes.  Posner, supra
note 7, at 309.  However, in many issue-areas, and in particular in regard to the issue of territorial integrity, the price of a bad 
reputation may well be lower than in more cooperative issue-areas, such as trade.  Id.
86 See Jack A. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114-15 (1999) 
(rejecting the argument that legal rules exert any compliance pull per se and stressing that convergence of state interest and legal 
rules, and not widely shared norms, are essential to an effective regime).
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most conducive to the maximization of welfare, it will violate the law even if other states stand ready to 
apply sanctions or impose reputational costs.  Norms do not command compliance; power does.
If the effectiveness of international law hinges upon the convergence of regime rules with the 
self-interest of states or with the threat or use of the ultimate sanction, one would not anticipate that IHL, 
a series of rules that limits the circumstances under which resort to force is lawful and the methods and 
means that may be employed, would secure much compliance from states whose leaders are committed 
not to the norms undergirding these rules but to the maximization of their security, wealth, and power in 
an anarchic international system.87  IHL is effectively a pre-war agreement to abstain from enumerated 
“battle strategies,” and RCT predicts that states will comply with rules that limit the resort to particular 
methods or means only if the benefits gained through the resort to these methods or means are less than 
the costs imposed by third states, whether reputational or, more likely, economic and military.88  States 
will readily consent to the proscription of methods and means that have little inherent operational utility 
and thus do not favor one state over another,89 or that they are unable to employ due to an inability to 
produce or fund the relevant technology.90  States will also consent to constraints on the use of weapons 
that are not cost-effective in that they consume significant resources to produce without contributing 
sufficiently to the destruction of the enemy.  However, states will either withhold consent to the 
prohibition of battle strategies the benefits of which, by their subjective calculations, outweigh the sum of 
the costs of their retaliatory use by enemies plus the costs of external sanctions,91 or state consent to such 
prohibitions will itself constitute a battle strategy: devious states will take whatever gains are available 
from the first use of methods and means they fraudulently disclaimed against their duped enemies.
Specifically, RCT has explained a general pattern of state compliance with rules governing the 
treatment of POWs not in terms of fundamental shared conceptions of humanity but as consistent with 
calculations that humane treatment of enemy POWs will encourage enemy soldiers to surrender and 
thereby terminate the conflict quickly and on favorable terms.92  Differential rates of compliance 
suggesting that wealthier states are more prone to observe rules regarding POWs are rationalized as 
consistent with the greater material capacities of resource-rich states to comply with expensive 
obligations to properly house, transport, and interrogate enemy captives; for wealthy states, if their 
compliance promotes enemy surrenders, it may register as cost-neutral or even as a gain, whereas for poor 
87 See Posner, supra note 7, at 308-09 (denying that “humanity,” other normative considerations, or legal rules themselves exert 
causal influence on state compliance decisions in regard to IHL).
88
 Morrow, supra note 39, at 46.  RCT scholars discount the importance of reputational sanctions in the armed conflict issue-area 
as under conditions of war states define welfare maximization in terms of the enhancement of their survival and power rather 
than in terms of their social standing.  See Posner, supra note 7, at 309 (“Neither reputational concerns nor interior controls . . . 
have much influence on the conduct of states during war.”).  Because reputational costs matter little, IHL is thus enforceable only 
“to the extent that nations . . . retaliate against belligerents who violate [it.]”  Id. at 297.
89
 Morrow, supra note 39, at 46. RCT assumes that states will not spend resources on war if they can dedicate them to civilian 
expenditures instead, and that states will thus eschew battle strategies of little martial benefit if in so doing they can generate 
“greater production and consumption for civilians than would occur if military investment were unconstrained.”  Posner, supra
note 7 at 314.
90
 In other words, each method and means of warfare has distributional effects in that it does not benefit all states equally, and 
RCT predicts that each state will seek to ban those methods and means that exceed its technological sophistication or that it 
believes will be more effective in the hands of other states than in its own.  Id. at 305, 310-312.
91 See id. at 297, 299-302 (indicating that some prohibited battle strategies, such as targeting civilians and civilian property, may 
aid a violator in terminating a war quickly on favorable terms, while others, such as the feigning of surrender to lure enemy 
troops into the open only to dispatch them, favors the weaker of two belligerents).
92 Id. at 312.  At worst, compliance with the rules supports reciprocity, and the net cost of this strategy is zero.  Id. at 308.
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states compliance consumes resources better directed toward the destruction of the enemy, and violation 
of rules concerning POWs is an efficient battle strategy.
Furthermore, the remarkably stable and general pattern of compliance with rules prohibiting 
CWs, a low-cost, incredibly effective weapons system, is susceptible to explanation by RCT.  Wealthy 
states will support bans on cheap and effective weapons per se in order to deny as many useful methods 
to poorer states as possible,93 and all states will have little incentive to employ terribly destructive yet 
technologically unsophisticated and widely available weapons from the use of which little advantage, due 
to the likelihood of retaliation in kind, will accrue to either side.  RCT speaks not only to means but to 
methods: the customary principles of military necessity,94 proportionality,95 and distinction96 are nothing 
but the result of continuous pressure placed upon more powerful states by less powerful states seeking, 
under the guise of professions of humanitarian concern over unnecessary suffering attendant to war, to 
force the former to employ less potent weapons readily available to the latter and thus to tilt the battlefield 
toward equilibrium.97
Finally, RCT accounts for a generalized failure of compliance with rules limiting the resort to 
force in the first instance, also known as the jus ad bellum,98 by simply noting that, although in theory 
states can converge their interests to form a collective security regime,99 in practice states have calculated 
that their interests in survival, wealth preservation, or power maximization have been better served by 
engaging in the unauthorized use of force.100
5. Institutionalism
Institutionalism can be disaggregated into three interrelated theories: managerialism, reputational 
theory, and transnational legal process.
a.  Managerialism
Managerialism [“MT”] can be distilled into the following series of premises: (1) the long-term 
interests of states are best served through cooperation on collective action problems; (2) states are 
naturally imbued with a propensity to comply with legal rules because a reputation as an international 
“good citizen” is intrinsically valuable101 and because violations may result in exclusion from the benefits 
93 Id. at 303 (postulating that IHL prohibitions on weapons systems will be “directed foremost at the most efficient weapons”, 
defined as those with the highest ratio of military effectiveness to cost, e.g., CWs).
94
 The customary IHL principle of necessity implicitly authorizes all operations undertaken in the immediate interest of self-
preservation provided a minimal threshold requirement—that they be intended and tended directly toward the military defeat of 
the enemy—is satisfied. See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 5 (1995) (defining military necessity as “the 
principle that a belligerent is justified in applying compulsion and force of any kind, to the extent necessary for . . . the complete 
submission of the enemy[.]”
95
 The customary IHL principle of proportionality, designed to shield civilians from the suffering of war, dictates that military 
force not be employed to cause damage excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. R.R. 
Baxter, Modernizing the Law of War, 78 MIL. L. REV. 165, 178-79 (1972) (defining proportionality).
96
 The customary IHL principle of distinction, which maintains that the only legitimate object of war is to destroy enemy armed 
forces, imposes a strict prohibition against the deliberate targeting of noncombatant personnel and civilian targets.  See
Christopher C. Burris, Re-Examining the Prisoner of War Status of PLO Fedayeen, 22 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 943, 
966 (1987) (discussing origins and application of principle of distinction).
97
 Posner, supra note 7, at 302.
98 See infra at pp._.
99 See STEPHEN KRASNER, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 173 (1983).
100 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No.
63 (April 2004), at 10-13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id.=546104.
101 See Moore, supra note 34, at 880.
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associated with cooperation;102 (3) norms widely perceived as fair and equitable and therefore legitimate103
are responsible for tapping into this natural propensity and fostering cooperative legal arrangements; (4) 
instances of noncompliance with international law are the exception rather than the rule;104 (5) most 
noncompliance is the result not of deliberate violation but rather of a lack of precision in specifying 
obligations in ambiguous or indeterminate treaties, a lack of technical capacity that prevents states willing 
to comply from physically doing so, or fundamental changes in circumstances that render compliance 
impossible;105 (6) states’ inherent preference for compliance defends legal regimes against decay in the 
face of violations: most states will continue to observe international legal obligations even if some states 
do not,106 and thus perfect compliance is unnecessary to define a legal regime as effective;107 (7) because 
states are interested in and prone to cooperation, compliance failures are remediable not through 
enforcement—an expensive “waste of time”108—but by consultation, negotiation, and persuasion; when 
disputes or defections occur, non-coercive methods alone are sufficient to adjust preferences and steer 
states back into conformity;109 and (8) because noncompliance is largely unintentional, the problem is 
neither structural nor rooted in divergent preferences but managerial—enhancement of regime 
effectiveness therefore requires enhancement of the capacities of weaker and poorer states and the 
removal of obstacles to compliance, formalization and clarification of legal obligations to render rules 
more compelling internalization of international norms in domestic legislation, and dissemination of 
102 See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 71 (contending that the threat of alienation from a “complex web of international 
arrangements” that have become “central to most states’ security and economic well-being” fosters compliance).
103 See id. at 127 (defining “legitimacy” as a relative judgment that a norm “emanates from a fair and accepted procedure, . . . is 
applied equally and without invidious discrimination, and . . . does not offend minimum substantive standards of fairness and 
equity.”).  MT predicts that the greater the clarity and “wisdom” of a given rule, the more likely states will be to accord it their 
compliance. Williamson, supra note 20, at 62.
104
 CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 71, at 9.  The question of partial compliance can be answered to support the MT contention 
that compliance is the norm: partial compliance requires an interpretive judgment as to whether performance has met the legally
obligated standard, and MT scholars are loathe to find noncompliance:
[T]here is a considerable zone within which behavior is accepted as adequately conforming . . . An “acceptable level of 
compliance” is not an invariant standard.  It changes over time with the capacities of the parties and the urgency of the 
problem.  It may depend on the type of treaty, the context, the exact behavior involved.  The matter is further 
complicated because, for many legal norms . . . questions of compliance are often contestable and call for complex, 
subtle, and frequently subjective evaluation.
Id. at 17.
105
 Downs et al, supra note 26, at 380.  Recent MT scholarship suggests that compliance with certain multilateral treaties may 
benefit from overt recognition of the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”  [“CDR”] which provides that 
states will vary with regard to their technical and economic capacities for implementation and that the formal rules, or at least 
interpretations of compliance, must take into consideration inequalities in capacities.  See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Common 
But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L.276 (2004).  Whether the principle of CDR would 
attenuate the obligation to comply with treaties that codify norms of jus cogens or provide for important public goods has as yet 
not been subject to theoretical inquiry.  Id. at 301.
106
 CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 71, at 19.
107 See Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 8, at 542 (explaining that for MT scholars compliance is a “continuum with the 
appropriate or tolerable level of compliance set through an interactive, sometimes tacit process[,]” and that some regimes are very 
tolerant of noncompliance).  MT views international legal regimes as flexible enough to sustain some degree of noncompliance 
without breaking, particularly if necessary to maintain prevent powerful states from abandoning them. See Jeol P. Trachtman, 
Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance, EUR. J. INT’L L. (1999) (“It is a realistic recognition that law and politics must coexist, 
and that the nirvana of perfect compliance is a chimera.”).
108
 CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 71, at 2 (arguing that military sanctions expend too many lives and too much treasure, and 
economic sanctions are too slow and ineffective, to secure compliance with the vast majority of legal regimes).
109 See ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 51 (1979).
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normative content through institutions and training programs.110  In sum, MT states will comply with legal 
regimes if only they are properly organized by powerful states willing to bear management costs.111
For MT scholars, IHL is just another legal regime, and proper management is key to its 
effectiveness.  Well-elaborated treaty instruments that plainly remove particular battle strategies from the 
repertoire of ratifying states will generate strong incentives toward compliance of their own accord,112
even under conditions of uncertainty as to the conduct of enemies that appertain during the “fog of 
war.”
113
 Although it does not predict perfect compliance—a distinction is drawn between individual 
violations not sanctioned by the state on the one hand and official state policies authorizing violations on 
the other,114 and urges tolerance in respect to localized “feuds of reciprocal punishments” carried out by 
limited numbers of combatants in order to preserve the regime115--MT contends that the creation of treaty-
based monitoring and verification mechanisms to capitalize upon the inherent proclivity of states to honor 
their substantive obligations is an effective approach to facilitating cooperation even during war.116
Enforcement measures, such as reprisal, are therefore to be used sparingly and, because they are of the 
most limited utility, only where management fails.
b. Reputational Theory
For adherents of reputational theories [“RT”], reputation, the “bulwark for the maintenance of 
commitments,” matters.  States, just as individuals, wish to claim the respect of their peers and avoid their 
reprobation,117 and considerations of national honor and prestige play an important role in restraining self-
interested state behavior.118  Therefore, states do not lightly enter into international agreements, but tend to 
110 See Raustiala, supra note 27, at 293 (describing the MT agenda for enhancing compliance through greater specification and 
implementation of regime norms and rules).
111
 Management costs typically involve supporting the institutions necessary to harmonize interests, facilitate negotiations, and 
provide monitoring and information dissemination.  See generally Keohane, supra note 77.
112 See James D. Morrow, The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties, 55 INT’L ORG. 971, 973 (2001) 
(explaining that IHL “sways actors’ decisions about which strategies they will use in pursuit of victory.”).
113
 IHL poses a “two-level problem” in that compliance is a function not only of official state choices but of the fidelity of 
individual combatants to the prescriptions and proscriptions established by IHL instruments as well as to the orders of their 
governments.  MT scholars term uncertainty as to the compliance of other states as “noise” and concede that the battlefield is a 
particularly noisy place; however, the source of noise on the battlefield—whether state decisions or individual violations—is 
difficult to attribute without unavailable information.  For MT scholars legal regimes permit states to resolve the  ignore reports 
of low-level violations of agreements by presuming that other states remain committed to the legal regime in question and that 
violations are not attributable to the state but rather to individual noncompliers.  See Morrow, supra note 39, at 52 (noting that 
individual violations may be difficult to discover and to prove, that even if proven may be contrary to state policy, and that the 
evaluation of state compliance with IHL is thus a strategic problem difficult to resolve without a theory of agency).
114 See id. (explaining that while “[t]here will always be some violations when the policing of individuals is critical for an issue” 
under MT “[t]he management of individual violations is generally left to the militaries of those violators.”).
115
 Morrow, supra note 113, at 975-76.
116 See id. at 982 (pointing to treaties establishing neutral third-parties as fact-finders, protecting powers, and other formal 
procedures for developing information as mechanism for managing compliance with IHL).
117 See Steven R. Ratner, Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a Conversation, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2064 
(2003) (stressing that although fear of reprisal is an important constraint on state compliance decisions, the desire to avoid shame 
associated with violating law is a significant consideration); YOUNG, supra note 10, at 22 (contending that states are sensitive to 
social pressures and seek to avoid ostracism while gaining from peers their social approval, extension of status, and friendship).  
More general research suggests that most social norms are observed to maintain and enhance status within a peer group rather 
than to avoid punishment.  See B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of Conformity, 102 J. POL. ECON. 841, 841-44 (1994) (arguing 
that individuals conform “because they recognize that even small departures from the norm will seriously impair their 
popularity.”).  For a discussion of the role of social norms as they relate to law, see generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER 
WITHOUT LAW (1991); Harold G. Grasmicj & Robert J. Bursik, Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: 
Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 837 (1990)..
118 See Tyler, supra note 63, at 225 (noting importance of peer groups in fostering compliance with legal norms); Williamson, 
supra note 20, at 81 (suggesting states have an interest in “fostering a reputation for reliability in the eyes of other [states]”); 
Keohane, supra note 77, at 490 (“In an interdependent . . . world, a reputation for reliability matters.”).
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observe those legal obligations they do undertake119 and to undertake those obligations widely deemed by 
other states to be constitutive of the “modern or civilized state.”120  Treaties are thus screening devices: by 
accepting legal obligations and honoring them, states demonstrate to the international community that 
they are good international citizens and deserve inclusion in cooperative regimes;121 conversely, by 
refusing to accept a legal obligation, a state “signals” to other states its rejection of community normative 
standards and self-classifies as an outlier from the pattern of norm-governed international relations.122
Because most states do not wish to forfeit the reputational benefits of association with “good” states or 
incur the reputational costs of being classified with “bad” states,123 and because some states are eager to 
publicly signal their approval of the normative content of certain kinds of legal obligations,124 RT explains 
ratification of treaties as a process whereby states demonstrate, protect, and enhance their reputations.125
Within RT theory, the very act of undertaking an international legal obligation, whether through 
ratification of a treaty or supporting a declaration of custom, positively affects state incentives.126
Although the choice to comply with a legal obligation may be costlier in material terms than 
noncompliance, the reputational harm self-inflicted by a violation is costlier still in many instances.127
While RT concedes that some states, desirous of the reputational gains that accrue upon signaling their 
acceptance of legal norms, may prove incapable or even unwilling to meet their obligations in practice,128
it maintains that most states will comply with regimes even when rules conflict with their short-term self-
interests because the process of socialization with other states effectively redefines self-interest and 
motivates states to wish to protect a reputation for compliance.129  At worst, states will attempt to justify or 
explain away their violations of law as somehow either faithful to the spirit (if not the letter) of the legal 
rule in question or as having occasioned only de minimis harm.130  In a real sense, compliance, viewed 
through the RT lens, is “herd behavior”131 secured through strategic mobilization of peer pressure.
As to IHL, RT makes no specific claims, yet some RT theorists concede that the potency of 
reputational effects is probably lowest in issue-areas where the stakes are highest and that for states the 
benefits that accrue from being perceived as a rule-follower are far less than the gains to be had through 
the election of prohibited but highly useful battle strategies.  In other words, short-term gains relative to 
119 Id.  That states generally defend their legally dubious conduct as lawful is proferred by RT theorists as further support for the 
conclusion that reputation matters. BEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 21.
120
 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 55, at 1778.
121 See Ho, supra note 24, at 654 (describing a reputation for compliance in the field of trade as a “stamp of approval”).
122
 This is a simplification: RT creates a 2x2 matrix into which states are assigned, on the basis not only of ratification but also of 
subsequent practice, as either 1) acceding and complying, 2) acceding but noncomplying, 3) nonacceding yet complying, and 4) 
nonacceding and noncomplying.  See Moore, supra note 34, at 903 (modeling a RT of compliance).
123 See id. at 902-03 (positing that some states accede to legal obligations because failure to do so “risks the cost of being classed 
with unrestrained states.”).
124 See Hathaway, supra note 12, at 1941 (describing ratification of treaties as in part an “expressive” process whereby states 
declare their solidarity with normative positions embodied in those instruments).
125 See Ratner, supra note 118, at 2058 (elaborating an RT explanation of state ratifications of multilateral treaties).
126
 Guzman, supra note 4, at 1828.
127 See Simmons, supra note 51, at 835 (hypothesizing that the mere existence of a legally binding rule changes the context for 
decisionmaking by imposing reputational costs on decisions not to comply).
128 See SHELTON, supra note 29, at 45 (conceding that the rare state will be immune from reputational costs and will comply 
only in the face of military or economic sanctions).
129 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 31, at 53 (defining the central problem in ILC as “how best to socialize ‘bad actors’”).
130 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1830 (noting that states accused of violations of law “proclaim [their] innocence or expend 
resources fighting to exonerate themselves[.]”).
131
 POSNER, supra note 80, at 41.
16
enemy states are far more valuable than long-term reputational considerations,132 and when threatened, 
states will do whatever they deem necessary to ensure their territorial integrity and political 
independence; only if they survive do they worry about what other states think of them.
c.  Transnational Legal Process
Transnational legal process theory [“TLP”] shares the realist premise that states are unitary 
rational actors in an anarchic system but nonetheless insists that states are in fact inclined toward 
cooperation and that international legal norms emerge through patterns of state cooperation.133
International legal regimes clarify and formalize patterns of cooperative behavior, transforming state 
incentives and conditioning further cooperation on compliance with rules within and across various issue-
areas;134 at the same time, transnational epistemic communities consisting largely of foreign policy elites 
arise to internalize cooperative norms and rules in domestic law and legal institutions, a process that 
deepens cooperation still further.135  It is this parallel process of institutionalization in international and 
domestic fora that accounts for the creation and internalization of legal norms and rules and the 
progressive evolution of cooperation.
For TLP theorists, compliance is a function of the degree to which a given legal regime is 
internalized in domestic law.  Variance in rates of state compliance is thus the result of variance in rates 
and degrees of incorporation of the relevant international legal regime.136  Once all states reach full 
incorporation, obedience—not merely compliance—will be achieved.  Although they do not eschew 
enforcement measures, TLP theorists concentrate upon tasking institutions, and the epistemic 
communities captaining them, with diffusing the normative content of international legal regimes and 
urging relevant constituencies to accede to further measures of internalization.137  Although TLP has paid 
little mind to the question of IHL compliance, the theory presumes that compliance should be greatest for 
those states that have (1) ratified the greatest number of IHL instruments and expressed the most 
unqualified support for customary obligations and (2) passed the most comprehensive domestic 
implementing legislation incorporating treaty-based and customary obligations in their civil and military 
132 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1825 (stating that reputational effects likely exist only “when the stakes are relatively modest” 
and suggesting that “many of the topics that receive the most attention in international law[,]” such as IHL, “are unlikely to be 
affected by international law.”).
133 See SHELTON, supra note 29, at 52-53 (presenting the TLP assumption that cooperation merely requires that states be 
encouraged to “indulge their initial inclinations” toward cooperation).
134 See Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-84, 204 (1996) (“It is through this repeated process 
of interaction and internalization that international law acquires its ‘stickiness’ . . . and that nations define promoting the rule of 
international law as part of their national self-interest.”).
135
 Hathaway, supra note 12, at 1961 (describing internalization of international norms and rules in domestic law, a process 
carried out primarily by foreign policy personnel but also through executive orders, legislation, and judicial decisions, as central 
to evolution of cooperation).  TLP theorists recognize that states will vary in the degree to which they internalize international 
law, but maintain that “every sizable government operates according to rules” and that invariably states will incorporate 
international legal obligations and thereby “produc[e] respect for standing rules of international law[.]”  FISHER, supra note 26, 
at 147.
136
 Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 8, at 544.
137 See generally Harold Hongjuh Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1998) (urging a 
holistic approach, centered upon domestic incorporation, to the project of enhancing compliance).
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laws.  TLP might further predict that membership in international institutions created to monitor 
compliance and adjudicate disputes and violations will correlate with increased compliance.add note
6. Normativism
Normativism is the cluster of pretheories concerned with the influence of morality and justice138
and committed to several primary principles: (1) sources of non-legal obligation exert theoretically 
significant causal effects on individual and state behaviors that are not reducible to rational or utilitarian 
calculations of material costs and benefits;139 (2) even in a world without “law,” individuals and states 
would engage in norm-governed behaviors;140 (3) states will accept legal obligations not solely to advance 
material self-interests but to further normative conduct;141 (4) individuals and states are motivated to obey 
obligations even when compliance runs counter to material self-interests;142 and (5) state compliance with 
international law reflects, to some measurable degree, commitments to norms.  Normativism consists of 
three distinct but interrelated theories each of which treats norms143 as vital to compliance: legitimacy 
theory, organizational theory, and constructivism.
a. Legitimacy Theory
Legitimacy theory [“LT”] posits that the more legitimate a regime, the more likely states will be 
to afford it compliance.  In turn, LT defines legitimacy as “a property of a rule . . . which itself exerts a 
pull toward compliance . . . because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into 
being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process[.]”144  LT describes 
add note
 See, e.g., Johanna van Sambeek & Mireille Hector, Disseminating of IHL at the Domestic Level, in MAKING THE VOICE 
OF HUMANITY HEARD (L. Lijnzaad, J. van Sambeek, & B. Tahzib-Lie, eds. 2004), at 384-97 (linking dissemination of 
knowledge of IHL within domestic societies with enhanced compliance).
138 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3 (1990).
139 See MARTHA FINNEMORE, DEFINING NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 87 (1996) 
(“[P]rincipled concerns, morality, and individual action” are as important to understanding the motivation of individuals and 
states are“rational” considerations); FISHER, supra note 26, at 143 (identifying religious beliefs, “family, schools, [and] cultural 
attitudes” regarding justice as primary determinants of interests and behaviors in normative accounts of legal compliance); 
TYLER, supra note 139, at 23 (holding that “other bases for securing compliance with law: social relations (friends, family, 
peers) and normative values” exceed the importance of formal legal rules); id. at 21 (“Citizens have been found to obey the law 
when the probability of punishment for noncompliance is almost nil and to break laws in cases involving substantial risks.  
Neither form of behavior makes sense from a strictly instrumental perspective.”).  Simply put, for normativist theoreticians norms 
have a “grip on the mind.” JOHN ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 100 (1989).
140 See POSNER, supra note 80, at 3 (“In a world with no law and rudimentary government, order of some sort would exist . . . 
The order would appear as routine compliance with social norms and the collective infliction of sanctions on those who violate 
them[.]”); FRIEDERICH W. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS (1989) (stressing importance of non-legal 
norms in international relations); ELLICKSON, supra note 118 (same).
141 See, e.g., Ann Florini, The Evolution of International Norms, 40 INT’L STUD. Q. 363, 367 (1996).
142 See Martii Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1946 (1990) (theorizing that non -legal sources of 
normative prescription regarding “what is right and good for human life” that precede attempts at positive legal regulation are 
more effective in securing compliance with behavioral objectives); YOUNG, supra note 10, at 23 (noting that “inner pressures” 
to comply with the law out of a sense of duty can overwhelm short-term seld interest in violating the law).  In normativist 
accounts of individual behavior, norms are “part of [an] internal motive system and guide [individuals’] behavior even in the 
absence of external authority.” M. Hoffman, Moral Internalization: Current Theory and Research, in ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (L. Nerkowitz ed., 1977).  As Tyler explains, considerations of self-interest and 
the effectiveness of enforcement measures are subordinate in theoretical terms to the power of norms:
If people view compliance with the law as appropriate because of their attitudes about how they should behave, they 
will voluntarily assume the obligation to follow legal rules.  They will feel personally committed to obeying the law, 
irrespective of whether they risk punishment for breaking the law.
TYLER, supra note 139, at 3.
143
 An operational definition describes norms as “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations” or as a “set of 
intersubjective understandings readily apparent to actors that makes behavioral claims on those actors” and “leave broad patterns 
of the sort that social science strives to explain.” FINNEMORE, supra note 140, at 2 n.2 (1996).  Put more simply, norms provide 
answers to the question of what “ought” to be, rather than solely to what is.
144
 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 24 (1995).  Legitimacy, expressed 
thusly, is distinct from morality inasmuch as commitment to obey law on moral grounds implies that the substantive content of 
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the primary determinants of legitimacy as (1) the clarity or transparency of the legal rules and the norms 
they reflect;145 (2) the symbolic importance of the rules; (3) the “coherence” of the regime, defined as the 
degree to which rules are connected to principles of reason;146 and (4) adherence to the regime, defined as 
the connection between its primary and secondary rules.147  Although some LT theorists suggest that 
compliance is more multivariate, hinging in part on the likelihood that violations will be detected and 
punished and in part on the views of relevant peer groups,148 LT invariably regards compliance as a 
function of legitimacy: those regimes widely perceived to be created and administered fairly are entitled 
to, and do in fact reap, compliance.149
Specifying LT still further, if compliance is a function of legitimacy, LT theory predicts that the 
degree to which any particular state complies with international law is in turn a function of the degree to 
which that state deems international law generally, or the particular regime in question specifically, to 
have been derived through fair procedures.  LT theory assesses whether the rules in question are 
perceived to be substantively just—i.e., connected to principles of reason, justice, morality, or other first 
principles150—as justice is a necessary precondition for compliance.  Finally, if legitimacy is held constant 
as between two alternative sets of rules, LT theory predicts that compliance will be greatest with that 
regime that expresses the most moral content.151
Thus, in regard to IHL, a regime consisting of numerous instruments to which essentially all 
states are parties and constituting what are arguably a series of obligations erga omnes, LT would predict 
that most states should perceive it as legitimate and that compliance should be high,152 particularly for 
those states for whom the primary rules are reasonable and the procedures for resolving disputes about the 
the law is perceived as inherently just, whereas a commitment to compliance on the ground that the regime is legitimate, while it 
need not exclude moral considerations, rest upon the narrower procedural conclusion that “the authority enforcing the law has the 
right to dictate behavior.”  TYLER, supra note 139, at 3 (differentiating morality and legitimacy).
145 See SHELTON, supra note 29, at 4.  An important premise of LT theory is that the greater the determinacy of a legal rule the 
more normative weight it is presumed to carry and the more compliance it will secure.  See, e.g., JAN KLABBERS, THE 
CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1996).
146 See FISHER, supra note 26, at 105 (“[F]rom the point of view of a government, . . . [t]he incentive to break a rule of 
international law or to respect it depends overwhelmingly upon the particular subject of the rule . . . A rule draws strength in 
proportion to the extent to which it makes sense to whom it applies.”); Mark W. Zacher, The Territorial Integrity Norm: 
International Boundaries and the Use of Force, 55 INT’L ORG. 215 (2001) (linking compliance with law to the degree to which 
“the norms it embodies are widely shared by its subjects.”).
147
 FRANCK, supra note 145, at 24.
148See Keohane, supra note 77, at 491-93 (describing the “normative optic” of international law and international relations, a 
manner of understanding that grounds the legitimacy of international regimes in norms).  Although moral considerations are not 
banished from LT, the theoretical significance of legitimacy, defined as procedural fairness, is regarded as greater than that of 
moral considerations, which are rooted more in substantive justice: an advantage of privileging legitimacy over morality in 
securing compliance is that
when the law is viewed as legitimate people feel that they “ought to obey” all laws, not just those that are consistent 
with their own moral principles.  Hence, legitimacy is a more widespread, “blanket” endorsement of law’s value than 
morality.  If authorities are legitimate, people are generally willing to accept the rules they create, whatever those rules 
might be.
TYLER, supra note 139, at 3.
149 See id. at 31 (analyzing studies demonstrating strong correlation between perceptions of legitimacy of legal systems and 
individual compliance); Kingsbury, supra note 79, at 355 (referencing studies linking compliance with legal rules to the 
perception that the rules are fair); FRANCK, supra note 145, at (theorizing that normative legal regimes are formed and 
perpetuated by transnational actors through series of socially derived procedures, and provided those procedures are widely 
perceived as fair, states tend to subordinate self-interest in favor of compliance).
150 See Williamson, supra note 20, at 74-77 (predicting compliance as a function of the degree of acceptance of the moral or 
substantive content of the norm within the domestic polity of the relevant state).
151
 FISHER, supra note 26, at 111 (“Other things being equal, the more elemental the rules are, the more inherent moral content 
there is and hence more . . . compliance . . . can be expected.”).
19
rules are fair.  Compliance failures, in turn, are attributable not to any failure to capture important 
normative principles but to failures of treaty drafters to specify clear primary rules,153 to the perceived 
unreasonableness of particular rules, or, most importantly, to perceptions of unfairness in the adjudication 
of disputes.  Finally, as understandings of the meanings of rules converge through practice, LT predicts 
that the legitimacy of, and compliance with, IHL should increase incrementally.154  To some degree, LT 
theory considers compliance with law to be a cultural preference promotable through fair procedural 
practice.
b.  Constructivism
In addition to the central premises of normative theories—that states are motivated by non-legal 
sources of obligation and that states will comply with international law even when to do so conflict with 
their material self-interest—constructivism posits the following: (1) states are not simply material 
creatures with pre-established preferences but are in fact ideational entities continuously reconstituted by 
the socially-generated values, morals, and ideas of the individuals and groups who form and direct 
them;155 (2) normative scripts of key individuals and groups are principally responsible for constructing 
states and investing them with preferences; (3) the constructive process is reciprocal and dynamic: the 
normative structure of the state is instilled in those who participate in its formation and direction;156 (4) 
politics is constructed at domestic and transnational levels, and preferences are flexible: individuals and 
groups in one state, through patterns of “persuasion, socialization, and pressure[,]” influence the 
normative perceptions and political agendae of their counterparts in other states;157 at the same time, state 
preferences are not immutable, and states actively and passively urge other states to reconstruct 
themselves and adopt their normative prescriptions;158 (5) legal rules qua rules do not independently 
generate compliance pull: laws are, in effect, “restate[ments] [of] social values and norms[,]”159 and 
individuals and states conform their conduct not to the formal content of rules but to a set of internalized 
norms that may or may not be reflected in formal legal regimes;160 and (6) to a large extent, compliance is 
a function of the congruence between operative norms and legal rules.
152 See FOX & MEYER, supra note 37, at 21 (describing IHL as a “series of unilateral engagements solemnly contracted before 
the world . . . which create obligations erga omnes . . . : they are moral, not merely legal obligations.”).
153 See BUTLER, supra note 23, at 195 (describing attacks on merchant vessels during the Gulf War as the result of uncertainty 
over the substantive content of legal obligations to neutrals).
154
 CHRIS GELPI, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF NORMS IN CRISIS BARGAINING 5 
(2003).
155 See Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 384, 384-85 (1994) 
(describing the role of norms in “constructing” the state). 
156 See generally PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, ED., THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN 
WORLD POLITICS (1996).
157 See MARGARET F. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 214 (1998) (discussing the 
reciprocal transnational effects of norm entrepreneurship and progressive discourses); see also FINNEMORE, supra note 140, at 
5-6 (arguing that NGOs transform state behaviors “not by constraining states with a given set of preferences from acting, but by 
changing their preferences.”).
158 See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist 
Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855, 878-82 (1998).
159
 E. Lutz & K. Sikkink, International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America, 54 INT’L ORG. 633, 656 (2000).
160 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2nd ed. 1994) (stressing that compliance requires an internal 
attitudinal commitment that in turn requires that the formal rules be consistent with normative values); Raustiala & Slaughter, 
supra note 66, at 504 (summarizing the constructivist argument that compliance requires that law comport with “internalized 
identities and norms of appropriate behavior”).
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Constructivism has left the terrain of IHL largely untilled.  Nonetheless, explanations and 
predictions of IHL compliance would seem to require, for constructivists, determinations of the extent to 
which the norms animating particular conventional and customary sources correspond with the 
preferences of key states and individuals as well as the extent to which those norms are faithfully 
reflected in formal rules of law.  Constructivism is vitally concerned with “who we are and what we want 
to become as a nation[,]”161 and provided states and key individuals have been “constructed” by, or 
conditioned to adhere to, a norm proscribing a method of warfare—i.e., assassination—and provided rules 
of law correspond to and tap into the normative prohibition, constructivism would predict that states 
would eschew the practice even if it is a substantively rational battle strategy.162  For constructivists, 
therefore, building a culture of IHL compliance requires a joint program of norm inculcation and legal 
engineering.
c.  Organizational-Cultural Theory
Organizational-cultural theory [“OCT”], a cluster of theories that disaggregate states and treat 
government bureaucracies, rather than states themselves, as the primary level of analysis of theoretical 
interest,163 has evolved from the presumption that bureaucracies are rational actors164 to more sophisticated 
models that account for state decisions through the analysis of the specific and idiosyncratic 
organizational culture165 in which relevant foreign policy behaviors are debated and advocated.  OCT 
posits that a common core of beliefs, values, and philosophies arises over time and specifies a code that 
dictates how a social group reacts to external stimuli and organizes its internal affairs; norms, rather than 
interests, drive the development of this organizational culture.166  In turn, each member is socialized 
through participation in his nomos167 and thus comes to internalize and espouse this culture and to 
conform his conduct to the expectations of the group.168  At the same time, the organizational cultures of 
certain social groups exert transformative influences upon other social groups and key individuals who 
161
 Seymour M. Hersh, Manhunt, NEW YORKER, Dec. 23, 2002, at 73.
162 See Michael N. Schmitt, State- Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17 YALE L. J. INT’L L. 609, 
631-32 (1992) (making a constructivist argument that a global norm precludes or slows recourse to assassination even when 
political killing might serve vital security interests and maximize national welfare).
163 See M.A. EAST, WHY NATIONS ACT 28-29 (1987) (tracing theoretical evolution in the study of international relations from 
the static level of analysis to the level of the governmental regime and the foreign policy bureaucracies).
164 See, e.g., GRAHAM ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION (1971) (elaborating an organizational theory of state behavior 
grounded in rational choice theory).
165 See LEGRO, supra note 55, at 4 (defining “organizational culture” as the hierarchy of beliefs that characterize the formal 
institutional structure of a given social group, profession, organization, or bureaucracy).
166 Id. at 19-20 (“What may seem completely irrational to an outsider may make perfect sense to those within a certain community 
. . . Buddhist monks setting themselves on fire or World War II Japanese pilots carrying out massive kamikaze attacks are 
difficult to understand unless seen through the lens of the particular cultural milieu in which those actions originated.”).  For a 
more general discussion of OCT, pitched as “global governance” theory and committed to the notion that networks of global 
governance, including bureaucracies, courts, regulatory agencies, and legislatures, are crucial to the evolution of normative legal 
architecture, see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
167 See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) (defining 
“nomos” as a “community of like-minded individuals sharing a way of life” and a “ world view”).
168 See LEGRO, supra note 55, at 23 (explaining that OCT “predict[s] that [behavior] will reflect and reaffirm [the] internal 
beliefs and customs” of the social group).  When members of social groups fail to behave in accordance with the expectations of 
the organizational cultures of their groups, the groups “reward and punish their members, either by withholding or conferring 
signs of group status and respect[.]”).  TYLER, supra note 139, at 23.  The pro-social normative pressure exerted by social 
groups is important in conforming behavior and is “similar to the influence of personal morality.”  Id.; see also ROBERT B. 
CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN PERSUASION (1984) (discussing the socialization of 
individuals into groups more generally).
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hold positions of authority both within states169 and across state boundaries via networks of professionals 
that form transnational epistemic communities around the nuclei of their domestic organizational 
cultures.170  Ultimately, OCT maintains that state preferences are neither predetermined nor dictated by 
rules but are created and shaped by the organizational cultures of those groups most salient to the issue-
area of international relations in question, and that state compliance choices are mediated and shaped by 
these organizational cultures.171
The armed forces of states monopolize the capacity to use force and possess virtually all the 
available military expertise.  Consequently, although civilian decisionmakers possess ultimate decisional 
authority in most states, national military bureaucracies [“NMBs”] are extremely influential social groups 
in respect to warfighting.  Organizational-cultural variables define the preferences of NMBs and “shap[e] 
how soldiers th[ink] about themselves, perceiv[e] the world, formulat[e] plans, advis[e] leaders, and [go] 
into action.”172  Although early OCT theorists predicted NMBs would invariably seek to maximize their 
autonomy and thus advocate to civilian decisionmakers conflict over peace and the use of all battle 
strategies over restraint,173 empirical data174 undermines this presumption and suggests to the contrary that 
NMBs routinely reject battle strategies that would directly contribute to victory for reasons rooted in 
organizational norms.175   In part this reciprocal restraint may be attributable to the disproportionate risk 
that decisions resulting in war or escalating the intensity of conflict impose upon the military caste 
relative to all other citizens:176 indeed, “the soldier above all prays for peace, for it is the soldier who must 
suffer and bear the deepest scars of war.”177  Even more important, however, is the fidelity that NMBs owe 
to the chivalric code that prescribes how, where, and when force may be used to subdue enemies and what 
methods and means may be employed to do so.
Since ancient times, certain acts committed during war, including the deliberate murder of 
civilians and the perfidious have been widely known to be “manifestly wrongful, on account of their 
flagrant inconsistency . . . with [the] professional character as an honorable [soldier.]”178  The medieval 
code of chivalry, which developed a detailed set of principles for the violation of which knighthood could 
169
 LEGRO, supra note 55, at 17 
170 See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3, 27 
(1992) (describing the process of transnational diffusion of the normative codes of “network[s] of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain” who function as “channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to 
governments as well as from country to country.”).
171
 Kingsbury, supra note 79, at 362-63.  OCT theory stresses that states are shaped by the organizational cultures of relevant 
social groups even as they exert reciprocal influence upon these groups.  See LEGRO, supra note 55, at 5 (“In formulating 
strategy, states must understand and influence, not only the opponent and the environment, but also the idiosyncratic beliefs of 
their internal stategy-making community.”).
172 Id. at 2.
173 Id. at 17-18 (examining early theories).
174
 The military organizational culture of a state is surveyed and measured by reviewing internal correspondence between civilian 
decisionmakers and senior military officers, military planning documents, manuals of military law and field regulations, and 
memoirs of key individual civilian decisionmakers and military personnel.  See, e.g., id. at 30.
175 See id. at 41-128 (explaining refusals of World War II belligerents to use unrestricted submarine warfare or chemical weapons 
and variance between decisions as to strategic bombing as grounded in the operative norms of of relevant NMBs).
176 See Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of International Law: Comment on Conference Papers, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 321, 326 
(2002) (“Military professionals have an interest in limiting the violence and savagery of warfare, because until the advent of 
bombing, and even since, they bear a disproportionate risk of becoming prisoners or casualties.”).  For a more general discussion 
of the principle of reciprocity in enforcing the behavioral norms of social groups, see GEORGE DALTON, TIRBAL AND 
PEASANT ECONOMIES 61-80 (1967).
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 General Douglas MacArthur.
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 MARK OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS 207 (1999).
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be stripped, further developed this martial code.179  Knights engaged in a casuistic process of self-
reflection and –criticism to determine whether particular acts breached this martial code.180  By the 
Renaissance a set of norms, internalized by a transnational professional caste requiring, inter alia, 
minimization of civilian casualties consistent with military objectives as a matter of honor,181 had perfused 
warfare.182  Further, the martial code, by rejecting the inhumanity of the enemy in favor of a conception of 
the foe as a fellow professional, directed the honorable soldier to renounce treachery and criminality in 
combating him,183 even if these tactics could be otherwise construed as rational.  As the martial code 
diffused and matured, a collective narrative developed to inform soldiers in the discharge of their duties; 
when in doubt, soldiers conformed to “stories about the great deeds of honorable soldiers” drawn from the 
“collective narrative of [their] corps.”184  In short, as a constituent aspect of their professional honor, 
soldiers are conditioned to accept risks by renouncing certain battle strategies,185 and it is this self-imposed 
commitment, undertaken as the price of membership in a global epistemic community,186 that upholds a 
common sociality and inspires adherence to the norms underlying IHL.187  Although variance exists across 
the range of NMBs, the chivalric code is a universal culture.188
For OCT then, predicting IHL compliance is a matter of determining the isomorphism between 
the formal rules of the legal regime and the behavioral dictates of the chivalric code: compliance 
correlates with congruence.  NMBs may well resist the use of lawful battle strategies and advocate 
unlawful strategies for reasons having little to do with IHL and everything to do with their organizational 
179 See MAURICE KEEN, NOBLES, KNIGHTS, AND MEN-AT-ARMS 51-59 (describing chivalric virtue as graciousness to 
vanquished foes in recognition of shared membership in an international brotherhood-at-arms).
180
 OSIEL, supra note 179, at 17.
181
 The concept of “honor” is now considered largely an anachronism in civil society but was once a “central construct in socio-
political thought and a commonplace in works of law and political philosophy.”  Allen Z. Hertz, Honour’s Role in the 
International States’ System, 31 DEN. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 113, 114 (2002).  Although definitions abound, most converge 
around the idea that honor signifies the “esteem, glory, or reverence that a man receives from his fellow men[.]”  ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 230 n.1 (Phillips Bradley ed., H. Rowe trans. 1953).
182 See OSIEL, supra note 179, at 31-32 (“[[Soldiers] ask themselves: ‘What is required of honorable soldiers, here and now?’ 
rather than ‘What does international law require[?]” . . . Martial honor ‘means doing nothing to tarnish that proud heritage’ of 
one’s unit, regiment, or branch of service[.]”).  Under the martial code, a soldier gauges his conduct by asking not whether it was 
legal but rather “[w]ould [my] actions pass muster if . . . evaluated by responsible, respectable soldiers of yesterday and today?”).  
James H. Toner, Teaching Military Ethics, 151 MIL. L. REV. 33, 37 (1993).
183
 In essence, the martial code fosters empathy for fellow martial professionals.  Dianne Guillemette, Legal Advisers in Armed 
Forces, in F. Kalshoven, Implementation of International Humanitarian Law 133, 144 (1989).
184
 OSIEL, supra note 179, at 21. This narrative identity is conferred largely by anecdotal reference to an accreting stock of stories 
that detail how heroic soldiers behaved in combat.  Id. (citing, as exemplary of such stories, Dept. of the Army, Values: A 
Handbook for Soldiers, sec. 2, Pamphlet 600 (Jan. 1987)).
185 See Statement of General Douglas MacArthur in Confirming the Death Dentence Imposed by a United States Military 
Commission on Japanese General Tomayuki Yamashita for Command Responsibility in the Murder of U.S. POWs, October 1946 
(“The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak and unarmed.   It is the very essence and reason for 
his being.  When he violates this sacred trust, he no only profanes his entire cult but threatens the very fabric of international 
society.  The traditions of fighting men are long and honorable.  They are based upon the noblest of human traits—sacrifice.”); 
see also FISHER, supra note 26, at 92 (“[S]oldiers are brought up to risk almost certain death rather than fail in their duty . . . 
even though there is no compensating chance of personal gain.”); Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22- A, 7 October 
1997, at para. 84 (holding that, by virtue of their special protective role, soldiers “are expected to exercise fortitude and a greater 
degree of resistance to a threat than civilians” and “by the very nature of their occupation . . . envisag[e] the possibility of violent 
death in pursuance of the cause for which they fight.”).
186 See Haas, supra note 171, at 1 (defining “epistemic community” as a  “network of professionals with recongized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain” as well as to a set 
of shared norms and practices to guide self-regulation); Goodman & Jinks, supra note 55, at 1783 (describing NMBs as a global 
epistemic community that adheres to prescriptive norms of conduct).
187 See RICHARD HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 5 (1983) (suggesting restraint in combat “d(oes) 
not stem from conscious articulation of principles of [IHL] so much as from a soldier’s honor[.]”).
188 See LEGRO, supra note 55, at 27, 149 (noting that although the code of chivalry is universal, the degree of concordance 
between the organizational cultures of NMBs and the chivalric code varies across the universe of states).
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cultures.189  OCT predicts that there are some battle strategies, such as the use of chemical weapons, that 
are universally rejected by a transnational consensus of NMBs.190  However, where the organizational 
culture of the NMB of the state in question is sufficiently deviant from the universal norms that inhere in 
the chivalric code,191 OCT directs investigators to treat this normative structure as significant in 
determining the range of battle strategies the NMB will advocate to civilian decisionmakers and to 
incorporate this variable in deriving compliance predictions.  
B.  Criticisms of Existing Pretheories
1. Realism
The realist assumptions that systemic variables alone are sufficient to explain state behavior, and 
that states pursue material self-interest, measured in power, to the exclusion of all other ends, are readily 
falsifiable.  States generally employ the least costly options that will secure their objectives, and 
cooperation is frequently preferable to unilateralist approaches.  Moreover, state policies change over 
time even in the absence of transformations in the systemic distribution of political and military 
capabilities, and consequently something other than power must have causal influence upon state 
preferences.192  Furthermore, not all states are as committed to power, or as agnostic with regard to the 
importance of norms, as realists would have us believe, and realism simply lacks any explanation for how 
states come by their preferences.193  Thus, unless international law boosts state power, realism cannot 
explain why states enter into treaties, particularly those that inhibit the accumulation and deployment of 
power as do IHL instruments, let alone pay them any heed during the clash of arms.
2. ET
Enforcement of law requires will and capacity, and many states are unwilling to muster either or 
both.  Evidence that the threat of punishment is often insufficient to deter noncompliance by powerful 
states whose military capacity largely immunizes their foreign policy decisions,194 as well as evidence that 
law-governed behavior can flourish even where no credible sanction can be imposed,195 leaves ET 
vulnerable to criticism as only slightly less ontologically primitive than realism.  
189 See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 55, at 1772 (noting that the U.S. policy of assassinating suspected terrorist leadership 
is lawful but has been opposed by senior members of the U.S. military bureaucracy on normative grounds).
190
 OCT theorists attribute a strong transnational aversion to the use of chemical weapons by NMBs to the widely-diffused view 
that chemical weapons are dishonorable, in that they kill indiscriminately and are largely indefensible, and foreign, inasmuch as 
their development and, to some extent, deployment is controlled by civilian scientists.  See LEGRO, supra note 55, at 150 
(summarizing this conclusion); see also Goodman and Jinks, supra note 55, at 1776 (stating that “[i]t has arguably become an 
unconditional feature of the modern state to forbear use of specific types of weapons[,]” such as chemical weapons, due to the 
overpowering influence of an opposed transnational military organizational culture).
191
 Explanations for deviance include national level variables (the political culture of the state) or governmental unit variables 
(group-level norms that motivate key decisionmakers) that are inconsistent with the chivalric code.  In other words, the normative 
structure of the state or decisional unit affects the organizational culture and state decisions.
192 See, e.g., ERIC SINGER & VALERIE HUDSON, ED., POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY 24 (1992) 
(“One of the most central criticisms of [realism] has been [its] inability to cope with change in a state’s policies.”).
193 See DAVID EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1953) 
(insisting that all theories of international relations, including realism must account for the formation of state preferences).
194 See FISHER, supra note 26, at 92 (“[O]f all the factors affecting President Kennedy and his advisers during the October 1962 
Cuban missile crisis, fear of possible punishment before a future Nuremburg Tribunal for having violated international law was 
not considered and, had it been raised, would have been dismissed out of hand.”).  States battling for their national survival are 
liberated from the threat of enforcement action: if they adhere to legal obligations but fail to survive, the question of enforcement 
is moot; if they violate the law and in so doing survive, whatever costs are imposed through enforcement measures are more than 
offset by the gains achieved through violation.
195 See YOUNG, supra note 10, at 18 (“Even when there are no public authorities and social pressures are absent, . . . compliance 
will sometimes emerge as a preferred option[.]”).
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3. Liberalism
The conclusion that liberal democratic states are more likely to comply with IHL than illiberal 
states is exceedingly difficult to prove, in part because the designation of particular states as liberal or 
illiberal is a subjective enterprise in which selection effects bias outcomes,196 and in part because most 
empirical studies have examined correlations between government regime type and war participation 
frequency, rather than IHL compliance.197  Although some scholars suggest that liberal states are more 
likely than illiberal states to accede to legal regimes, others question whether their willingness to do so is 
motivated by a desire to abide by their normative content as opposed to an interest in “satisfying the 
public face of international law” and appeasing domestic constituencies while surreptitiously carrying on 
as usual.198  Others query whether democratic states, because they are more tolerant of the proliferation of 
interest groups than illiberal states, are more prone to contestation over the process of incorporating legal 
obligations into the domestic framework and thus less likely to comply with legal regimes that, by virtue 
of their imprecision or ambiguity, are more vulnerable to self-serving interpretations.199  Still others note 
that even illiberal states comply with many of their obligations, including those to which they have 
acceded in issue-areas trenching in high politics, such as the use of force.200  Finally, liberalist scholars 
offer little to explain the microprocesses whereby the preferences of domestic groups and individuals 
transform the preferences of states in favor of IHL compliance.201
4. RCT
Although RCT presents a parsimonious explanation for state compliance with IHL, if the central 
postulate upon which it rests—that individuals are rational and equally endowed with fixed preferences 
for welfare maximization—is falsifiable or, at least, subject to conditions and limitations, its 
generalizability is suspect.202  Although nearly all decisionmakers will flee a burning house, they are 
differentiable even in regard to their responses to stark existential threats, and in respect to lesser-order 
challenges preferences vary tremendously in response to a host of non-material inputs, including social 
norms, emotions, cultural practices, and the need for identity, security, recognition, self-esteem, and 
justice.203  The world is home not only to homo economicus but to idiosyncratics, ideologues, fools, 
196 See Toril Aalberg, Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View, 33 J. PEACE RES. 1 (1996) (noting that the taxonomy of 
states into liberal and illiberal categories requires numerous subjective judgments and is fraught with selection bias).
197 See, e.g., Nils Petter Gleditsch, Democracy and Peace, 29 J. PEACE RES. 369 (1992) (finding that war participation rates do 
not vary as between democracies and non-democracies); BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1994) 
(recognizing that “democratic peace” theory has ignored the question of IHL compliance)
198 See, e.g., Jacqueline Alder & Gaul Lugten, Frozen Fish Block: How Committed are North Atlantic States to Accountability, 
Conservation and Management of Fisheries?, 26 MARINE POL’Y 345, 356 (2002); Hathaway, supra note 12, at 2016 
(suggesting that for some states, treaty ratification allows a state to express insincere support for treaty norms while diffusing 
domestic and international pressure to actually comply.  Some even suggest that, because accession often associates with 
reductions in compliance, and because liberal states are more likely to accede to treaties than illiberal states, a negative 
association exists between liberalism and compliance.  See, e.g., Moore, supra note 34, at 881.
199 See, e.g., Ho, supra note 24, at 663-83.
200 See Williamson, supra note 20, at 81 (indicating that many illiberal states, including “dictatorships,” comply with legal 
obligations under arms control and security agreements).
201
 For a constructivist critique of the inability of liberalism to account for the process whereby liberal states acquire and adapt 
their preferences, see KECK & KSIKKINK, supra note 158, at 214.
202 See Thomas Ulen, Rational Choice in Law and Economics, in Boudewijn Boukert & Geerit de Geest, eds., Encyclopedia of 
Law and Economics 790 (Edward Elgar 2000) (contending that this core assumption of RCT is indeed falsifiable).
203 See generally JOHN W. BURTON, CONFLICT: HUMAN NEEDS THEORY (1990).   For a critique of RCT as a reductionist 
approach, see William H. Riker, The Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory, 16 POL. PSCYH. 23 (1995); MARY ANN 
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wishful and delusional thinkers,204 altruists, martyrs, and those who actively prefer violence and misery to 
wealth and comfort,205 and many nonrational persons wend their ways into command of states and key 
institutions.206  Decisionmaking pathologies produce substantial deviation from RCT predictions, i.e., the 
decision by Saddam Hussein to remain in Kuwait and await a U.S.-led invasion in 1991 or the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor.  Moreover, even if one accepts the RCT premise that individuals are self-
interested, the complexity and uncertainty that characterize many foreign policy decisional environments 
force decisionmakers who lack relevant information to adopt “short-cuts to rationality” that produce 
systematic and motivated errors in judgment at variance with RCT predictions.207  People make mistakes, 
and some critics of RCT would go so far as to reverse the presumption and require decisionmakers to 
“establis[h] that their . . . decisions for war and peace are fully based on truly national and objective 
considerations, rather than expressing mere rationalizations of private emotional dispositions.”208  In sum, 
RCT critics insist that because state preferences vary as a function of variance in the preferences of key 
decisionmakers,209 and therefore explanations of state compliance with IHL are reducible to explanations 
of the foundations of the preferences of key decisionmakers with regard to that regime.210
5. Managerialism
The assumption that states comply with law because well-articulated and –managed legal regimes 
facilitate their collective interest in cooperation is controvertible in the case of IHL, a legal regime 
directed to the conduct of states that have placed themselves in the least cooperative posture imaginable.  
MT, committed to the notion of states as inherently cooperative, cannot explain why states deliberately 
choose to reject the constraints imposed by IHL and employ prohibited battle strategies in order to prevail 
over their adversaries, and the MT response—enhancement of monitoring and verification—is 
particularly ill-suited to addressing deliberate noncompliance.  States may simply be disinterested in 
cooperation during war no matter how clear the rules that purport to govern its conduct nor how well-
developed the mechanisms designed to spread information and thereby cooperation.  If so it may simply 
TETREAULT & CHARLES FREDERICK ABEL, DEPENDENCY THEORY AND THE RETURN OF HIGH POLITICS 14-
17 (1986) (arguing that foreign policy decisionmaking is “much less rational than we all pretend it is”).
204
 “Wishful thinking” is a motivated bias in which decisionmakers evaluate the probability of outcomes they prefer as more likely 
to occur, and the probability of outcomes they disfavor as less likely to occur, than rational analysis would suggest to be the case.  
See SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 268.
205 See DONALD A. SYLVAN & STEVE CHAN, EDS., FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING: PERCEPTION, 
COGNITION, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 2-3 (1984) (offering examples to reject the presumption of individual 
rationality).
206 See KEOHANE, supra note 109, at 72 (warning that RCT cannot be “applied mechanically” to the study of international 
relations because there are “sinners and saints” in the world); see also David G. Winter, Personality and Political Behavior, in 
SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 110 (stressing that the “intrusion of personal appetites, needs, fears, and obsessions g[i]ve a 
quality—irrational, self-defeating, and/or violently aggressive—to many [foreign policy decisions.]”).
207
 ROBERT M. JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION 113 (1976).  “Motivated errors” are judgments based not on 
objective evaluations of available evidence but on the basis of needs or desires.  SEARS ET AL, supra note 78, at 267.
208
 LLOYD S. ETHEREDGE, A WORLD OF MEN: THE PRIVATE SOURCES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 100 
(1978).  For many critics of RCT, “”assumptions about the inherent rationality of humans rests upon little, if any, foundation.” 
SINGER & HUDSON, supra note 193, at 24.
209 See Morrow, supra note 39, at 50 (“States vary greatly in their interest in supporting restrictions on violence during wartime.”).
210 Id. at 51 (attributing state decisions as to IHL compliance to the beliefs and moral judgments of their decisionmakers with 
respect to the substance of that regime).
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be the case that the policy guidance offered by MT is limited in its applicability to issue-areas in which 
states can enjoy material benefits from cooperative behavior, such as trade or environmental protection.211
6. Reputational Theory
RT has been challenged as limited in its theoretical reach to those issue-areas in which states 
value a reputation.  Although a reputation for honesty, fairness, and cooperation is valuable in economic 
and diplomatic transactions because other states will refrain from dealing with states that do not possess 
such characteristics, in the issue-area of armed conflict such a reputation may actually be perceived as a 
weakness, and states may actually prefer a reputation “for toughness or even for being willing to bully 
weaker states, more than they value reputations for compliance.”212  Critics of RT suggest that when the 
potential gains for violating law are great enough, particularly in comparison to the probable reputational 
costs that must be absorbed for pursuing self-interest, reputational concerns shrink to nothing.213  In regard 
to the use of force, where the stakes are greatest, even some RT scholars admit that reputation is all but 
irrelevant.214
7. TLP
Nearly every state has incorporated all the primary instruments of IHL.  If, as TLP contends, 
compliance is a function of the degree to which a given legal regime is internalized in domestic law, 
states should reflexively and uniformly obey IHL.  Because practice contradicts this prediction, it is 
reasonable to question whether in fact the norms expressed in the rules elaborated by IHL instruments are 
internalized, and whether incorporation is necessarily, as TLP theorists believe, instructive in any 
meaningful sense as to how much legitimacy is to be imputed to the relevant norms.  The principle 
shortcomings of TLP theory are that it fails to treat the process of norm incorporation as the proper 
subject of inquiry and that it leaves unexplored the mechanisms whereby norms change behavior or 
attitudes.  As a consequence, TLP cannot offer insights into why and when states comply with IHL and is 
left simply presuming that they do notwithstanding evidence to the contrary.
8. LT
If LT is arguably more than simply the bare assertion that nations obey the law, it is not a testable 
theory.  Mere observation of state compliance without an explanatory model is a descriptive, but not a 
nomothetic, statement of the relationship between law and behavior.  LT builds no causal bridge between 
the norms of procedural fairness it identifies as essential to the legitimacy of international legal rules and 
211 See Downs et al, supra note 26, at 391 (reaching this conclusion); see also Raustiala, supra note 27, at 405-08 (criticizing MT 
as “dangerously contaminated by selection problems” for failing to draw cases from a range of issue-areas, including security and 
armed conflict, that would more appropriately represent the entire spectrum of international relations); Moore, supra note_, at 
1832-33 (“As long as one is only interested in coordination games, [MT] provides a good guide for compliance and national 
behavior.”).
212
 Keohane, supra note 77, at 497.  Skeptics of RT note that legal commitments involving national security are qualitatively 
different from those in other issue-areas and are, in some sense, made to be broken: because all states are presumably prepared to 
do whatever necessary to ensure their physical survival, other states discount the reliability of commitments that would limit 
states in this regard, and consequently do not impose significant reputational costs for their violation. See, e.g., Richard Baxter, 
International Law in “Her Infinite Variety,” 29 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 551 (1980).
213 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 86, at 1135-36.
214 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1883-84 (conceding that “[t]he value of a reputation for compliance with international 
commitments is rarely large enough to affect the outcome when decisions are of such magnitude.”); id. at 1885 (“The most 
promising fields of study [for RT] . . . are those in which reputational effects are likely to affect behavior”  such as environmental 
or economic issues, but the “great questions of war . . . and [peace]” are likely beyond its explanatory reach).
27
their effects upon decisionmakers who must make compliance decisions, and as a consequence it is 
unable to elaborate any testable explanatory hypotheses.215
9. Constructivism
By offering slightly more insight into the pathways whereby norms alter preferences and give rise 
to formal legal regimes, constructivism does permit the generation of some testable hypotheses.  
However, just as is LT, constructivism is grossly underspecified: no account is offered for the process 
whereby norms are acculturated and linked with individual decisions, and constructivists simply offer a 
loose explanation that relies on the workings of international civil society as a sort of deus ex machina.216
What is worse, constructivism rests upon a contestable assumption regarding human and state nature.  
Constructivists tacitly assume that the norms that come to predominate in the construction of individual 
and state preferences will invariably motivate the transformation from power and self-interest toward 
greater transnational cooperation.  Throughout human history, destructive ideologies and the lust for 
power have proven at least as susceptible of proliferation, and it is equally plausible that individual and 
state preferences strongly favoring the self-interested maximization of power may emerge, diffuse 
through the international system, and prove fatal to law-governed cooperation.217  Moreover, not all 
individuals are as amenable to construction as are others, and some actively resist normative 
socialization.218  Although the potential that individuals and states can be “constructed” by norms 
destructive of law and international civil society neither precludes compliance with IHL nor invalidates 
constructivism, it does demonstrate the need for additional theoretical articulation and substantiation.
10. OCT
OCT offers a coherent explanation for state compliance with rules of IHL that are congruent with 
the martial code, and predicts state compliance where both the martial code and IHL either prohibit the 
battle strategy in question (states will not employ the strategy) or permit it (states will employ the 
strategy).  However, OCT cannot explain instances where NMBs refrain from battle strategies that, while 
prohibited by positive law, are clearly permissible under the martial code.  If organizational culture is the 
independent variable, one would expect NMBs to discount the significance of IHL in favor of 
organizational preferences.  Moreover, OCT theory cannot explain noncompliance with rules that mirror 
the commandments and injunctions of the martial code without incorporating levels of analysis 
exogenous to the NMB.  Some individuals and groups may simply be resistant to socialization and thus 
impervious to the influence of organizational-cultural norms.  Perhaps most significantly, OCT is unable 
to explain instances where NMBs refrain from employing battle strategies permissible under both the 
martial code and IHL without importing variables from levels of analysis that are conceptually distinct 
from organizational culture.   In short, to explain and predict IHL compliance it is not enough simply to 
215
 For a critique of LT, see Kingsbury, supra note 79, at 356-57.
216 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 31, at 42 (examining this deficiency in constructivist theory).
217 See Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 635 (2004) (querying whether 
constructivists might in fact be destructive of legal norms and institutions).
218 See LEROY N. RIESELBACH & GEORGE I. BALCH, PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS 6 (1968) (describing the individual 
as a “distinct, autonomous person whose behavior, while influenced by the cultural and social situations in which he finds 
himself, will reflect the kind of individual he is . . . . [He] is by no means a helpless pawn, pushed and pulled by cultural and 
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gauge the goodness of fit of the formal legal rules to the organizational culture the rules are meant to 
govern; rather, the causes and effects of organizational culture must themselves be problematized.
C.  Compliance Decisionmaking and the Inadequacy of Existing Theories
Notwithstanding their individual merits, all existing theories are hobbled by structural biases that 
obscure human agency.  Realists and adherents of ET and RCT characterize individuals as simply rational 
calculators of the relationship between state self-interests and compliance, while theorists of all other 
stripes treat them as, to greater or lesser degree, mere captives of rules embedded in regimes, institutions, 
and patterned cultural imperatives.  Although subnational and supranational actors wax ever more 
important, the question of IHL compliance is ultimately directed to the question of responsibility for 
decisions, and neither the international system, nor states, nor domestic interest groups, nor bureaucracies 
have the capacity to elect compliance or noncompliance.219  The sole entities with the capacity to exercise 
choice are individuals, and only those individuals with the authority and power to commit the state are 
directly relevant to the study of compliance generally and IHL compliance in particular.220  People, and 
not abstractions such as organizations, cultures, interest groups, states, or systems,221 decide whether or 
not to comply with law, and even if individual preferences, attitudes, or values are derived from these 
entities these determinants of behavior constitute personality-based individual-level variables that may 
account for much of the systematic variance in compliance as between decisionmakers and, in turn, as 
between the states on behalf of which they decide.  If so—if failures of compliance are often due to 
“indiscipline, ignorance, and cruelty”222 among other personality-based factors—a robust theory of human 
agency is essential to any explanation or prediction of state compliance with IHL.
This is not to suggest that other levels of analysis are theoretical blind alleys.  The decision 
whether to comply with IHL is a question of foreign policy, and foreign policy is no more simply a 
question of personality than it is simply a question of power.  The manner in which organizational 
machinery conditions and shapes individual preferences, as well as the political features of the 
government regime, the national and cultural attributes of the society in which the individual makes 
decisions, and the opportunities and constraints yielded and imposed by the distribution of power and 
resources in the international system all exert causal influences on individual decisions with regard to 
compliance with law, and each of these levels of analysis223 must be investigated, operationalized, and 
social forces.”); see also NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 284 (1978) (reminding that 
“any account of rules and norms and standards of conduct must . . . take account of those who operate with these norms.”).
219 See YOUNG, supra note 10, at 4 (insisting that all entities other than individuals behave in accordance “with the dictates of 
some genuine actor and need not be dealt with separately in any study of compliance.”).
220 See id. at 41 (“[The] special feature of the compliance problem of collective entities is the question of who is ultimately 
responsible for violations[,]” and “it is ultimately the actions of individuals which determine the external behavior of collective 
entities.”).
221 See JAMES N. ROSENAU, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 88 (1961) (describing the state as an 
“abstraction from the pattern of behavior shown by persons.”)
222
 BUTLER, supra note 23, at 195.
223
 For a presentation, description, and discussion of the various “levels of analysis” that scholars have created as conceptual 
categories to organize the study of international relations, see EAST, supra note 164 (enumerating five primary levels of 
analysis—personal characteristics of decisionmakers, structures of government units, political features of regimes, national 
attributes of societies, and properties of the international system).
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integrated into a theoretical model if its full explanatory and predictive potential is to be realized.224  By 
the same token, neglect of the structure in which decisions are made can ignore important constraints 
within which decisionmakers identify and select between choices.  All levels of analysis are necessary, 
and no one level is sufficient.  The objective of long-term research programs should be to build bridges 
between the various levels of analysis rather than to force a choice between them.225  The complexity of 
the phenomenon under analysis generates natural resistance to reductionism.
Nevertheless, the most determinate of explanations requires that theoretical relationships between 
be established at the most specific level of analysis at which investigation is possible.  Because none of 
the existing theories accord significant theoretical weight to the individual decisionmaker, the 
determinacy and explanatory power of resulting explanations suffer accordingly.  If individual-level 
variables were not investigable, or not determinable, or if the results of experiments at the individual level 
of analysis were not generalizeable, failures to incorporate these variables into theories of IHL 
compliance would be defensible.  If, however, the tendency to give short shrift to the role of individuals 
in the study of legal compliance results from a lack of capacity to employ requisite methodologies drawn 
primarily from other disciplines,226 or, worse, the unwillingness to invest the labor and time necessary to 
acquire training in these methodologies and disciplines, the sacrifice of explanatory capacity in the name 
of convenience and parsimony is, to put it mildly, “particularly troubling.”227  Whatever the reasons, it is 
no longer adequate to simply speculate as to the existence and importance of the individual-level 
variables that are causally related to state compliance with IHL228 or, still worse, to assume, because they 
are difficult to observe and measure, that they are irrelevant.229
224 See SEARS et al, supra note 78, at 253 (stressing that individual-level variables do not provide a logically complete 
explanation of state behavior); see also FARRELL, supra note 32, at 43 (stating that each level of analysis must be addressed and 
accorded a relative measure of potency in the development of a theory of foreign policy behavior).
225
 LINDA O. VALENTY & OFER FELDMAN, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP FOR THE NEW CENTURY (19).
226 See FRED W. GREENSTEIN, PERSONALITY AND POLITICS 2 (1969) (suggesting that many scholars ignore the role of 
personality because they “do not feel equipped to analyze personality in ways that meet their intellectual standards[.]”).
227
 Daniel L. Byman & Kenneth M. Pollack, Let Us Now Praise Great Men, 25 INT’L SEC. 107, 108 (2001). Some scholars go so 
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The geopolitical history of the 20th century is inexplicable without reference to Wilson, Hitler, 
Stalin, Churchill, Roosevelt, Reagan, Gorbachev, and Hussein, and the “policymaking community in 
Washington takes it as an article of faith that who is the prime minister of Great Britain, the chancellor of 
Germany, or the king of Saudi Arabia has real repercussions for the United States and the rest of the 
world.”230  That this is so is because people, not states, make decisions, and because people, not states, are 
the primary actors in the international system. Personality231 matters in international relations and in 
international law, and war, along with the decisions regarding its commencement, prosecution, and 
conclusion, may well “begin[] in the minds of men”232 and women.  If so—if “what you decide depends 
ultimately upon who you are”233—then the answers to the “‘why?” questions in international relations”234
and international law will remain beyond our ken unless and until we accept this methodological 
imperative and turn inward to probe the decisionmaking process itself.  While the proposition that 
individuals are indispensable to the explanation of their decisions235 might strike some observers as 
intuitively obvious, it is one thing to sense that personality is crucial, but quite another to specify how, 
when, and above all why it is so.  What we suspect is greater than what we know.  A worthwhile theory of 
IHL compliance must offer a precise and accurate description of compliance decisions, a parsimonious 
yet valid explanation of compliance and noncompliance, and the promise of reliable prediction.  
Accordingly, Part II elaborates a positive theory236 that treats state decisions and judgments regarding 
compliance with the sub-regime of IHL governing the resort to self-defense as dependent variables 
explainable by the incorporation of individual-level independent variables within the chain of causation.
II. A Personality Theory of IHL Compliance
A.  Personality Theory
1. Political Psychology
The century-old237 field of political psychology [“PP”] posits the individual as not merely causally 
significant but rather as central to explanations and predictions of the political behavior of collective 




 “Personality” is the unique and systematic pattern of cognitive, affective, and behavioral functioning that each individual 
manifests in response to a range of internal and environmental stimuli.  JERROLD M. POST, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
MEASUREMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERS 69 (2003).  Although personalities can be classed into typologies, individual 
personality is as unique as a fingerprint and remarkably stable over a range of behaviors and inputs and over time.  Id. Personality 
theory contends that a strong causal relationship exists linking personality with decisional style and preferences.  See, e.g., 
ROSENAU, supra note 222, at 89.
232 See supra note *.
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 ETHEREDGE, supra note 209, at 39.
234
 RICHARD C. SNYDER, H.W. BRUCK, & BURTON SAPIN, EDS., FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING 33 (1962).
235 See Raymond Birt, Personality and Foreign Policy: The Case of Stalin, 14 POL. PSYCH 607, 608-09 (1987) (elaborating the 
“actor indispensability” thesis: that unless the same foreign policy decision would be made by all decisionmakers the role of 
personality is important in explaining decisions).
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 A “positive” theory is distinct from a normative theory in that it attempts to state what is, and not what ought to be, and thus is 
falsifiable.  See JAMES N. ROSENAU, COMPARING FOREIGN POLICIES 17 (1972).  A positive theory includes a 
specification of constructs or concepts, a set of hypotheses, and criteria for explanation of behavior.
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 The earliest political psychological theorization was conducted in the early 20th century by famed Viennese psychiatrist 
Sigmund Freud, who postulated that political decisionmakers displaced their motives onto the public and rationalized this 
displacement in terms of the public interest.  See HAROLD LASWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 75-76 
(1930).
238 See SINGER & HUDSON, supra note 193, at 256 (regarding the human decisionmaker as “much more than a mere 
idiosyncracy or a dismissable random error term in a formal equation”).
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world around them.239  Although variables drawn from other levels of analysis factor into explanations of 
the behavior of the social abstractions called “states,” because it is individual political elites, and not 
states, who develop and implement the policies that shape the political universe,240 PP regards all political 
behavior as the consequence of the complex interaction of psychological phenomena in the minds of the 
individuals responsible for those policies.241 Thus, viewed through the prism of PP it is the psychology of 
individual decisionmakers that is the orienting focus for the study of international relations.  Because the 
psychologies of decisionmakers have consequential correlates, and because each individual is endowed 
with a unique personal psychology, PP dictates a research agenda that can explain how “who” the 
decisionmaker is translates into the decisions he has made and will make.  Accordingly, the political 
psychologist must (1) develop a theory of personality that models the causal relationship between relevant 
psychological variables and foreign policy decisions and accounts for variance across the broadest 
possible range of decisionmakers, (2) assess the relative potency of variables from other levels of analysis 
in terms of their contribution to decisional latitude or constraint, and integrate them into the theory.
2.  General Premises and Assumptions
“Personality” refers to the “all aspects of an individual qua individual”242 that influence his 
behavior.243  Within personality theory [“PT”], each individual is an aggregate of a unique complex of 
constructs that drive a constant process of selection from among decisional alternatives.  Choices are 
made to satisfy internal motivational, valuational, or attitudinal dispositions and preferences and to 
preserve desirable aspects or alter undesirable aspects of the environment as understood through the 
unique frame of reference supplied by the decisionmaker’s personality, and it is this personality that 
dictates the substance and process of these choices and yields behavioral and consequential effects.244
Although PT regards decisions as deliberate and conscious, it emphatically does not presume 
rationality.245  In making decisions, individuals are obligated to perform a series of complex tasks, 
including the search for information, the ordering of preferences, the development of decisional 
239
 “The individual, far from being a mechanism manipulated by forces such as the ‘national interest’ or ‘power relationships,’ is a 
significant independent factor in the decisionmaking process.”  PATRICK J. McGOWAN & HOWARD B. SHAPIRO, THE 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY 53 (1973).
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 PT assumes that through decisionmaking “individuals contribute to the situations they encounter” and “modify the 
situation[s][.]”  DAVID MAGNUSSON, PERSONALITY AT THE CROSSROADS: CURRENT ISSUES IN 
INTERACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 20 (1977).  Although strategic position, domestic politics, and other constraints matter, the 
political elites invested with decisional authority can generally transcend these factors and exercise direct influence on state 
behavior by choosing and implementing national strategies.  See generally SNYDER ET AL., supra note 235.
241 See LAWRENCE S. FALKOWSKI, PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 304 (1979) 
(differentiating PP from disciplines that presume causation to flow in the opposite direction—i.e., that individual decisions are 
caused by the influence of variables at higher levels of sociopolitical organization).  Although it recognizes that social and 
systemic variables exert reciprocal influence on individual decisionmakers, PP regards the causative pathway primarily directed 
from individuals outward.  Id. 
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 MARGARET G. HERMANN, A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS 2 (1977).
243 See LEROY N. RIESELBACH & GEORGE I. BALACH, PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS 6 (defining personality as “what . 
. . the individual . ..  brings into the behavioral situation.”).
244 See SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 21 (postulating that every decisional alternative is “associated with a set of beliefs about 
the outcomes that are potentially associated with each alternative” and are “idiosyncratic to every decision-maker.”).
245 See ROSENAU, supra note 222, at 195 (describing decisions as “more or less deliberate and conscious choices” but refraining 
from characterizing decisionmaking as a rational process); see also JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, THE CYBERNETIC THEORY 
OF DECISION: NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS 138 (contending that decisions made under conditions of 
complexity and uncertainty cannot be explained by RCT).
32
alternatives, and the making of choices,246 and most are simply incapable of absorbing sufficient 
information and undertaking adequate evaluation to reach decisions that consistently maximize their 
welfare, or that of their constituents.247  The human mind is a limited instrument, and under conditions of 
uncertainty and complexity individuals must simplify the decisionmaking process to avoid cognitive 
overload and reach closure.248  As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explains,
During fast-moving events those at the center of decisions are overwhelmed by floods of reports 
compounded by conjecture, knowledge, hope, and worry.  These must be sieved through their own 
preconceptions.  Only rarely does a coherent picture emerge; in a sense coherence must be imposed on 
events by the decisionmaker[.]249
To lighten their burdens, decisionmakers unconsciously resort to heuristic mechanisms that 
conserve mental resources by creating shortcuts to judgments.250  These various mechanisms—beliefs, 
images, values, experiences, motivations, attitudes, perceptions, operational codes, and traits—represent 
the basic constituents of personality and function as the primary determinants of decisions.  Identifying 
the relevant set of mechanisms, or constructs, operative in the decisionmaking context affords valuable
insight into the explanation and prediction of behavior.251  Establishing the process whereby these 
mechanisms influence decisional tasks permits the generation of testable propositions and the 
development of a theory.252  To explain and predict behavior thus requires the conceptualization of the 
role of personality with behavioral referents for specific constructs.
c. Personality Constructs
a. beliefs
“Beliefs” are internalized scripts about the nature of reality and about expected or preferred future 
outcomes253 that create a set of cognitive predispositions that shape the manner in which incoming 
information is processed and interpreted.254  Individuals acquire a systematic tendency to see what they 
expect to see on the basis of the content of beliefs that they acquire early in life255 and which exert great 
influence upon
the individual’s interpretation of events, and thus the individual’s identification of when there is a need or 
opportunity for making a choice; the individual’s choice and use of information, the individual’s definition 
of what constitutes realistic alternative courses of action, and what values are considered in a choice 
between alternative(s) . . . [Beliefs] influence the actor’s definition of both the objectives and alternative 
246 See ALEXANDER GEORGE, PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EFFECTIVE USE OF 
INFORMATION AND ADVICE 10 (enumerating decisional tasks).
247 See YAACOV Y.I. VERTZBERGER, THE WORLD IN THEIR MINDS: INFORMATION PROCESSING, COGNITION, 
AND PERCEPTION IN FOREIGN POLICY 21 (1990) (noting that the inability to process information opens decisionmakers to 
the prospect of “bias and error” that yield “particularly serious consequences such as loss of life, material damage, and wounded 
national morale[.]”).
248 See CHARLES F. HERMAN, CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR., & JAMES N. ROSENAU, EDS., NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE 
STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY 210-11 (describing heuristic techniques decisionmakers use to simplify decisional tasks).
249
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250
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CHI. L. REV. _ (2004).
251
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 Beliefs are essentially statements about relationships between cause and effect.  See DANIEL HERADSTVEIT, THE ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT: PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSTACLES TO PEACE 20 (1979) (“If a man perceives some relationship 
between two things or between some thing and a characteristic of it, he is said to hold a belief.”).
254
 SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 264.
255 See JERVIS, supra note 208, at 281 (tracing beliefs and perceptions to early first-hand experiences).
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courses of action available to his opponent, and the actor’s perception of the likely consequences of his 
own and his opponent’s actions.256
Individuals are systematically more receptive to information that is consistent with their beliefs 
than to information that contradicts them, and decisionmakers are prone to selectively process 
information in such a manner as to lend support to their belief systems,257 particularly under conditions of 
situational complexity, informational uncertainty, lack of historical guidance, time pressure, and stress.258
Relevant actors seek information and then structure reality in a manner consistent with their beliefs and in 
so doing selectively ignore or fail to integrate necessary information, building bias into their 
decisionmaking.259 When confronted with repeated inconsistencies between belief systems and the 
empirical world, individuals, to avoid cognitive dissonance, must either modify their beliefs or disconfirm 
the validity of inconsistent information.  However, so powerful are beliefs in dictating perceptions and 
decisions that individuals exhibit a strong tendency to resist adaptation and to structure their interactions 
with other actors in a manner consistent with the content of their beliefs regardless of contrary empirical 
evidence.260
In other words, beliefs are remarkably stable conceptual anchors that resist reality, and it is the 
variance in the constellations of beliefs that constitute individual personalities that explains, in some 
measure, variance in diagnostic and decisional propensities.  Beliefs may be hierarchically organized 
around a small set of master beliefs, and operational code and cognitive mapping models261 suggest that 
the most central, stable, consistent, and, therefore, theoretically relevant beliefs as regards theories of 
international relations are those concerning the fundamental nature of human beings (good or evil), the 
nature of politics (conflictual or cooperative, malleable or predetermined, predictable or unpredictable), 
the value of human life, the role of chance, and the nature of the opponent.262
b.  images
“Images” are the accumulated understandings about himself and the world an individual 
organizes into an affective and evaluative structure to simplify decisionmaking.263  Although images may 
reflect empirical reality, they are subjective interpretations: individuals “respon[d] not only to the 
‘objective’ characteristics of a situation, but also to the meaning the situation has for [the]m.”264
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260 See MICHAEL BRECHER, CRISES IN WORLD POLITICS 12 (1993).
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262 See, e.g., David G. Winter, Margaret G. Hermann, Walter Weibtraub, & Stephen G. Walker, The Personalities of Bush and 
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 JOHN C. FARRELL & ASA P. SMITH, EDS., IMAGE AND REALITY IN WORLD POLITICS 16 (1967).
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Perhaps the most relevant image is the stereotype, defined as
a simplistic, unsophisticated belief about an individual or group that can be used to determine the proper 
way to think about individuals or groups and to enable decisionmakers to fit a broad range of events into 
well-defined, narrow categories, allowing speed and economy of mental effort . . . and justifi[cation of] 
particular patterns of behavior and thinking[.]265
Stereotypes artificially rationalize decisions by attributing admirable qualities to allies and venality to 
opponents, thus enhancing perceptions of the probabilities of success while introducing bias and 
increasing the likelihood of decisional failure.266
Stereotypes of other actors may be the master key to understanding foreign policy 
decisionmaking.267  If states are external abstractions that can only be experienced as an internal function, 
it is logical that images of states should reflect the personalities of those who experience and construct 
them.268  Empirical evidence suggests that the pattern of behavior directed toward a given state is 
congruent with the images held by the decisionmaker about the given state: a positive image corresponds 
with friendly, cooperative behavior, whereas a negative image corresponds with hostile, conflictual 
behavior.269  In short, the image of a state or other actor held by the decisionmaker firmly guides his 
selection of decisional alternatives with respect to that state or actor.
c.  values
“Values” are normative statements about behaviors, objects, and situations that are situated along 
a relative continuum, superimposed upon information, and used to evaluate information.270 Values are 
interwoven with beliefs and images but can be modeled as separate causal factors.
d.  attitudes
“Attitudes,” defined as ideational formations having affective and cognitive dimensions that 
create a disposition for a particular pattern of behavior toward categories of objects and social 
situations,”271 are, like values, intimately connected to images and beliefs.  Individuals tend to discard 
information incongruent with their attitudes and to search for information that supports attitudinal 
proclivities.272  The most theoretically significant attitudes as identified in foreign policy research tend to 
be those which create predispositions to feel or act positively or negatively toward other states.273
e.  traits
“Traits” are the “public, observable element of personality, the consistencies of style readily 
noticed by other[s]” that “reflect the language of ‘first impressions,’ the adjectives and adverbs of 
everyday language that we used to describe other people.”274  Trait theorists maintain that factors such as 
energy level, self-confidence, communication style, organizational capacity, impulsivity, sociability, 
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emotional expressiveness, intelligence, extraversion, and sensitivity275 are stable behavioral dispositions 
that exert latent influence upon individual choices and behaviors.276
f.  motives
“Motives” are latent dispositions that direct decisionmakers to define situations, make evaluative 
judgments, mobilize energy and resources, and selectively pursue end states in the empirical world.277
Researchers identify needs for power, achievement, and affiliation as among the most theoretically 
important motives in explaining decisionmaking in international relations.278
g.  summary
Whether scholars incorporate beliefs, images, values, attitudes, traits, motives, or other 
personality constructs in their decisionmaking models, each term references a mechanism operant in the 
mind of an individual faced with uncertainty and time constraints which filters, orders, simplifies, and 
explains the political universe while facilitating the task of identifying, evaluating, and selecting from 
between decisional alternatives.  For purposes of simplicity and clarity, the general term “personality 
construct” references each of the various elements of personality described herein.
d. Measuring Personality
Problems with data access hamper the development and testing of a PT model of decisionmaking.  
Attempts to specify the manner in which personality translates into foreign policy decisions require the 
opening of the black box of the decisional unit to ascertain precisely what decisionmakers think, say, and 
do during the decisionmaking process, yet this is generally impossible prior to the declassification of 
official records.  Moreover, public officials tend to zealously guard national and personal secrets, and 
what data leaks to the research and lay communities, such as memoirs, retrospective accounts, and 
secondary source materials, tend to be less than completely reliable,279 particularly while principals are 
still alive.280  Similarly, assessments of the link between personality and foreign policy decisionmaking 
which rely on literature reviews, insider interviews, and biographies, are subject to validity problems due 
to temporal and spatial distance from the subject, deliberate or unintentional deception, faulty interview 
designs, and human fallibility.281  Content analysis has been utilized as an alternative form of personality 
measurement in all the major studies which have applied PT to foreign policy analysis,282 yet it too is 
beset with validity problems.  Speeches, interviews, and private conversations may not reflect the true 
beliefs, images, or values of decisionmakers or offer a faithful guide to their personalities.283
Establishing the role of personality in the decisionmaking process requires a measurement 
protocol.  Direct measurement is possible through interviews by psychiatrists and psychologists, direct 
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observation, and formal tests.  However, unless decisionmakers submit to psychometric testing or clinical 
anamnesis,284 personality must be inferred from behavior.  The “psychobiographical approach,” or 
“assessment at a distance,”285 establishes an a priori measurement protocol and then gathers all possible 
sources, including letters, speeches, interviews, documents, newspapers, autobiographies, anecdotal 
evidence, and direct observation data, to generate an explicit, valid, and reliable assessment of 
personality.286   Psychobiographers engage in an iterative process of data collection, aggregation, and 
testing, comparing each source to the others, to judge the reliability and validity of empirical data.287  PT 
scholars draw upon this psychobiographical data to “score” decisionmakers on those personality 
constructs hypothesized to give rise to variance in the political behaviors under analysis, with the ultimate 
objective the explanation of how particular combinations of personality constructs, known as “personality 
profiles,” direct decisionmakers to elect particular decisions and, in turn, produce specific behaviors.288
5.  Conditionality and Contingency: Other Levels of Analysis
The relationship between personality and state behavior is one of contingency: assertions of 
causality are couched by PT theorists as true only in some cases and under certain conditions, and caution 
must be exercised when generalizing from their findings.289  Individuals make decisions within a wide 
range of decisional environments, and they are constrained and influenced, to greater or lesser extent, by 
external political, economic, and social realities,290 as well as by the culture of relevant governmental 
bureaucracies291 and domestic public opinion.  Although more powerful states face fewer external 
limitations than weaker states, and hegemons face even fewer, no state, and therefore no decisionmaker, 
is omnipotent.  However, the influence of exogenous constraints is bounded.
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The role occupied by the individual is relevant to assessing the weight attributable to personality 
in PT.  The individual at the apex of the state hierarchy is invested with maximum decisional autonomy,292
and may be more impervious to other inputs than previously imagined293 even if he or she does not 
command an authoritarian regime.294  Head decisionmakers [“HDs”],295 whether by the textual 
commitments of constitutions or by tradition, are invested with the greatest quantum of power relative to 
other domestic actors in the field of foreign policy,296 and as decisional freedom increases the role of 
exogenous constraints diminishes.
Furthermore, situational context is crucial, and constraints ebb with the nature of the impetus 
toward decisionmaking, and with the issue-area in question.  During situations of heightened ambiguity, 
instability, and uncertainty, PT accords far greater causal weight to personality constructs than to other 
variables,297 and an absence of precedent, increased time constraints, and increased emotional stress 
further diminish the theoretical significance of exogenous factors.298  Responsibility follows power, and 
HDs, upon whom the ultimate responsibility for power rests heavily, tend to rely less upon external 
sources of guidance when their state is subject to external threat.  Because the role of government 
bureaucracies and the influence of domestic opinion contracts during conditions of ambiguity or 
292 See HERMANN, supra note 243, at 2 (identifying the head-of-state, the “individual who has the authority to commit the 
resources and select the goals of a political unit, and, in turn, to affect its policies,” as the focal point of the analysis of foreign 
policy decisionmaking).  Even the most liberal of states repose great power and decisional autonomy in their heads of state.  See 
POST, supra note 232, at 1452 (“Modern democracies place individuals at their helm with access to immense power and, of 
necessity, grant them enormous discretion in its use.”).
293 See SHAI FELDMAN, U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY: THE DOMESTIC SETTING 20 (1988) (“[Head decisionmakers] 
don’t act contrary to their beliefs because of domestic political constraints . . . They may adjust, they may moderate their 
positions, they may manipulate . . . decisions, so they may look one way before an election and they may look another way after 
an election . . . but that is different from manipulating . . . policy.”); see also STEVEN L. SPIEGEL, THE OTHER ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT: MAKING AMERICA’S MIDDLE EAST POLICY FROM TRUMAN TO REAGAN 10 (1985) (stating 
that domestic interest groups constrain and influence foreign policy but do not alter presidential decisions and that “in the end, 
policy can be understood only by examining an administration’s foreign policy priorities, philosophical assumptions, decision-
making system, and key personalities.”).
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 Even in the most rational, mature, rule-of-law democracies, the head decisionmaker wields significant foreign policy 
decisional authority. See GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 3 (“If some higher power had set out to design a democracy in which 
the individual on top mattered, the result might well resemble the American political system.”).
295
 Although enriched theories of state behavior require an account of the influence of the personalities of individuals other than 
HDs, such as generals, diplomats, and key religious authorities, PT has centered its research agenda heretofore upon the HD, who 
possesses final authority to commit the state to decisions.  Byman & Pollack, supra note 228, at 146.
296
 Although domestic issues have external consequences, and vice versa, foreign policy is generally regarded as an issue 
qualitatively distinct from domestic policy, and HDs  are generally granted broader latitude to place their stamp upon the conduct 
of the state in its external relations, particularly those involving the use of force, than they are with respect to domestic issues. See
TETREAULT & ABEL, supra note 204, at 25-26 (noting that the U.S. Congress has traditionally been able to dominate foreign 
policy on economic issues, but presidents have dominated foreign policy on national security questions); see also RICHARD 
SNYDER & EDGAR S. FURNISS, AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY 189 (1954) (“Public opinion may inspire or hamper, 
Congress may push or restrain, aides may give advice, but in the last analysis, the President must decide.”).  This “inside-outside” 
distinction pertains to Western liberal, as well as authoritarian, regimes:
In the U.S. context, American presidents face fewer institutional constraints in the real of foreign policy than they do in 
domestic policy, where congressional involvement is normally required to make or implement policy decisions.  In 
foreign policy, with the exception of Congress’s role in ratifying treaties and declaring war, U.S. presidents usually 
serve as the chief architects and executors of the nation’s policies.
PAUL ‘T HART, ERIC K. STERN, & BENGT SUNDELIUS, BEYOND GROUPTHINK 193 (1997).
297 See MAGNUSSON, supra note 241, at 333 (“[Personality] can determine behavior . . . most strongly when the situation is 
ambiguously structured . . . so that people are uncertain about how to categorize it, have to structure it in their own terms, and 
have no clear expectations about the behaviors most likely to be appropriate . . . in that situation.”).
298 See, e.g., JOAN OFFERMAN-ZUCKERBERG, ED., POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 141 (stating that personality 
constructs “are most apt to be important in times of crisis, real or perceived, when leaders are under a great deal of stress.”); 
WILLIAM B. QUANDT, DECADE OF DECISION 35 (1979) (concluding that crises diminish exogenous constraints and 
magnify the importance of personality); ETHEREDGE, supra note 209, at 5 (stating that crisis decisionmaking is “in large part” 
a function of the personality of the HD).
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uncertainty,299 the salience of exogenous constraints is at a nadir and the role of the personality of the HD 
in the chain of causation resulting in state behaviors is at a zenith in the buildup to, and during, conflict 
and war.300  Although legislative and bureaucratic actors, and to some extent public opinion, can be 
influential on questions of war and peace,301 when a HD projects force outward institutional constraints 
wither.302
While the relationship between personality and decisionmaking may be contingent and 
conditional it is positive, and the foreign policy behaviors of a state, and in particular those involving the 
use of armed force, reflect the personality of the HD at the helm of the state and are inexplicable without 
reference thereto.303  Although PT does not advance the “naïve view of political outcomes as merely the 
projection of leaders’ personalities,” neither does it accept the “equally simplistic view that individual 
personalities have no effect.”304  If PT concedes that personality-based theories are often supplemental to, 
rather than replacements for, more general and abstract explanations,305 it nevertheless insists that under 
delimited circumstances the personality of the HD contributes in causally significant measure to the 
formation and implementation of policy choices.306  In sum, although it is insufficient to the development 
of a general theory of foreign policy, the singular importance of personality to the explanation and 
299 See FALKOWSKI, supra note 242, at 310 (stating that during crises the governmental decisionmaking process becomes 
centralized under the aegis of the HD).
300 See Betty Glad, Black and White Thinking: Ronald Reagan’s Approach to Foreign Policy, 4 POL. PSYCH. 33, 69 (1984) 
(“[I]n the foreign policy arena, particularly during crisis situations, the [head decisionmaker] has the freedom to act on his own.  
Institutional and cultural constraints are apt to be lacking when he projects outward[.]”); see also ROBERT AXELROD, 
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 30 (1984); Byman & Pollock, supra note 228, at 109.
301
 The influence of public opinion on state decisionmaking in regard to questions of war and peace is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  For an argument that the influence of domestic opinion is “severely circumscribed in time of war,” see Baxter, supra 
note 62, at  84.  For a counter-argument, see JOHN MUELLER, POLICY AND OPINION IN THE GULF WAR (1994).
302 See GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 4 (“The power of the [HD] manifests itself in its purest form in the global arena, where 
[his] actions as commander in chief can determine the fate of the human race . . . [His] latitude for independent action is even 
greater in the unstructured post-cold war world than it was during the cold war, when the threat of mutual destruction 
concentrated minds and constrained actions.”) (assessing the relative power of the U.S. President on questions of national 
security); VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 3 (“The qualities that distinguish one chief executive from another have 
their greatest potential impact in the realm of national security[.]”).
303 See GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 189 (“To a startling degree [U.S. foreign policy] reflects the character and personality 
of the President.”) (quoting former presidential adviser Clark Clifford); Christopher C. Joyner, Dissecting the Lawfulness of 
United States Foreign Policy: Classroom Debates as Pedagogical Devices, 9 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 331, 333 (2003) (“The 
political ideology of [HDs] in . . . [a] government will determine the way in which that government perceives international 
affairs, and those perceptions are the main ingredients for . . .policy options and action choices.”); QUANDT, supra note 299, at 
28 (concluding that the study of leaders’ personalities yields the greatest insight into explaining and predicting their foreign 
policy decisions); SPIEGEL, supra note 294, at 390 (“foreign policy can be understood only by studying the ideas, the attitudes, 
and the experiences of the ‘people at the top.’”); JONAS DAVID BARBER, THE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: 
PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE 3 (1985) (stating that understanding the personality of a HD is 
“crucial” to predicting his or her foreign policy decisions).
304
 POST, supra note 232, at 1. Although variables drawn from other levels of analysis may be causally significant to many 
research questions, PT contends that much of the variance can often be explained by individual-level variables.  Id.
305
 In constructing any theory of complex processes, particularly those involving human agency, is inevitable that a degree of 
reductionism will be employed.  Nonetheless, PT maintains that if it can be demonstrated that personality alone can explain much 
of the variance in decisionmaking and state behavior, then a predominant focus on personality cannot be readily dismissed as 
reductionist.  Moreover, by reducing the number of experimental variables, the parsimony and investigability of resulting 
research questions are enhanced.  For a discussion of potential criticisms of PT generally and the model propounded supra in this 
Article, see infra at pp._.
306 See ‘T HART ET AL., supra note 297, at 6 (describing PT as a “counterweight to more general, abstract, and parsimonious 
theories of international relations and foreign policy” which is “geared toward explaining policies that are at odds with 
predictions based upon . . . rational choice . . . models of international politics[.]”); see also DONALD GREEN & IAN 
SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE 204 (1994) (arguing more generally that we should conceive of social 
science “less as a prizefight between competing theoretical perspectives . . . and more as a joint venture in which explanations 
condition and augment one another[.]”).
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prediction of state behavior in certain circumstances where HDs make essentially unconstrained and 
authoritative decisions is an “existential reality.”307
B.  An Integrated Pretheory of IHL Compliance
1. Introduction
Although a diverse array of theories can be subsumed within the rubric of PT,308 all treat empirical 
behavior(s) as the explanandum—the thing(s) to be explained—and one or more personality constructs as 
the explanans—the explanatory variables.309   In other words, state behaviors are dependent variables that 
are the end result of a chain of causation that runs through the personality of the individual who sets the 
course the state will follow, and the personality constructs that constitute this unique personality are 
independent variables.310  A review of the historical record of state IHL compliance suggests that a model 
which allows for psychobiographical measurement of several policy-relevant personality constructs may 
enable enriched explanations of compliance decisions while retaining parsimony.  In the development of 
an integrated theoretical model an effort will be made to enumerate and define the personality constructs 
operant in the personalities of HDs responsible, via the selection of IHL compliance decisions, for 
particular outcomes; this accomplished, a set of preliminary hypotheses based upon the causal linkages 
between personality constructs and compliance decisions and outcomes shall be offered and tested. 
2.  Independent Variables: Personality Constructs
The proposed theory of IHL compliance hypothesizes that the presence or absence of four constructs
in the personalities of HDs are responsible for state compliance with or violation of IHL; in the theoretical 
model these personality constructs, which serve as independent variables, are “militarism,” “anomism,” 
“hostility,” and “adventurism.”
a.  militarism
“Militarism” is a global construct consisting of numerous subconstructs that tap a set of 
intercorrelated beliefs, values, images, and attitudes.  The militarist is more likely to consider military 
alternatives than his nonmilitaristic counterpart, more prone to escalate conflictual situations, and more 
likely to lead his state to war.311  Nationalism and a favorable attitude toward power have been identified 
as the subconstructs most predictive of the level of conflict and cooperation associated with a
decisionmaker both cross-sectionally and longitudinally;312 nonetheless, all thirteen subconstructs that 
typify the militarist, specifically nationalism, a favorable attitude toward power, patriotism, aggression, 
authoritarianism, militarism, competitiveness, dogmatism, introversion, isolationism, ambitiousness, low 
self-esteem, and military experience are incorporated in the theoretical model.  The ideal-typic313 militarist 
307
 BARBER, supra note 304, at 521.
308 See KNUTSON, supra note 288, at 29 (surveying theories in brief).
309
 SINGER & HUDSON, supra note 193, at 248-49.
310 See Joyner, supra note 304, at 333 (“[I]t is . . . government officials who ultimately decide whether, when, how much, and 
under what particular circumstances [states] will or will not obey a certain rule of international law.”).
311 See, e.g., DONALD SYLVAN & STEVE CHAN, EDS., FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING: PERCEPTION, 
COGNITION, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 108-09 (1984) (suggesting personality attributes of militarist or “warlike” 
decisionmakers); VERTZBERGER, supra note 248, at 172 (same); SINGER & HUDSON, supra note 193, at 92.
312
 FALKOWSKI, supra note 242, at 44; SINGER & HUDSON, supra note 193, at 87.
313
 “Ideal types” are theoretical constructs that model selected aspects of the empirical world and permit comparative assessment 
of the extent to which those aspects exist in a particular real case.  See Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social 
Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 49 (Edward A. Shils & Heary A. Finch trans. & eds. 1949).
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scores high, indicating the presence of the subconstruct in his or her personality profile to an extent 
significantly greater than the average person, on each subconstruct.
i.  subconstructs of militarism
“Nationalism” is a belief that one’s nation is superior to and more honorable than other nations by 
virtue of its superior culture, tradition, race, ethnic composition, philosophy of government, or other 
characteristic(s),314 as well as the motivation to “develop, protect, maintain, or refine” this culture, 
tradition, race, or philosophy.315  Nationalists are more prone to defend fellow nationals in word and in 
deed, and more likely than non-nationalists to serve in the armed forces of their state of nationality.316  On 
the other hand, nationalists are less able to make subtle distinctions and gradations than are non-
nationalists.317  Nationalism is positively intercorrelated with other subconstructs, including militarism, 
authoritarianism, dogmatism, isolationism, and a favorable attitude toward power.318  The foreign policy 
outputs of nationalists tend to be more conflictual than those associated with their non-nationalist 
counterparts,319 and these effects are heightened in the context of cultural dissimilarities between the 
nationalist and the target of foreign policy.320
“Favorable attitude toward power” [“FAP”] is a composite subconstruct which refers to the 
beliefs held by the individual in the desirability and utility of possessing and employing force in the 
pursuit of objectives.  Specific indicators include positive attitudes toward the military, nuclear weapons, 
war, coercion, and control over others.321  FAP is positively intercorrelated with competitiveness, 
authoritarianism, aggression, isolationism, ambitiousness, and distrust.322 The militarist believes that 
power, and in particular military power, is essential to preserving international peace323 and thus has a 
strongly favorable attitude toward power and the use of force.324
“Patriotism” is the “attachment [felt] by group members to their group and the state in which they 
reside” that motivates individuals to be willing to sacrifice personal goals and individual well-being for 
the benefit of the group.325  Patriotism is positively intercorrelated with nationalism.  
“Aggression” is the trait that directs an individual to engage in self-assertive, self-protective, 
domineering, hostile, and/or violent interactions with others.326  Aggression is positively intercorrelated 
with FAP, isolationism, and low self-esteem.327
314
 Paul C. Stern, Why do People Sacrifice for their Nations?, 16 POL. PSYCH. 217, 217 (1995).
315
 VAMIK VOLKAN, THE NEED TO HAVE ENEMIES AND ALLIES 88, 94-95 (1988) (describing “hyper-nationalists” as 
convinced that their nationality harbors “the human identity”).
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 H. Denker, D. Malova, & S. Hoogendoorn, Nationalism and Its Explanations, 24 POL. PSYCH. 345, 350 (2003).
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 Winter et al., supra note 263, at 231.
318 See Denker et al., supra note 317, at 380 (identifying correlates of nationalism); FALKOWSKI, supra note 242, at 34 (same).
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 EAST, supra note 164, at 65; SINGER & HUDSON, supra note 193, at 88.
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 COTTAM, supra note 262, at 62.
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 JANIS, supra note 267, at 69; DENNIS J.D. SANDOLE, CAPTURING THE COMPLEXITY OF CONFLICT 24 (1999).
322 See Holsti, supra note 279, at 497 (identifying correlates of FAP); POST, supra note_, at 165, 190-91, (same).
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 KNUTSON, supra note 288, at 285.
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 Brian D’Agostino, Self-Images of Hawks and Doves: A Control Systems Model of Militarism, 16 POL. PSYCH. 259, 265 
(1999).
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 SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 727.
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 MAGNUSSON, supra note 241, at 165.
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 FELDMAN & VALENTY, supra note 228, at 50; MAGNUSSON, supra note 241, at 166 (indicating that individuals with low 
self-esteem react aggressively when they believe their self-esteem is in the process of being challenged).
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“Authoritarianism” is the belief that the value of unquestioning obedience to authority is superior 
to individual freedom of judgment and that the credibility of information is a function of the authority of 
its source rather than of its factual reliability.328  Authoritarians rigidly adhere to conventional values and 
social conformity, look for and condemn violators of tradition as a social threat, and are preoccupied with 
hierarchies and social cohesion.329  Authoritarianism is positively intercorrelated with isolationism and 
nationalism.330
“Militarism” is the belief that war is a glorious and noble endeavor that serves the progressive 
betterment of character, culture, and civilization.331
“Military experience” imprints upon an individual who serves in the national armed forces with a 
set of beliefs, values, and images associated with that service, and individuals with military experience 
tend to acquire a “culture of war” that leaves them with a more favorable attitude toward power and 
conflict332 and renders them more quick to perceive external threats.333
“Competitiveness” is the motivation to participate in a struggle against others and the belief that 
this struggle is necessary to the attainment of objectives and the satisfaction of wants and needs.
“Dogmatism” refers to the degree to which an individual is incapable of performing the following 
cognitive processes: identifying linkages between concepts; employing a great number of dimensions in 
the description of stimuli; utilizing a great number of rules in integrating components into a coherent 
whole; tolerating contrary beliefs; objectively evaluating ideas with which he disagrees; employing 
contingency analyses; adapting to ambiguity; generating alternatives; assimilating cues, particularly those 
that run counter to preconceptions, from the external environment; and perceiving shades of grey and 
nuances as opposed to thinking in “black and white.”334  Dogmatism correlates with aggression, 
authoritarianism, and competitiveness.335
“Introversion” describes an attitude and a trait in which an individual directs his interests and 
attention inward to his own thoughts and experiences rather than outward to external objects or people.  
Introverts are less vulnerable to social pressure but less resistant to assimilating external cues than are 
extroverts.336  Introversion is positively intercorrelated with aggression and FAP.337
328
 VERTZBERGER, supra note 248, at 172.
329 See generally T.W. ADORNO, E. FRENKEL-BRUNSWICK, & D.J. LEVINSON, THE AUTHORITARIAN 
PERSONALITY (1950); Stanley Feldman, Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism, 24 POL. PSYCH. 41, 
41-51 (2003).
330 See generally Daniel J. Levinson, Authoritarian Personality and Foreign Policy, 1 J. CONFL. RES. 37 (1957).
331 See JOHANN K. BLUNTSCHLI, DES MODERNE KRIEGSRECHT (1866) (“War is an element of the world order 
established by God” which fosters the “noble virtues of man—courage, self-sacrifice, obedience”); HELMUT VON MOLTKE, 
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sacrifice.”) (cited in K.L. Nelson & S.C. Olin, Why War? (1979)).  
332 See SANDOLE, supra note 322, at 185 (suggesting that soldiers fulfil needs for recognition, self-esteem, affiliation, and 
meaning by their military service and that some soldiers “lament the passing of the Cold War” and with it their opportunities to 
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Really Like, NEWSWEEK, Jul. 3, 1995, at 27-28) (“I’ve seen countless veterans . . . stumble home after the high-noon purpose 
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“Isolationism,” also known as “alienation,” is the negative value attached to interaction with 
others, to the nurturing of relationships, and to helping other people and groups. Isolationists lack a 
predisposition to establish, maintain, and restore positive relationships with others, to seek approval, and 
to limit the type or degree of their conflictual relationships with others.338  Isolationism is positively 
intercorrelated with FAP,339 aggression,340 competitiveness,341 and low self-esteem.342
“Ambitiousness” is the value attached to personal accomplishment, and ambitious individuals are 
predisposed to strive for success in tasks involving leadership and the demonstration of intelligence.343
Ambitiousness is positively intercorrelated with aggressiveness.344
“Low self-esteem” is the absence of a belief in one’s own capability, inherent worth, and 
entitlement to the respect and admiration of others; individuals with low self-esteem are not self-
confident, patient, receptive to external cues, or likely to perceive themselves as competent and well-
regarded by their peers,345 but are more prone to violent behavior than are those with high self-esteem.346
Low self-esteem is positively intercorrelated with aggression.347
ii.  militarism: summary
The ideal-typic militarist is a nationalistic patriot with prior military service who views the use of 
power favorably, is an aggressive competitor and keenly ambitious, and is authoritarian and dogmatic yet 
introverted and isolated from others and beset with low self-esteem.  While the pure ideal-typic militarist 
may exist only in theory, militarists score high, indicating the presence of the subconstruct in his or her 
personality profile to an extent significantly greater than the average person, on a majority of the 
subconstructs.
b.  Anomism
“Anomism” consists of five subconstructs—disrespect for law, disrespect for legal authorities, 
amoralism, ignorance of law, and ignorance of IHL—that tap a set of intercorrelated beliefs, values, 
images, and attitudes regarding the rule of law.  The anomist has little regard for the law or legal 
authorites, lacks moral or ethical qualms about violating legal obligations, and knows little of the 
substance of law generally and even less about IHL.  In brief, the anomist is a serial and unrepentant 
lawbreaker.  The ideal-typic anomist scores high on each subconstruct.  
i.  Disrespect for Law
338
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Although “[e]veryone breaks the law sometimes, and some people break it often[,]”348 for many 
individuals law is an object of reverence,349 and obedience to legal commands is nearly a quasireligious 
obligation.350  Many, and perhaps almost all, people quite simply believe that law must be obeyed for the 
simple reason that it is law.351  The anomist, in contrast, accords no independent normative value to legal 
obligations and regards legal obedience in purely instrumental terms: if obeying the law suits his self-
interest, he does so, but if obedience thwarts the pursuit of his ends, law is but another objective 
impediment that must be overcome or negotiated away.352  Disrespect for law is negatively correlated with 
educational attainment.353
ii.  Disrespect for Legal Authority
Respect for legal authority is widely diffused across demographic, cultural, and geographic 
domains.354  Most people accord legal authorities, including the police and the judiciary, the presumption 
of integrity, competence, and legitimacy, and as a consequence are likely to voluntarily cooperate and 
comply with them in their official capacities.355  By contrast, anomists treat legal authorities just as they 
do legal obligations: not as inherently worthy of respect or obedience but rather as potential constraints to 
be factored into calculations of how best to pursue self-interest.
iii.  Amoralism
“Amoralism” refers to an absence of absolutism exercised in the evaluation and judgment of 
character, conduct, ethics, and values.  Its converse, moralism, can be, but is not necessarily, religiously 
motivated.  Several scholars suggest that moral judgments are more consequential than the perceived 
certainty or threat of punishment in decisionmaking with respect to compliance with legal obligations,356
and at least one argues that “morality [is] the most important factor in shaping law-related behavior.”357
As Tyler explains,
[P]eople d[o] not simply act in pursuit of gains.  Rather, their own personal sense of right and wrong 
influence[s] their behavior.  Most people give little or no consideration to the possible gains and losses 
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349 See ROBERT DALLEK, THE AMERICAN STYLE OF FOREIGN POLICY: CULTURAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN 
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associated with illegal behavior.  Instead, they simply engage in the behavior that they think is morally 
right.358
Although morality can undermine compliance with law where the specific rules in question are perceived 
as morally illegitimate, most people regard compliance as a moral duty and consider non-compliance 
morally unjustifiable.359  Moreover, many individuals consider the moral evil occasioned by 
noncompliance to be greater than the evil of obeying a law with which they disagree, and consequently 
comply on moral grounds.360  The ideal-typic anomist, however, accords no moral virtue to compliance 
and is agnostic, and thus amoral, with respect to right and wrong.
iv.  Ignorance of Law
“Ignorance of law” is the absence of formal legal education.  Those with legal training may be 
more likely than those untutored in the law to regard legal obligations as significant in relation to other 
commitments.361   Although legal training “does not assure that [decisionmakers trained in the law] will 
cast their votes for law observance, . . . some knowledge of the law, some appreciation of its significance, 
and some attitudes and habits of respect for the law find a place in the process of decision.”362  Moreover, 
although most decisionmakers may know little about law,363 legal knowledge is an important determinant 
of compliance: the more a decisionmaker understands his legal obligations, the more likely s/he will be to 
comply.364  Accordingly, the anomist scores high on an index of ignorance of the law.
v.  Ignorance of IHL
“Ignorance of IHL” refers to the absence of legal training in the IHL issue-area.  As with the 
subconstruct “ignorance of law,” knowledge of IHL is a determinant of compliance with IHL, and the less 
a decisionmaker knows about IHL the less likely s/he is to comply with the regime.
vi.  summary, operationalization, and intercorrelations
While the pure ideal-typic anomist may exist only in theory, s/he is ignorant of the law, regards 
compliance with legal rules and authorities in purely instrumental terms, and complies only where it 
serves self-interests: morality does not factor into the analysis.
c. Hostility
“Hostility” cconsists of ten subconstructs—distrust, narcissism, cynicism, misanthropy, 
ethnocentrism, hostility, Machiavellianism, lack of empathy, selfishness, and anti-internationalism —that 
tap a set of intercorrelated beliefs, values, images, and attitudes regarding human relationships. The ideal-
typic hostile scores high, indicating the presence of the subconstruct in his or her personality profile to an 
extent significantly greater than the average person, on each subconstruct.
358 Id. at 116.
359 See JANIS & MANN, supra note 292, at 27 (describing use by many decisionmakers of a “simple moral precept” to make 
decisions); TYLER, supra note 139, at 38-39 (reporting that most people consider violation of law to be morally wrong).
360 See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION 66 (1959) (“[I]f we ask why we ought to obey rules of law 
simply because they are rules of law, the answer is that there is a rule of morality of which that is the content.  We obey not 
necessarily because we think that the law is right, but because we think it right to obey the law.”)
361 See Ratner, supra note 13, at 662-65 (suggesting the degree of legal training is significant to prioritization of legal obligations 
relative to other obligations).
362
 HENKIN, supra note 6, at 65-66.
363 See BYERS & NOLTE, supra note 18, at 104 (ascribing ignorance of international law to most decisionmakers).
364 See Joyner, supra note 304, at 334 (“If . . . decision-makers know what the law is, then they can fashion policy to conform to 
the expectations of other governments.”).
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i. Distrust
“Distrust” refers to a belief in the inherent lack of goodness in human beings; individuals with a 
high degree of distrust have misgivings about the intentions and activities of others and are wary of other 
actors.365  Individuals with a high degree of distrust are more likely than those who are less distrusting, or 
more idealistic,366 to overperceive, and overreact, to threats.367  The most distrustful decisionmakers can be 
termed “paranoid,” defined as intensely suspicious of others, convinced that others are scheming to cause 
them harm or impose their will, and prone to see enemies in everyone despite contradictory evidence.368
Paranoids tend to resort unnecessarily to forceful measures in response to perceived threats.369  Distrust 
intercorrelates with cynicism and hostility.
ii. Narcissism
“Narcissism” is the belief that one is endowed with great power, physical appeal, and the right to 
exploit and dominate others.370  Narcissists crave attention and constant reassurance and need to be 
perceived as powerful, appealing, and worthy of love and admiration.371  Narcissists are preoccupied with 
grandiose fantasies of wealth and fame, devoid of conscience or remorse, and willing to use whatever 
force is necessary to achieve goals.372  The most malignant of narcissists, or “antisocial personalities,” are 
often reckless, sadistic, suicidal, and prone to depression.373
Narcissists are self-absorbed and are not possessed of deeply-held beliefs about the external 
world: their images of others are flexible, and other actors are of value or of concern to the narcissist only 
to the extent that they enhance his personal self-interest or present him in a good light.  For the narcissist, 
what is good for himself is good for his state, and foreign policy issues are reducible to considerations of 
how particular decisions advance his concept of self.374  Because they are detached from reality to the 
extent of their self-absorption, narcissists are systematically inclined to overestimate their own 
capabilities and fail to recognize external constraints.375  Narcissism is positively intercorrelated with 
dogmatism, isolationism, and disrespect of law and legal authorities.376
iii. Cynicism
365
 STEINBRUNER, supra note 286, at 47.
366 See George, supra note 262, at 202 (characterizing individuals who are trusting of others and believe in a “fundamental 
harmony of interests among peoples and nations” as “idealists”); see also JOHN C. FARRELL & ASA P. SMITH, EDS., 
IMAGE AND REALITY IN WORLD POLITICS 16 (1967) (dividing decisionmakers into those who believe in the “inherent 
good faith” of others and those who are convinced of the “inherent bad faith” of humanity).
367
 See Michele G. Alexander, Marilynn B. Brewer, & Richard K. Hermann, Images and Affect: A Functional Analysis of Out-
group Stereotypes, 77 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCH. 78, 80 (1999).
368 See JERROLD POST & R. ROBINS, POLITICAL PARANOIA: THE PSYCHOPOLITICS OF HATRED 7-12 (defining the 
paranoid personality).
369 See J. DAVIS, THREATS AND PROMISES 41 (2000); SINGER & HUDSON, supra note 193, at 88.
370 See VERTZBERGER, supra note 248 at 174 (defining the narcissistic personality).
371 See LASSWELL, supra note 238, at 262.
372
 POST, supra note 232, at 83-84.
373 See W. JOHN LIVESLEY, ED., THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL IV-REVISED 117 (1995).
374
 POST, supra note 232, at 87.  Famous historical narcissists include Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler, both of whom portrayed 
themselves as the auteurs of new political-economic orders.  See Betty Glad, Why Tyrants Go Too Far: Malignant Narcissism 
and Absolute Power, 23 POL. PSYCH. 1, 5 (2002).
375 Id. at 33-34.
376 See POST, supra note 232, at 85 (dogmatism); DSM-IV, supra note 373, at 117 (isolationism, respect for law and legal 
authorities).
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“Cynicism” is the belief that others are self-interested, insincere, and motivated primarily by 
material considerations, and the corresponding negative general image of humanity.377  Cynics expect the 
worst of others, and consequently are more likely to perceive threats than are individuals who view others 
as inherently cooperative, sincere, and motivated by norms.378
iv. Misanthropy
“Misanthropy” is a generalized dislike, and even hatred, of human beings.  Simply put, 
misanthropes are antisocial, do not seek or enjoy the company of others, and actively seek to avoid or, in 
the alternative, to cause harm to other persons.
v. Ethnocentrism
“Ethnocentrism” is the belief that one’s own ethnic, racial, or cultural group is superior to others 
and the attitude that association with persons of one’s own ethnic, racial, or cultural group is preferable to 
association with members of other groups.379  Whether ethnocentrism has biological determinants or is 
simply a social construction is as yet uncertain.380  Whatever the cause, ethnocentrics project their 
preference for members of their own groupings onto the international system, and the degree of their 
cooperation with other states is, in some measure, determined by the degree of ethnic similarity or 
dissimilarity.381  Accordingly, justification for hostility is readily available to the ethnocentric who 
identifies ethnic dissimilarities between his own state and the target of his decisionmaking and attributes 
hostile intent to the target on the basis of these dissimilarities;382 greater vigilance is thus required to 
protect against this threat.383  Taken to extremes, ethnocentrism creates a culture of fear that rationalizes 
infliction of harm on out-groups to preempt the threat they pose.384  Ethnocentrism is positively 
intercorrelated with aggression, distrust385 and selfishness.386
vi. Hostility
“Hostility” is the perception that others hold highly negative images of, and have strongly 
negative intentions toward, one’s self, group, or state.387  In some sense, hostility is the corollary of 
distrust in that it is an assessment of the degree of distrust operant in the calculus of external actors.  The 
greater the perception of hostility, the less likely a decisionmaker will be to recognize disconfirming 
377 See R.E. Agger, M.N. Goldstein, & S.A. Pearl, Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning, 23 J. POL. 477 (1961).
378
 HERMANN, supra note 336, at 339.
379 See WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS 12-13 (1906) (describing ethnocentrism as in-group tendency to “nourish 
its own pride and vanity, boast[] itself superior, exalt[] its own divinities, and look[] with contempt on outsiders.”).
380
 For a discussion of ongoing research, see E.J. Gil-White, Are Ethnic Groups Biological “Species” to the Human Brain?: 
Essentialism in Our Cognition of Some Social Categories, 42 CURR. ANTHRO. 515 (2001).
381
 CHITTICK, supra note 229, at 52 (tracing congruence between patterns of interaction in international relations and the 
patterns of attitudes regarding relevant ethnicities held by groups in various states).
382 See Alexander et al., supra note 368, at 78-79 (describing resort to imagery derived from ethnic differences to justify inter-
state hostility); VOLKAN, supra note 316, at 119-21 (describing the process whereby ethnic or cultural difference is translated 
into enemy status in the minds of ethnocentric decisionmakers); SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 585 (“Symbolic threats arise 
from intergroup differences in basic differences[.]”).
383 See POST, supra note 232, at 200 (linking ethnocentrism and hypervigilance in foreign policy decisionmaking). 
384 See, e.g., Meredith W. Watts, Political Xenophobia in the Transition from Socialism: Threat, Racism, and Ideology Among 
East German Youth, 17 POL. PSYCH. 97, 119 (1996); SANDOLE, supra note 322, at 111 (linking ethnocentrism and 
externalization of aggression to out-groups); SINGER & HUDSON, supra note 193, at 88 (same).
385 See OFFERMAN-ZUCKERBERG, supra note 288, at 277 (aggression); POST, supra note 232, at 200 (distrust).
386
 SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 161 (identifying the opposite of ethnocentrism as “altruism”).
387
 FARRELL & SMITH, supra note 367, at 16.
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information388 and the more likely s/he will be to perceive external actors as aggressive,389 to escalate 
threats,390 and to meet the perception of aggression with force.391  Although heightened perceptions of 
hostility may correspond to political realities, particularly in the context of long-standing military 
confrontations wherein the citizens of belligerents become sensitized to expect hostility from their overt 
adversaries,392 most individuals can distinguish “immediate and genuinely hostile out-groups” without 
“detecting hostility from the entire world.”393  Clinically hostile individuals, however, are caught in a 
“siege mentality” that persists independently of reason.394  Hostility is intercorrelated with distrust, 
aggression, and patriotism.395
vii. Machiavellianism
“Machiavellianism” is the set of values that denies the relevance of morality in politics and 
asserts that deception, stealth, and manipulation are justified in pursuing and maintaining power and self-
interest.396  The Machiavellian is “completely ruthless in the struggle for power,” devious, and utterly 
amoral in the pursuit of self-interest.397  Neither norms, nor laws, stand in his way.398  Machiavellianism is 
positively intercorrelated with hostility, ethnocentrism, narcissism, distrust, amoralism, selfishness, and 
lack of empathy.
viii. Lack of Empathy
Empathy is defined as the “projection of one’s own personality into the personality of another in 
order to understand him better” and the “ability to share in another’s emotions or feelings.”399  It is the 
trait that disposes an individual to seek out and understand the views, interests, and values of other 
persons and groups.400  Empathy may ameliorate self-interest and guide decisionmakers toward 
considering the consequences of their decisions for others; through its effects, empathy may dampen the 
frequency and intensity of international conflict. 401   By contrast, “lack of empathy” is the incapacity to 
form accurate perceptions and judgments of others and inflexibility in adapting to and learning from 
388
 FALKOWSKI, supra note, at 295.
389 See SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 265 (theorizing that high levels of hostility correlate with the presumption of the 
“inherent bad faith” and aggressiveness of other actors and the tendency to cast others as “enemies”).
390 See POST & ROBINS, supra note 369, at 26 (explaining that some individuals “lack the basic social skill of reacting to a 
provocation by either ignoring it or meeting the level of provocation” and instead “meet hostility with greater hostility”).
391 See, e.g., Avi Shlaim, Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War, 28 WORLD POL. 348 
(1976) (correlating hostility with perception of threats); Dan Jacobson & Daniel Bar-Tal, Structure of Security Beliefs Among 
Israeli Students, 16 POL. PSYCH. 567, 580 (1995) (correlating hostility with the use of force in foreign policy); DAVIS, supra 
note_, at 5 (stating that the tendency of decisionmakers to adopt aggressive foreign policies is reinforced by the belief that their 
state is “surrounded by a hostile environment”).
392 See Jacobson & Bar-Tal, supra note 393, at 585 (describing the preoccupation with security that has become the “master 
symbol in the Israeli-Jewish ethos” and a “kind of ‘religion’” in response to millennia of military conflict with numerous 
surrounding states, peoples, and terrorist groups).
393
 POST & ROBINS, supra note 369, at 57.
394 See McGOWAN & SHAPIRO, supra note 240 at 53-60 (postulating correlation between irrational perceptions of hostility and 
violent foreign policy decisionmaking).
395 See POST & ROBINS, supra note 369, at 57 (distrust and aggression); Alexander Thompson, Applying Rational Choice 
Theory to International Law: The Promise and Pitfalls, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 285 (2002) (patriotism).
396 See generally NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (W.K. Marriott transl. 1916) (1505).
397 See Glad, supra note 375, at 33.
398 See RAYMOND ARON, POLITICS AND HISTORY (M.B. Conant transl 1995) (defining machiavellianism as the sacrifice 
of morality to expedience). 
399
 WEBSTERS NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 458 (2nd College Ed. 1984).
400
 SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 266.
401 See generally M.L. Hoffman, Toward a Theory of Empathic Arousal and Development 227-56, in M. Lewis & L.A. 
Rosenblum, eds., The Development of Affect (1978).
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incoming stimuli.402  Individuals who lack empathy are more likely to dehumanize their adversaries and to 
legitimate conflictual policies in regard to their opponents.403 Lack of empathy is positively intercorrelated 
with aggression404 distrust, and hostility.405
ix. Selfishness
Altruism is the value placed upon aiding others despite high risks and high costs and despite the 
absence of the expectation of an external reward; altruism is arguably the polar opposite of selfishness.406
The paradigmatic example is the self-sacrifice of the soldier who saves a number of his comrades from 
certain death by throwing himself upon a grenade in their midst, absorbing the blow but ensuring his own 
demise.407  “Selfishness” is the antithesis of altruism and is positively intercorrelated with lack of 
empathy, low self-esteem, ethnocentrism, and authoritarianism.408
x. Anti-internationalism
“Ant-internationalism” describes an orientation toward the global environment that shuns 
cooperative participation in a wide range of international affairs, including educational, sporting, cultural, 
social, economic, and security arrangements.  Anti-internationalism is, to some extent, the corollary of 
hypernationalism: anti-internationalists view unfavorably the creation and maintenance of transnational 
networks to enhance international contacts and cooperation, and, given a choice between national 
sovereignty and transnational regulation, are disposed to prefer the former.409  Anti-internationalism is 
positively intercorrelated with distrust, hostility, aggression, and lack of empathy.410
xi. Hostility: Summary and Operationalization
The ideal-typic hostile is a self-absorbed, delusional, and amoral individual who is deeply 
distrustful and suspicious of the intentions of others and sees threats lurking everywhere.  S/he bears an 
animus toward humanity that is mitigated only in regard to persons of his or her own racial, ethnic, or 
cultural group, and s/he is prepared to do anything and everything, including use aggressive force, to 
defeat the omnipresent threats posed by outgroups about whom s/he knows or cares little.
d. Adventurism
“Adventurism”consists of seven subconstructs—risk tolerance, internal locus of control, 
impulsivity, anxiety, optimism, stress, and maleness —that tap a set of intercorrelated beliefs, values, 
images, attitudes, and biological predispositions regarding the tolerance of uncertainty and the role of 
402
 Lee F. Anderson, A Comparison of Simulation, Case Studies, and Problems: Papers in Teaching Decision-Making 78 (doctoral 
dissertation, Northwestern University, 1964).
403
 VOLKAN, supra note 316, at 121 (stating that “empathy must be destroyed in order to dehumanize the enemy” and to 
denature the moral consequences of directing aggression toward them).
404
 ETHEREDGE, supra note 209, at 53.
405
 ELMS, supra note 274, at 130.
406 See generally  HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL 
CHOICE (1984) (comparing and contrasting altruism and selfishness).
407 See William H. Riker, The Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory, 16 POL. PSYCH. 23, 38 (1995) (examining 
citations of Congressional Medal of Honor recipients as evidence of the expression of altruism).
408
 OFFERMAN-ZUCKERBERG, supra note 299, at 291-96 (empathy, self-esteem); SEARS ET AL., supra note 78 ,at 161 
(ethnocentrism, authoritarianism)
409 See EUGENE  R. WITTKOPF, COOPERATIVE AND MILITANT INTERNATIONALISM (1990).
410 See Howard P. Smith & Ellen Weber Rosen, Some Psychological Correlates of Worldmindedness and Authoritarianism, 26 J. 
PERSONALITY 170 (1958) (measuring correlates of internationalism (described as “worldmindedness”)).
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chance. The ideal-typic adventurist scores high, indicating the presence in his or her personality profile to 
an extent significantly greater than the average person, on each subconstruct.
i. Tolerance of Risk
Uncertainty, or risk, is an immutable characteristic of the universe,411 and individuals vary in their 
tolerance for it.412 Several theories posit that certain individuals are cognitively disposed to greater 
tolerance of risk than are others,413 while other theories focus on the decisionmaking context and suggest 
that high-stakes decision problems, particularly those that arise during armed conflicts, are most likely to 
promote risk-taking behaviors.414  “Tolerance of risk” is a measurement of the degree to which an 
individual will routinely choose courses of action that, although they may offer the prospect of gains, 
carry with them significant possibilities of injury, damage, harm, or loss.  Risk-tolerant individuals are 
more likely to take chances and expose themselves and their states to danger in the pursuit of absolute and 
relative gains than are risk-averse individuals, who tend to seek the decision that satisfies minimal policy 
objectives with the least possibility for loss.415  The most risk-tolerant individuals are inclined to forgo 
easy gains in pursuit of quixotic objectives.416  Tolerance of risk is positively intercorrelated with 
impulsivity and internal locus of control.417
ii. Internal Locus of Control
“Internal locus of control” refers to the belief that one is capable of exerting a positive influence 
over the external world significant enough to bring about a particular future result chosen by and 
favorable to the individual.  For individuals whose locus of control is external to themselves, the belief 
that no matter what they do their destiny is preordained can lead to decisional paralysis and mental 
inactivity.  In contrast, individuals with an internal locus of control attribute causality of and 
responsibility for their behavior to themselves rather than to the external world.418  Will, and not Fate, 
determines their future.  Consequently, decisionmakers with an internal locus of control are more likely 
than those with an internal locus of control to challenge environmental constraints and “push the limits of 
what is possible” and less likely to remain passive or accept compromise solutions.419
iii. Impulsivity
411 See Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, Rethinking and Reconceptualizing Risk in Foreign Policy Deicison-Making: A Sociocognitive 
Approach, 16 POL. PSYCH 347, 349 (1995) (defining “uncertainty” as the condition that pertains when a deicisonmaker “has 
neither the knowledge of nor the objective probabilities of distribution of the outcomes associated with an event” and contrasting 
this with “risk,” defined as the objective and informed measurement of the probability of an event).  The distinction is not 
theoretically significant for purposes of this study and shall thus be conflated.
412 Id. at 152 (describing risk-propensity as “idiosyncratic” and variable across range of decisionmakers).
413 See, e.g., SEARS ET AL., supra note 78 (describing prospect theory, which postulates that certain decisionmakers will accept 
high risk to avoid losses); FALKOWSKI, supra note 242, at 103 (theorizing that “optimizers” are more likely to choose options 
with greater payoffs but higher risks than are “satisficers,” who seek low payoffs and are risk averse)
414 See, e.g., Vertzberger, supra note 412, at 363.
415 Id. at 368-69.
416 See ROSE McDERMOTT, RISK-TAKING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: PROSPECT THEORY IN AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 2 (1998) (developing a comprehensive theory of risk in foreign policy decisionmaking).
417
 Barry O’Neill, Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 617, 627 (2001) (presenting correlates of 
risk-tolerance).
418
 MAGNUSSON, supra note 241, at 186-88 (contrasting internal and external locus of control and associated beliefs).
419
 POST, supra note 232, at 187-88.
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“Impulsivity” is the trait characterized by the inability to self-modulate sensory input, inhibit 
sensation-seeking behavior, or consider the consequences of actions.420  Impulsivity is negatively 
intercorrelated with intraversion.421
iv. Anxiety
“Anxiety” is the trait in which an individual is particularly prone to evaluate stimuli as dangerous 
and to experience concomitant feelings of worry, distress, and panic. Anxious individuals are more likely 
than non-anxious individuals to perceive and respond to threats and to have greater difficulty in relaxing 
after stimulation.422
v. Optimism
“Optimism” is the belief that the future will generally produce preferred outcomes and that it is 
prudent to expect the best of people, things, and events.  Optimists are disposed to underestimate risk and 
overestimate their own capabilities.423  Optimism is positively intercorrelated with tolerance of risk and 
internal locus of control.424
vi. Stress 
“Stress” is the aggregate of the physical and emotional responses produced by an individual in 
unconscious adaptation to environmental stimuli.425  Individuals vary in their perceptions of stress and in 
their ability to preserve cognitive functioning as stressors mount, yet all experience degradation in their 
ability to generate alternatives and choose optimal courses of action in situations that threaten core values 
and interests.426  The more pronounced the stress experienced by a decisionmaker, the less likely s/he is to 
generate alternatives and the more likely s/he is to elect high-risk options.427  Stres is positively 
intercorrelated with aggression, cognitive simplicty, and tolerance of risk.428
vii. Male Sex
Some aspects of personality relevant to decisionmaking are likely sex-specific.  Although sex-
role differences may be constructs of socialization rather than biologically determined,429 men are 
significantly and consistently more likely than women to be competitive, aggressive, ethnocentric, 
Machiavellian, distrustful, ambitious, and lack empathy.430
420 See H.J. EYSENCK & S.B.G. EYSENCK, PERSONALITY STRUCTURE AND MEASUREMENT (1967).
421
 MAGNUSSON, supra note 241, at 132.
422 See generally C.D. SPIELBERGER, ANXIETY AND BEHAVIOR (1966).
423 See, e.g., ROBERTA WOHLSTETTER, PEARL HARBOR: WARNING AND DECISION 348-401 (discussing the role 
optimism may have played in contributing to U.S. underestimation of the Japanese threat in 1941).
424
 FALKOWSKI, supra note 242, at 103 (correlating optimism with selection of low-risk alternatives).
425 See A.J. MAULE & O. SVENSON, TIME PRESSURE AND STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION 
MAKING  1-2 (2003) (defining stress).
426 See generally id.
427 Id.
428
 HERMANN, supra note 336, at 353 (aggression); ALAN DOWTY, MIDDLE EAST CRISES: U.S. DECISION-MAKING IN 
1958, 1970, AND 1973 12-18 (1984) (cognitive simplicity); McDERMOTT, supra note 417, at 4 (tolerance of risk).
429 But see OFFERMAN-ZUCKERBERG, supra note 299, at 384 (suggesting that women may be, by virtue of their biologically 
determined function as “givers of life,” more invested in nurturing offspring, more committed to preserving peace in order to 
protect those offspring, and thus more likely to “help bring about human harmony on earth”); J. Sidanius & B. Ekehammar, Sex, 
Political Party Preference and Higher-Order Dimensions of Socio-Political Ideology, 115 J. PSYCH. 233 (1983) (attributing 
sex-based personality difference to reproductive strategies and investment levels in offspring).
430 See D’Agostino, supra note 325, at 280 (discussing nature-nurture debate in context of sex-specific beliefs, values, and images 
postulated as correlates of militarism).  For a discussion of differences real and perceived between men and women in the theory 
and practice of international relations, as well as a series of explanations for these differences, see MARYSIA ZALEWSKI & 
JANE PARPART, EDS., THE “MAN” QUESTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1998).
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viii.  Summary and Operationalization: Adventurism
The ideal-typic adventurist is an impulsive gambler who is so optimistic that he can assert his will 
upon events that he will risk all for the sheer thrill of pursuing the prospect of a victory no matter how 
small or unlikely.  He resolves the tremendous anxiety and stress that accompanies his risky behavior by 
trusting blindly and, in effect, rolling the dice.
3.  Dependent Variables: Decisions and Judgments Regarding Anticipatory Self-Defense
The PT model of IHL compliance [“PT-IHLC”] regards the presence or absence of the 
personality constructs of militarism, anomism, hostility, and adventurism in the personalities of HDs as 
independent variables [“IVs”] that determine state compliance with IHL and treats these decisions and the 
resulting judgments of other actors as the dependent variables [“DVs”].  To test the strength of the 
causative relationship at this primary stage of theory development, a constituent sub-regime of IHL—that 
governing war initiation—has been selected as the initial building block upon which the more general 
study of compliance decisions throughout the range of IHL issues, including the selection of methods and 
the choice of means, will be subsequently built.431  Specifically, the DVs in the present study concern 
compliance with that aspect of the subregime of IHL governing the resort to war prior to the occurrence 
of an armed attack, termed “anticipatory self-defense” [“ASD”].
DVs include the following: 
(1) whether ASD is considered as an option;
(2) whether ASD is selected; 
(3) whether attempt is made to defend an exercise of ASD;
(4) whether an exercise of ASD is defended on legal grounds;
(5) whether other actors regard an exercise of ASD as lawful at the time of its exercise;
(6) whether other actors regard an exercise of ASD as legitimate at the time of its exercise;
(7) whether the state engaging in ASD is subject to legal sanctions;
(8) whether other actors regard an exercise of ASD as lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect;
(9) whether the HD who ordered his/her state to engage in or refrain from ASD would make the 
same decision if offered the opportunity to decide again; and
(10) whether an exercise of ASD can fairly be said to have contributed to world order.
a. introduction: ASD
For most of history the sovereign prerogative of states to resort to armed conflict was immune 
from regulation,432 and well into the 20th century states exercised the right to engage in war in response to 
a host of perceived offenses, to collect debts, and to acquire territory.433  However, the Covenant of the 
League of Nations434 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928435 advanced the crystallization of an as yet 
431 See infra at pp._ (discussing plans for future research incorporating additional dependent variables).
432
 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 176 (1994).  As late as the 17th century, jurists 
proclaimed that the right of self-defense extended to the vindication of any national claim.  See D.P. O’CONNELL, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 339 (1965).
433 See 6 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 152-55 (1943) (discussing legal bases for state practice in 
employing force in early 20th century).
434 See Covenant of the League of Nations, Treaty of Versailles, Jun. 20, 1919, Part I, 225 Consol. T.S. 189, at Art. 12 
(committing states-parties not to resort to war against other states-parties “within three months” after an unsuccessful attempt to 
arbitrate the dispute).
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inchoate international customary prohibition436 on “aggression,” commonly defined as the use of armed 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state.437   In turn, the emerging 
jus ad bellum438 found expression in 1945 in the Charter of the United Nations,439 as well as application at 
Nuremburg,440 and quickly acquired the status of a peremptory norm.441  Article 2(4) of the Charter 
categorically proscribes “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state,”442 and thus it is “well settled in modern international law that no nation may 
engage in aggression.”443
Nevertheless, imposition of a sharp prohibition on aggression has not disabled the “inherent 
right” of states to self-defense.444  Although the UN Charter has had a transformative effect on the law 
governing the resort to force,445 states remain free under customary international law to use force “in 
conformity with the Charter.”446  Accordingly, states resort to armed self-help to defend their territory and 
political independence and protect their nationals and property abroad from threats of death or injury,447
435 See Treaty Providing for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy [“Kellogg- Briand Pact”], Aug. 28, 1928, 46 
Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, at Art. 1 (“condemn[ing] recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and 
renounc[ing] it, as an instrument of national policy” in relations between states-parties).
436
 International law consists of treaty-based, as well as customary, sources of law.  See Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945) (enumerating sources of international law as treaties, custom, general principles, and the 
opinions of expert commentators).  Customary international law evolves from the practice of states consistent with the subjective 
understanding that such practice is legally obligatory.  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Denmark & Netherlands), 
1969 I.C.J. 4.
437
 The precise definition of “aggression” has bedeviled international lawyers for nearly a century. See Jonathan A. Bush, “The 
Supreme Crime” and its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2324 
(2002) (chronicling the history of attempts to define the term); JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 88 
(suggesting it may be impossible to overcome politics and achieve a universal definition). In recent years a general definition of 
aggression has emerged that includes the elements of a military attack, not otherwise justified by international law, directed 
against the territory of another state.  See Louis Rene Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Preemption, and Anticipatory Self-
Defense, 13 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 259, 263 n.5 (1991) (synthesizing various definitions).
438
 The strand of IHL known as the jus ad bellum governs the right to resort to armed force, whereas jus in bello governs the 
methods and means employed in war and specifies who and what are legitimate targets.  See William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes 
Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 767, 770 (1999) (differenting jus ad bellum from jus 
in bello).
439
 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, TS 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945, at Art. 
2(4) (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
the political independence of any state[.]”).
440 See 1 TRIAL MAJ. WAR CRIM. BEFORE INT’L MIL. TRIB 208, 218-22 (1946), reprinted at 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 207 
(1947) [“Nuremburg Judgment”] (convicting defendants of conspiracy to wage “aggressive war”).
441
 A norm of jus cogens “is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.”  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, at Art. 53.  The prohibition against 
aggression in international relations is widely regarded as having attained the status of a norm of jus cogens.  See ARTHUR 
WARRS, 2 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1949-1998 741 (1999) (“the law of the Charter concerning the 
prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of jus 
cogens.”); Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and around Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at 100 
(holding that the norms represented by Article 2(4) approach jus cogens status).
442
 UN Charter, supra note 440, at Art. 2(4).
443
 Jeffrey F. Addicott, Proposal for a New Executive Order Banning Assassination, 37 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 751, 769 
(2003).
444
 “Self-defense” under international law may be defined as “a lawful use of force . . . under conditions prescribed by 
international law, in response to a previous unlawful use (or, at least, a threat) of force.”  DINSTEIN, supra note 433, at 175.
445
 Scholars debate not whether the UN Charter has transformed the jus ad bellum but the degree to which it has done so.  See 
Timothy Kearley, Regulation of Preventive and Preemptive Force in the United Nations Charter: A Search for Original Intent, 
WYOMING L. REV. 664, 665 (2003) (examining such debates).
446
 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Rep.
447 See Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 95, 99 (1989) (noting that states “have 
traditionally defended their military personnel, citizens, commerce, and property from attacks[.]”); Robert J. Beck & Anthony 
Clark Arend, “Don’t Tread on U.S.”: International Law and Forcible State Response to Terrorism, 12 WISC. INT’L L. J. 153, 
153 (1994) (“No nation should be limited to using force to protect its citizens . . . to situations in which they are within its 
boundaries.”) Jordan W. Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism, WHITTIER L. REV. 711, 729 (1986) 
(enumerating lawful bases for the use of force in self-defense).
53
and they do so without impinging the territorial integrity or political independence of states that fail in 
their duty to protect aliens and alien property within their jurisdiction.448  Moreover, self-defense remains 
so intrinsic to the concept of sovereignty even in the Charter era that the right is likely “one that would be 
asserted by nations absent recognition in international law.”449
In fact, the Charter does not of its own force disable or impair the right to self-defense, nor is it 
clear that its framers intended that it do so.450  Article 2(4) prohibits only three specific applications of the 
threat or use of force: (1) where prejudicial to the territorial integrity of states; (2) contrary to the political 
independence of states; and (3) “in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”451  In other words, a use of force not excluded by operation of Article 2(4) is theoretically 
permitted, and provided it cannot legitimately be construed as challenging either the territorial integrity or 
political independence of a state or as inconsistent with the primary purpose of the UN—the 
“maintenance of international peace and security,”452—it is arguably permissible.453  The use of force 
under such circumstances is arguably not inconsistent with the maintenance of international peace and 
security and not contrary to the Charter.  Even more directly, Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes454
the “inherent right” of a state subjected to aggression to engage in self-defense, and to receive the 
assistance of other states to that end.455
Precisely when the right to self-defend is transformed into a right to employ force is a hotly 
contested question.  The customary international law doctrine of ASD456 holds that when a state is faced 
448 See JULIUS STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS 24-26 (1974) (contrasting aggression in violation of Article 2(4) with 
defensive measures consistent with 2(4)); (characterizing use of force to protect nationals as lawful); MYERS MCDOUGAL & 
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 862-70 (1981) (same).  Although 
literature review suggests that a majority of commentators now supports the right of a state to protect its nationals where 
necessary by armed force, for opposing views see, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF 
FORCE BY STATES 301, (rejecting right of intervention to protect nationals); HENKIN, supra note 6, at 145 (same).
449
 Byard Q. Clemmons & Gary D. Brown, Rethinking International Self-Defense: The United Nations’ Emerging Role, NAV. L. 
REV. 217, 218 (1998).  Indeed, as soon as the Kellogg-Briand Pact entered into force the U.S. and nearly a dozen other states 
moved to qualify the instrument with an authoritative interpretation providing that nothing in the text “restricts or impairs in any 
way the right of self-defense[,]” which is “inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty.”  United States, Identic 
Notes, 1928, reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT’L L. Supp (1928).
450 See TIMOTHY L.H. McCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (1996) (concluding, after analysis 
of the legislative history, that the Charter was not intended to terminate customary international law with regard to the use of 
force or to draw all uses of force within the scope of Article 2(4)); BROWNLIE, supra note 449, at 271 (finding “no indication 
that the Charter language was meant to do anything other than reflect the current right of self-defense)); D. BOWETT SELF-
DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 188 (1956) (citing Doc. 1179, I/9(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 247 (1945)) (stating that 
under the UN Charter “self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired); Sean D. Magenis, Natural Law as the Customary 
International Law of Self-Defense, B.U. INT’L L.J. 413, 414 (2002) (Charter framers did not intend to limit the natural right of 
states to self-defense); George Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties Have Said, 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 351 (1998) (concluding the framers understood self-defense to be an inherent and inalienable right); 
Thomas Mallison & Sally Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor:  Aggression or 
Self-Defense, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 420 (1982) (concluding from its drafting history that the Charter incorporates 
in toto the inherent right of self-defense ex ante in customary law).
451
 UN Charter, supra note 440, at Art. 2(4).
452 Id. at Art. 1(1).
453 See Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, MICH. J. INT’L L. 513, 521-22 (same); but see Rex J. 
Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for Violations of Arms Control Agreements: “Star Wars” and Other Glimpses 
of the Future, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 73, 90-92 (1985) (conducting detailed exegesis of the travaux preparatoires of the UN 
Charter to reach the conclusion that “Article 2(4) was not intended to permit force to be used even when not inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.”).
454
 Article 51 is not an affirmative grant but is rather the recognition of an inherent right of self-defense.  See Walker, supra note 
451, at 351-52 (clarifying status of the right to self-defense in the Charter as a recognized, and not a conferred, right).
455 See UN Charter, supra note 440, at Art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations[.]”).
456
 ASD is sometimes referred to as “preemptive self-defense.”  See, e.g., Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive 
Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 599, 600 (2003 (equating the terms).
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with an imminent threat of armed attack it may lawfully resort to proportional acts of defensive armed 
force to preempt the attack before it is inflicted.457  The question remains unresolved whether the 
transformations wrought by Charter include impairment of the right of states to engage in ASD even 
under the narrowly delimited circumstances of necessity resulting from an imminent threat of sufficient 
magnitude.458  For restrictivists,459 ASD is a dangerous warrant for manipulative, self-serving states to 
engage in prima facie illegal aggression while cloaking their actions under the guise of legal legitimacy.460
For restrictivists Article 51 is unambiguous in its requirement that an armed attack occur prior to the 
lawful exercise of self-defense.  For the pragmatists, however, to read the Charter hypertechnically to 
require that a state assume the posture of a “sitting duck” and submit to potentially decisive first strike, 
thereby risking its survival, would completely alter customary law as it existed at the birth of the UN and 
“protect the aggressor’s right to the first stroke,”461 a logically and morally bankrupt conclusion.462  ASD is 
457
 In the strict sense, the doctrine of ASD is inapplicable to ongoing conflicts, under which circumstances the formal state of 
belligerence has been created, military operations are not designed to anticipate enemy attacks, and the rights of belligerents to 
self-defense cannot be said to depend upon whether it is possible to demonstrate an imminent threat, as the threat exists from the 
moment of the first strike.  See Schmitt, supra note 454, at 535 (“Once the first attack in an ongoing campaign has been launched, 
the issue of [ASD] becomes moot.”).
458
 Some commentators add the requirement that the threat be of sufficient magnitude as to justify resort to ASD on the theory that 
lesser threats can be managed without resort to force.  Addicott, supra note 444, at 778.
459
 A number of commentators hew to the restrictivist position and reject the post-Charter viability of the customary international 
law doctrine of ASD as incompatible with the regime regulating the resort to armed conflict established by the Charter.  See, e.g., 
DINSTEIN, supra note 433, at 159-85; LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8-10, 121-22 
(1995); ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 32 (1987); BROWNLIE, supra note 
449, at 257-61, 273-79, 366- 67; Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Prevent Terrorist Attacks, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 537, 541 
(1999).  At least one restrictivist approves ASD on policy grounds but rejects the doctrine as incompatible with the Charter.  See
Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 
Harv J L & Pub Poly 539, 539 (2002) (suggesting that although ASD can be a sound policy argument “it would plainly violate 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”).
460 See Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, in International Law: A Contemporary Perspective 394-410 
(Richard A. Falk eds. 1985) (developing arguments in support of this concern).
461 Waldock, supra note_, at 498; see also id. “[I]t would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending State 
to allow its assailant to deliver the first, and perhaps fatal, blow[.]”); Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards 
a Doctrine of Anticipatory Counter-Terrorism, FLA. J. INT’L L. 151, 184-85 (2002) (extrapolating the logic of a prohibition on 
ASD into a blanket of territorial inviolability for states that harbor the “most blatant preparation for an assault upon another 
state's independence[.]”).
462
 “Suppose military intelligence at the Pentagon received indisputable evidence that a hostile State was poised to launch 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, at a fixed zero hour only 24 hours ahead, against New York, Boston and Washington, would it 
be an aggressor under the Charter if it refused to wait until those cities had received the missiles before it reacted by the use of 
force? . . .[I]s it bound by law to wait for its own destruction?”  STONE, supra note 449, at 99.  Some restrictivists concede that a 
coherent theory of legal regulation of force in international relations must make room for ASD in some very limited 
circumstances.  See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 433, at 172-75 (arguing that the U.S. could legally have attacked the Japanese 
fleet en route to Pearl Harbor on the ground the U.S. had “clear and convincing” intelligence that the Japanese were committed to 
attack); WALZER, supra note 36, at 81 (allowing the permissibility of ASD where the enemy demonstrates “a manifest intent to 
injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or doing 
anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk.”); WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE THREAT OF TOTAL 
DESTRUCTION AND SELF-DEFENSE 259-60 (1964) (“[I]n the absence of effective international machinery the right of self-
defence must . . . be extended to the defence against a clearly imminent aggression, despite the apparently contrary language of 
Article 51[.]”). However, not all restrictivists are as tolerant of even a slight exception, and thus representatives to the San 
Francisco Conference questioned whether the argument that the Charter could be construed to abolish customary rights of self-
defense was politically and legally defensible.  See, e.g., U.N. Doc.A/2211, paras. 392-93 (indicating questioning of the delegates 
by Representative Maktos (U.S.) and van Glabbeke (Belgium) as to whether the U.S., if it had received prior notice of an 
impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, would have been branded an aggressor had it engaged in ASD to destroy the 
Japanese forces detailed to bomb Pearl Harbor).  A former jurist of the ICJ demonstrates the continued incongruity of the 
restrictivist position nearly sixty years later:
[C]ommon sense cannot require one to interpret an ambiguous provision in a text in a way that requires a state 
passively to accept its fate before it can defend itself.  And, even in the face of conventional warfare, this would also 
seem the only realistic interpretation of the contemporary right to self-defence . . . [T]his view accords better with State 
practice and with the realities of modern military conditions than with the more restrictive interpretation of Article 51[.]
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 242 (1994).
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thus, for pragmatists, consistent with the entitlement of states to defend against brewing threats even 
before they are attacked.463
B. Operationalization
A sharp theoretical bifurcation on the question of the lawfulness of ASD in the abstract dictates 
the result that ASD is almost invariably appraised in light of, and following, specific applications in 
practice.  Moreover, although a specific exercise of ASD is immediately opened to contestation, its legal 
legitimacy is often not ripe for review until long afterwards, when the defending state finally declassifies 
and submits the sensitive intelligence that established the factual predicate upon which its decision to act 
rested to public review.464  Accordingly, it is difficult to assess a particular act of ASD as “legal” or 
“illegal” ipso facto.  However, it is possible to establish causal linkages between personality profiles and 
decisions to resort to, or refrain from, the exercise of ASD under circumstances where the question as to 
whether or not to act in anticipation of a potential attack arises or might reasonably have arisen, and, 
secondarily, to link personality profiles to third party decisions as to whether instances of resort to ASD 
are lawful or otherwise justified.
Accordingly each DV will be dichotomized and scored as a either “yes” for the presence of the 
outcome or “no” for its absence.  Operationalization of DVs 1-3 are self-explanatory; DV 4 requires 
simply an assessment of whether the defending state offers any justification whatsoever for its actions; 
463
 For a discussion of ASD as the natural legal duty of states, see William Bradford, The Duty to Defend Them: A Natural Legal 
Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101  (2004, forthcoming).
464Some commentators insist that states engaging in ASD submit to an international “jurying” process whereby the evidence 
adduced by the state seeking a variance is “tried”  aforehand with the onus on the requesting state to prove its purity of motives, 
the proportionality of the proposed use of force, and the severity of the threat.  See Thomas M. Franck, The Use of Force in 
International Law, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7, at 15-17 (2003); Thomas Graham, National Self-Defense, International 
Law, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 14 (2003) insisting that if international relations is to become law-
governed, “states must openly justify their actions[,]” to include decisions to engage in ASD, to the review of states and 
international organizations).  However, considerations of bureaucratic inefficiency, opposing political interests, and the absence 
of effective transnational procedures for protecting shared intelligence sources and methods militate against submission to an 
international jury.  To wit, the establishment of the factual predicate of an imminent threat is a time-consuming process made all 
the more so by the machinery of the UN system.  See Post-Cold War International Security Threats: Terrorism, Drugs, and 
Organized Crime Symposium, MICH. J. INT’L L. 655, 716 (discussing bureaucratic inefficiencies and glacial pace of the UN 
system); Michael A. Lysobey, How Iraq Maintained its Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs: An Analysis of the 
Disarmament of Iraq and the Legal Enforcement Options of the United Nations Security Council in 1997-1998, 5 U.C.L.A. J. 
INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 135, 152-53 (2000) (describing Security Council as “plodding” and subject to the “whim of whatever 
political and economic factors are motivating the Council.”).  Moreover, proof requires the sharing of intelligence, something 
states are loathe to do with all but their closest allies for fear that revelation of the evidence will permit deductions as to how the 
evidence was acquired (methods) and by whom (sources), as well as the possibility that reviewers sympathetic to the target might 
share the intelligence with the target. Sara N. Scheideman, Standards of Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism, 50 Syracuse 
L. Rev. 249 (2000); see also Linkie, supra note_, at 573 (explaining that the U.S. cannot reveal all its evidence without 
compromising the human intelligence sources, who may be placed within terrorist organizations or supply networks, or 
disclosing its methods of interception and decryption of enemy communications); Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: 
The Strikes Again bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 567 (1999) (“[I]n the midst of a . . . war, a country defending its 
territory and its nationals will rarely be able to disclose intelligence sources in a public forum.”);  Graham, supra this note, at 7 
(conceding that it is very unrealistic to suggest that states be forced to disgorge the intelligence upon which they rely in taking 
measures to preempt attack).  Moreover, even after reviewing the evidence, states unwilling on other grounds to approve a 
proposed exercise of ASD are far less likely to concede that the proffered evidence is probative of the existence of an imminent 
threat.  Id.  Worse yet, the inaccessibility of the target state to the state engaging in ASD, coupled with the interest of target states 
in concealing relevant evidence of WMDs or terrorist training centers that would otherwise supply the “smoking gun” creates 
difficulties in acquiring and assembling all the evidence necessary to establish the factual predicate beyond a reasonable doubt 
that would be required in a domestic criminal case, yet the most strident critics of a particular exercise of ASD are likely to 
demand that the acting state clear this evidentiary hurdle. John-Alex Romano, Combating Terrorism and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Reviving the Doctrine of a State of Necessity, GEORGETOWN L.J. 1023, 1039-40 (1999). Even if the burden of 
proof were to be reduced to merely require a state to prove the facts justifying an exception to the general prohibition against self-
help by “sophisticated pleading backed by relevant and highly probative evidence,” as some suggest should suffice, states will be 
hard-pressed to satisfy this lesser standard.  Franck, supra note 465, at 16.
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DV 5 directs an inquiry into whether and how other states and the UN judge the lawfulness of the 
exercise of ASD, whereas DV 6 examines whether, although other states regard the act of ASD to have 
been formally unlawful they nonetheless recognize the legitimacy of its exercise in the specific 
circumstances by refraining from statements of condemnation; DV 7 is an assessment of whether formal 
legal sanctions are imposed upon the defending state; DV 8 is an assessment of whether, after the passage 
of time and the revelation of additional facts bearing upon the imminence of the threat, the act of ASD is 
now regarded as lawful and/or legitimate by other states; DV 9 is self-explanatory; and DV 10 requires a 
subjective assessment of whether, in light of all the available evidence and without any regard to the 
legality of the act of ASD in question, the actions of the defending state can objectively be said to have 
been preservative of peace, stability, justice, the rule of law, and/or other superordinate values held in 
common by the international community.
C. Causal Linkages and Preliminary Hypotheses
The following linkages between independent and dependent variables are proposed at this 
juncture as preliminary hypotheses [“PHs”]:
1. The more militaristic the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD as an option;
2. The more militaristic the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to engage in ASD;
3. The more militaristic the decisionmaker the less likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD;
4. The more militaristic the less likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD on legal, as opposed to 
strategic, grounds; 
5. The more militaristic the decisionmaker the less likely most other actors will be to judge the use of 
ASD to be lawful;
6. The more militaristic the decisionmaker the less likely most other actors will be to regard an exercise 
of ASD as legitimate;
7. The more militaristic the decisionmaker the less likely other actors will be to impose legal sanctions;
8. The more militaristic the decisionmaker the more likely other actors will be to regard an exercise of 
ASD as lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect;
9. The more militaristic the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be, in hindsight, to make the same 
decision again with regard to ASD;
10. The more militaristic the decisionmaker the less likely his/her decision with regard to ASD can fairly 
be said to have supported world order;
11. The more anomistic the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD as an option;
12. The more anomistic the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to engage in ASD;
13. The more anomistic the decisionmaker the less likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD;
14. The more anomistic the decisionmaker the less likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD on legal, as 
opposed to strategic, grounds;
15. The more anomistic the decisionmaker the less likely most other decisionmakers will be to judge the 
use of ASD as lawful;
16. The more anomistic the decisionmaker the less likely most other actors will be to regard an exercise of 
ASD as legitimate;
17. The more anomistic the decisionmaker the less likely other actors will be to impose legal sanctions;
18. The more anomistic a decisionmaker the less likely other actors will be to regard an exercise of ASD 
as lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect;
19. The more anomistic a decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be, in hindsight, to make the same 
decision again with regard to ASD;
20. The more anomistic the decisionmaker the less likely his/her decision with regard to ASD can fairly be 
said to have supported world order;
21. The more hostile the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD as an option;
22. The more hostile the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to engage in ASD;
23. The more hostile the decisionmaker the less likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD;
24. The more hostile the decisionmaker the less likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD on legal, as 
opposed to strategic, grounds;
25. The more hostile the decisionmaker the less likely most other decisionmakers will be to judge the use 
of ASD to be lawful;
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26. The more hostile the decisionmaker the less likely most other actors will be to regard an exercise of 
ASD as legitimate;
27. The more hostile the decisionmaker the less likely other actors will be to impose legal sanctions;
28. The more hostile a decisionmaker the more likely other actors will be to regard an exercise of ASD as 
lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect;
29. The more hostile a decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be, in hindsight, to make the same decision 
again with regard to ASD;
30. The more hostile the decisionmaker the less likely his/her decision with regard to ASD can fairly be 
said to have supported world order;
31. The more adventurist the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD as an option;
32. The more adventurist the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to engage in ASD;
33. The more adventurist the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD; 
34. The more adventurist the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to defend the use of ASD on legal 
as well as strategic grounds;
35. The more adventurist the decisionmaker the more likely most other decisionmakers will be to judge the 
use of ASD to be lawful.
36. The more adventuristic the decisionmaker the more likely most other actors will be to regard an 
exercise of ASD as legitimate;
37. The more adventuristic the decisionmaker the less likely other actors will be to impose legal sanctions;
38. The more adventuristic a decisionmaker the more likely other actors will be to regard an exercise of 
ASD as lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect;
39. The more adventuristic a decisionmaker the less likely s/he will be, in hindsight, to make the same 
decision again with regard to ASD;
40. The more adventuristic the decisionmaker the more likely his/her decision with regard to ASD can 
fairly be said to have supported world order.
III.  Personality and IHL Compliance: Testing the Theory
A. Data
Testing the theory requires analysis of available psychobiographical data concerning those HDs 
who made verifiable decisions with respect to whether to engage in ASD during historical armed conflicts 
in circumstances where a claim of right to engage in ASD, however contestable, either was made or could 
arguably have been made on the basis of available facts.465  Because the legal subregime regarding ASD 
did not arise until, arguably, 1929, data is necessarily unavailable before that year.466  However, available 
data, drawn from a series of 11 military crises, including World War II (1939-1945) the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (1962), the Six Day War (1967), the October War (1973), the Strike on Osiraq (1981), Libya 
(1986), Panama (1989), Iraq (1993), North Korea (1996), Afghanistan and Sudan (1998), and Iraq (2003), 
as well as from psychobiographical sources,467 permits dichotomous measurement and scoring of each 
relevant HD on each personality construct.  The universe of HDs encompasses 6 U.S. Presidents 
(Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Ronald W. Reagan, George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton, 
and George W. Bush) and 4 HDs of other nationalities (Josef Stalin, Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, and 
Menahem Begin).
1.  World War II (1939-1945) 
a.  Josef Stalin, Soviet Union: OPERATION BARBAROSSA (1941)
i. IVs: scores on personality constructs
a. militarism
465
 The selection of cases in the present study may be faulted for over- or under-inclusiveness; however, it is intended not to 
authoritatively resolve the question of which exercises or force, or failures to exercise force, can be considered as instances of
ASD but rather as a means to test a theory, prompt discussion, and generate future research directions.
466 See supra at p._ (discussing origins of jus ad bellum).
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Soviet premier Josef Stalin [“JS”] was a Georgian ideologue who reposited his loyalty not in the 
Georgian nation or even the Soviet state but rather in international communism.  Nevertheless, a 
communism triumph was an objective for which JS violently and diligently labored his entire life, first as 
a professional revolutionary and bank robber, then as a brutal organizational man in the Bolshevik 
structure, and finally as the Soviet premier,468 and because “nationalism” includes a belief in the 
superiority of a “philosophy of government”469 JS is scored as a nationalist.  JS was a brutal dictator and a 
pure authoritarian who ruled by mass purges, engineered starvation, show trials, and fear, and he ordered 
over 30 million Soviets to their deaths over a twenty-year period.470
Although JS lacked military experience or knowledge and in fact held a low opinion of the 
military,471 he was a hyper-competitive and –ambitious personality with a “single-minded sense of 
purpose” who believed a great struggle—economic, political, and military—was necessary to defeat 
capitalism and fascism.472  He was a consummate dogmatist who despised intellectuals and was “totally 
convinced that he was always right and the only person farsighted enough to lead his country.”473 JS was 
a socially withdrawn introvert with no interests save statecraft and no personal friends, and in fact others 
avoided him out of fear.474  Still, JS was a “man of enormous self-confidence” and self-esteem who scores 
high on all subconstructs of militarism save for military experience, and thus is scored as a militarist.
b. anomism
JS possessed a “strong streak of criminality and madness”475 that resulted in his expulsion from 
the seminary and induced him into an early career as a revolutionary, terrorist gunman, and bank robber.476
He was corrupt to the core,477 “devoid of any scruples” and a “master of sanctimoniousness, hypocrisy, 
and mendacity”478 who never experienced guilt or remorse for his mass murder of millions.479  JS, who had 
no legal training, scores high on every subconstruct of anomism and is scored an anomist.
c. hostility
Psychobiographers have reached a near-consensus that JS was a megalomaniac, a narcissist,480
and a clinical paranoid481 whose deep-seated antipathy toward the West was the animating force of his 
life.482  JS was a “first-rate tactician, intriguer, and plotter, playing enemies and potential enemies against 
467 See POST, supra note 232 (describing sources of psychobiographical data, including biographies, content analyses of 
speeches, press conferences, addresses, informal remarks, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, etc.).
468
 WALTER LAQUEUR, STALIN 7-9 (1999) (chronicling JS’s violent rise through the Communist system); Michael G. Smith, 
Stalin’s Martyrs: The Tragic Romance of the Russian Revolution, in Redefining Stalinism (Harold Shukman ed. 2003), at 100-02 
(same). 
469 See supra at p._.
470
 LAQUEUR, supra note 469, at 10, 33-34, 134.
471 Id. at 91, 219, 224 (noting JS’s disregard for and tactical and strategic ignorance of military matters).
472 Id. at 14, 149.
473 Id. at 160.
474 See id. at 8, 147, 160 (describing JS as an introvert feared by others).
475 Id. at 12.
476 Id. at 7-8.
477 See Jefffrey Brooks, Stalin’s Politics of Obligation, in Redefining Stalinism, supra note 469, at 50 (describing the “gift-giving, 
bribery, [an] official favours” JS used to cement political relationships among cronies).
478
 LAQUEUR, supra note 469, at 14.
479 Id. at 132.
480 See id. at 15 (noting that JS demanded extravagant praise in official biographies, poems, plays, songs, and other media and 
thrived on a cult of personality).
481 See id. at 134 (discussing expert opinions as to clinical diagnosis of JS).
482
 LAQUEUR, supra note 469, at 204.
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the other[,]”and as his deeds and his utter amoralism together attest, if only one pure cynic, misanthrope, 
and Machiavellian has ever walked the earth, his name was Joseph Stalin.483  Although JS’s fixation was 
ideological rather than ethnocentric, he hated his son in large measure for his marriage to a Jew.484  JS was 
a hostile, brutal man devoid of empathy and ruthlessly selfish, and under JS the Soviet Union had no 
allies, only temporary non-enemies.485  In short, JS scores high on every subconstruct of hostility and thus 
is scored as hostile.
d. aventurism
JS’s entire political program—communism—was predicated upon the assumption that mankind 
had the power to bring about the end of history, and although JS lived during a period of extreme trial and 
tribulation he remained remarkably optimistic that communism would succeed and that the Soviet Union 
would triumph over Nazi Germany.486   His early criminality and his failure to consider the consequences 
of the 1930s show trials, which destroyed the nucleus of the Red Army and many of the scientists that 
would prove necessary to the defeat of Nazism, suggests that JS was a risk-tolerant and impulsive 
personality.487  JS thus scores high on all subconstructs of adventurism and is scored an adventurist.
e.  summary of independent variables: JS
JS is scored as militaristic, anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic.
ii. DVs: ASD and OPERATION BARBAROSSA
Despite ample evidence that Germany intended to launch OPERATION BARBAROSSA—the 
invasion of the Soviet Union—in spring 1941,488 JS, whether convinced that reports were the product of a 
vast Allied conspiracy,489 that Hitler would not attack until defeating the UK, that a rapprochement with 
Hitler was possible,490 or that Soviet forces were unprepared for war until 1942 at the very least, did not 
seriously consider or engage in ASD.491  It is unlikely JS would have made a different decision if given the 
opportunity, as it is unclear whether a military advantage would have accrued to the Soviet Union while 
the political costs of attacking Germany would likely have outweighed any minor gains.
b. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S.: Pearl Harbor (1941)
i. IVs: scores on personality constructs
1. militarism
483 See Robert Service, Stalinism and the Soviet State Order, 7, 8, in Redefining Stalinism, supra note_ (describing JS’s view that 
humanity was a “mass to be indoctrinated, mobilised and . . . sacrificed for the good of the cause.”).
484
 LAQUEUR, supra note 469, at 153.
485 See generally id. (describing tempestuous and uncertain relationships of JS’s Soviet Union with supposed “allies”).
486 See id. (describing JS as a calm and optimistic person even during moments of seeming despair).
487 See supra note 471 (discussing the deaths of millions during the show trials).
488 See LAQUEUR, supra note 469, at 89, 220 (stating that JS had documentary evidence of the impending OPERATION 
BARBAROSSA but deliberately ignored it); Christopher Andrew & Julie Elkner, Stalin and Foreign Intelligence, in Redefining 
Stalinism, supra note 469, at 78 (noting that a great many Soviet intelligence agents and military intelligence officers reported 
Nazi preparations to attack Russia throughout June 1941).
489 Id. at 78 (describing JS’s “pathologically suspicious” approach to intelligence analysis and his denunciations of those who 
warned him, accurately, of the impending German attack as “disinformer[s]”).
490
 LAQUEUR, supra note 469, at 131.  JS may have believed it possible to stave off conflict with Germany by exploiting the war 
between the Allies and the Nazis and creating a territorial buffer of Eastern Europe.  See, e.g., SILVIO PONS, STALIN AND 
THE INEVITABLE WAR 1936-1941 xiii, 216-19 (2002) (offering this explanation for Soviet inaction in 1941).
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 Uri-Bar Joseph & Arie W. Kruglanski, Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom 
Kippur Surprise, 24 POL. PSYCH. 75, 75-76, 94.  Although the Soviet High Command presented JS with a plan for ASD against 
Germany, JS did not give it serious consideration.  PONS, supra note 491, at 220.
60
Although he did not harbor notions of the racial or ethnic superiority of the people of the U.S., 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt [“FDR”] was a patriotic nationalist who believed that the U.S. was a 
unique nation, by virtue of its democratic traditions and devotion to liberty,492 with a special historical 
mandate that charged him with a duty to lead its people through their struggle to overcome the Great 
Depression and the menace of fascism to a “rendezvous with destiny.”493  Recognizing and deeply valuing 
power as an instrument of policy, FDR led the U.S. in amassing and deploying tremendous military might 
to the defeat of the Axis powers.494  Although he had a tendency to be domineering and assertive, FDR 
was not an aggressive personality.495  Nevertheless, he had a strong authoritarian streak that manifested in 
his hierarchical management style, his unwillingness to consult with advisors, and his insensitivity to 
subordinates,496 and although FDR cannot be fairly described as a militarist,497 and despite his lack of 
military experience,498 he did not shy from the use of force to defend his core values.  Curiously, despite 
his lofty accomplishments and great ambition,499 FDR was not a particularly competitive person,500 and his 
choice of the Democratic Party as his political home was to a large extent predicated upon his desire to 
avoid the unpleasantry of competing for office-holding with his nephews, the sons of former President 
Teddy Roosevelt and members of the GOP.501
Although FDR was of above-average intelligence with a powerful memory and great personal 
energy,502 he is described as a “second-rate intellect” of fairly limited cognitive complexity.503  At the same 
time, although FDR was superlative at and very interested in maintaining interpersonal relationships, his 
interest in affiliation may have been primarily instrumental: he has been characterized as “difficult to 
know,” “aloof,” and disinterested in personal friendships.  This characterization may be a function of 
perceptions of the low self-esteem that plagued FDR following his debilitating battle with polio and his 
confinement to a wheelchair.
FDR scores high on nine of thirteen subconstructs of militarism—nationalism, FAP, patriotism, 
authoritarianism, dogmatism, ambitiousness, introversion, isolationism, and low self-esteem—and thus is 
scored as a militarist.
2.  anomism
492
 GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 24 (emphasizing FDR’s strong valuation of democracy and of an American role in world 
democratic leadership).
493 Id. at 16.  FDR came to believe in his teens or early twenties that “he would become God’s chosen, and the American people’s 
constitutionally elected, instrument for the stewardship of his country.”  CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN DELANO 
ROOSEVELT 39 (2003).
494 Id. at 24.
495 See Steven J. Rubenzer & T.R. Fashingbauer, Testing the Presidents: Personality and Character(s) Among America’s Leaders
(unpublished manuscript, 2002) (on file with author).
496
 LEWIS L. GOULD, THE MODERN AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 90 (2003); see also GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 22 
(noting that FDR purposefully fostered rivalries between his aides to buttress his authority).
497 See ROBERT S. THOMPSON, A TIME FOR WAR 43 (1991) (quoting FDR as describing war as a “contagion”).  Still, it is 
impossible to label FDR, a major agitator for U.S. entry into World War I, a pacifist.  BLACK, supra note 494, at 72-73.
498 Id. at 83 (reporting that FDR offered to resign as Secretary of the Navy to serve in the armed forces but was requested to 
withdraw his resignation by President Wilson).
499 See id. at 25 (describing FDR as ambitious to the point of being “nasty” and of attributing setbacks to “malice or unfairness” 
rather than to his own failings); Rubenzer, supra note 496.
500 See BLACK, supra note 494, at 53 (describing FDR as a person committed to “dilettantism” who “[went] through the motions 
to get along” at Groton, Harvard, Columbia Law School, and on Wall Street)/
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 GOULD, supra note 497, at 89.
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Although FDR publicly hailed the rule of law as one of the virtues of liberal democracy, and its 
absence as one of the vices of totalitarianism, in his private persona FDR regarded law as primarily a 
constraint susceptible to manipulation.  As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he was censured by the 
Senate for using illegal investigative means to identify and entrap homosexual sailors.504  When faced with 
a hostile Supreme Court, he attempted to change its composition by legislative fiat,505 and, as evidenced 
by his order interning Japanese Americans during World War II506 and his approval of illegal wiretaps and 
postal interceptions,507 constitutional rights were, for FDR, subordinate to his role as commander in chief 
during wartime, which role he exercised largely independent of democratic political constraints prior to 
late 1941.508  His attempts to transform legal institutions and rules or, alternatively, to interpret law to 
serve his objectives, suggests that FDR regarded legal authority, just as law, as external constraints that 
could be overcome by contrary power.509  Similarly, although FDR described the Axis powers as an 
“unholy alliance,”510 he did not always demonstrate a commitment to strong moral precepts in his personal 
life, having succumbed to a decades-long affair with his secretary beginning in 1918 that irreparably 
damaged his marriage.511 Available evidence strongly suggests that, although he attended Columbia Law 
School until 1906 (it is unlikely he had any training in IHL),512 for FDR moral considerations did not 
generate any duty to adhere to legal commands. Accordingly, FDR scores high on four subconstructs of 
anomism—disrespect for law, disrespect for legal authority, amoralism, and ignorance of IHL—and thus 
is scored an anomist.
3.  hostility
FDR, although neither a paranoid nor a misanthrope, was a cynical, suspicious man513 who 
anticipated the worst in others and did not abstain from manipulation to accomplish his objectives.514
Similarly, FDR has not been described as either particularly empathetic or altruistic: he was a realist who 
503
 GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 24-25 (highlighting an insensitivity to abstraction and a “striking capacity to ignore 
disagreeable realities”).
504
 ROY JENKINS, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 12-13 (2003).
505 See KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: INTO THE STORM 1937-1940 (1993) (discussing the failure of the “court-packing plan” 
designed to overcome opposition to FDR’s New Deal legislation mounted by the Republican-appointed members of the Supreme 
Court).  In his transmissions to Congress of his reasons for wishing to expand the Supreme Court, FDR further demonstrated 
some of the characteristics of anomism: he suggested, disingenuously, that the current members of the Court were unable to 
discharge their workload and that those over 70 required assistance.  JENKINS, supra note 505, at 94.
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 In 1942, FDR issued Executive Order 9066, ordering the internment of all persons of Japanese ancestry resident in designated 
military exclusion zones in the Western U.S. in concentration camps, an action upheld on grounds of military necessity.  See
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218, 223 (1944) (upholding internment order).
507 See THOMPSON, supra note 498, at 240 (noting FDR’s order to FBI to wiretaps of suspected spies despite absence of legal 
authority); id. at 240-41 (noting FDR ordered FBI to open mail of suspected “Fifth Columnists,” including Charles Lindbergh, 
despite opinion of his attorney general that there was no legal authority to do so).
508 See GOULD, supra note 497, at 94 (“Never fastidious about the law and procedural issues, [FDR] acted as a commander in 
chief rather than as an upholder of constitutional rights.”); id. at 95 (describing the “undeclared naval war against German 
submarines in 1941” that FDR waged without any disclosure to the public and with little notice to Congress).
509 See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 498, at 112 (reporting that during his reading of the oath of office at his second 
inauguration in 1937, FDR, in response to the words “promise to support the Constitution of the United States,” wanted to say, 
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 FDR is described as a “desultory” student who had little interest in or aptitude for law.  BLACK, supra note 494, at 49.  
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understood and appreciated the relevance of power and self-interest in international relations.  Still, his 
alliance preferences were motivated by instrumental concerns and not by a common ethnicity or culture, 
and as such he was not clinically ethnocentric.515  Moreover, FDR did not detach from reality, nor did he 
demonstrate the recklessness associated with narcissists.  
Furthermore, FDR was, even if by necessity rather than by design, a committed internationalist 
who recognized and capitalized upon the need for cooperative relationships with allies in order to defeat 
the Axis.516  Although FDR exhibited some of the values associated with Machiavellianism,517 particularly 
during the two years before U.S. entry into World War II,518 he cannot be characterized as entirely ruthless 
or utterly amoral,519 and the better description might be that he was a calculating, self-interested realist.  
Accordingly, because he scores high on five of ten subconstructs of hostility—distrust, cynicism, 
hostility, lack of empathy, and selfishness—FDR can be scored as either hostile or non-hostile; artful 
intuition directs the scoring of FDR as hostile.
4.  adventurism
Although he strongly believed in his ability to transform the domestic and international order, and 
although he was an optimist who assured the American people that “they only thing [they] ha[d] to fear 
was fear itself,”520 FDR was a cautious, risk-avoiding person who, during the most stressful decade of 
history, waited for situations to develop before committing himself.521  FDR recognized the limitations of 
will and the vagaries of fate and waited for the proper correlation of both, so much so that many scholars 
suggest that his over-caution resulted in failures to “exploit the leadership possibilities of the modern 
presidency.”522  However, FDR was calm, even serene, during stressful times,523 and because the best 
available evidence suggests that FDR scores high on only three subconstructs of adventurism—optimism, 
stress, and male sex—he is scored as a non-adventurist.
5.  summary of independent variables: FDR
FDR is scored a militarist who is anomistic and hostile and yet not adventuristic.
ii. DVs: ASD and Pearl Harbor
515 See JENKINS, supra note 505, at 140 (suggesting that although he refused to desegregate the armed forces, FDR was not 
racist or ethnocentric but simply pragmatic and unwilling to be “too much in advance of public opinion”); BLACK, supra note 
494, at 49 (noting that FDR was tolerant of Jews and other ethnic groups even in the face of others’ social prejudice).
516
 Additionally, FDR proposed several pre-war plans for Europe-wide collective security and trade liberalization that would have 
relied upon substantial U.S. participation had the Axis powers accepted them.  Id. at 515-16.
517 See, e,g, JENKINS, supra note 505, at 108 (describing FDR as Machiavellian for pretending to search for a successor after his 
second term while in reality only offering up unacceptable alternatives to create the impression that he was indispensable and 
thus deserving of a third term); see also BLACK, supra note 494, at 25 (describing “notorious” traits and “devious tendencies” of 
FDR, including the exaggeration of personal achievements and the denial of personal responsibility for shortcomings); id. at 540 
(describing FDR as “ruthless” in matters of foreign policy).
518 See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 498, at 274-77 (describing FDR’s secret diplomacy and his 1940 campaign promises to 
keep the U.S. out of World War II, a promise he had been intending to breach for at least two years); id. at 279-80 (describing 
how FDR offered Hollywood producers convicted of income tax evasion sentence deals in exchange for their release of overtly 
patriotic films to generate public support for his pro-war policy); id. at 354 (recounting FDR’s fabrication of a German attack 
upon a U.S. vessel).
519 See BLACK, supra note 494, at 829 (describing FDR as “just as Machiavellian as Hitler or Stalin at times, though, unlike 
them, he had a proper humanitarian concern for the consequences of his actions[.]”).
520
 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., Mar. 4, 1933.
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 GOULD, supra note 497, at 81.
522 Id. at 91.
523 See BLACK, supra note 494, at 39 (indicating that the source of FDR’s lack of anxiety was his “sense of oneness with the 
ongoing processes of the universe an dhis feeling of being . . . in tune with the infinite.”) (citation omitted).
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Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the U.S. undertook no 
estimate of the likelihood of such an attack, no determination of the probability of the damage that might 
be incurred, and no measures of preemption.524  Quite simply, the U.S., despite a series of warnings that an 
attack was part of a Japanese plan to dominate the Pacific, did nothing.525  Despite the impetus for FDR to 
at least contemplate ASD against Japan, he did not.526  Overconfidence, a widespread belief that the 
Japanese would not launch a surprise attack,527 and an overwhelming preoccupation with the German 
threat to the detriment of planning for a Pacific war have been offered as explanations;528 others suggest 
that FDR was committed to entering the war but simply refused to do so save for in circumstances that 
could not be characterized as other than self-defense.529  Still, given the opportunity to revisit the 
decisional moment and preempt the Imperial Fleet at sea, where U.S. naval power was more than a match, 
it is hard to imagine FDR, a man who knew war was inevitable and could have used his vast rhetorical 
power to explain to the American people that the Japanese attack had already been underway, would have 
refrained from doing so.
2.  President John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
a.  IVs: personality constructs
i. militarism
John F. Kennedy [“JFK”] was an ardent nationalist who challenged Americans to rise to the 
burden of national service and dedicated his presidency to the fulfillment of a historic duty to “pay any 
price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and 
success of liberty[.]”530  During World War II he served valorously in the South Pacific, setting the stage 
for his political career, and throughout his life he retained the belief that power was indispensable to the 
defense of freedom.531  However, JFK’s highly collegial and respectful management style disqualified him 
as an authoritarian,532 and although a spirit of intense competitiveness and an “overpowering need for 
achievement” were legacies of his domineering father, he did not adopt an aggressive approach to 
524
 For a comprehensive examination of the failure of the U.S. to anticipate and prevent the attack on Pearl Harbor, see generally
WOHLSTETTER, supra note 424.
525 See THOMPSON, supra note 498, at 369-88, 399- 400 (chronicling U.S. advance warning of the Japanese attack);
526 See BLACK, supra note 494, at 669 (indicating FDR knew that under U.S. economic embargo Japan, starved of material 
resources, would be obligated either to abandon its territorial ambitions in Southeast Asia or, more likely, attack the U.S.).
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 In his address to Congress on 8 December 1941, FDR expressed moral outrage that Japan would have “suddenly and 
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528 See generally WOHLSTETTER, supra note 424 (detailing in depth the origins of U.S. failure to anticipate Pearl Harbor).
529 See JENKINS, supra note 505, at 131 (reporting that during the summer of 1941 FDR commented to aides that he “was not 
willing to fire the first shot” and that he was “waiting to be pushed into [war].”) (quoting FDR); BLACK, supra note 494, at 676 
(stating that FDR “acquiesced knowingly in a policy that would result in a Japanese attack”); id. at 679 (describing FDR as 
“insistent on allowing [Japan] the first blow” in order to mobilize domestic opinion in favor of war).
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 John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., Jan. 20, 1961.
531 See J.F. Kennedy, The Cuban Missile Crisis, in T. Windt, ed.,, Presidential Rhetoric: 1961 to the Present, 3rd ed., at 9-11 (“[I]t 
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interpersonal relationships and in fact expressed a strong antipathy to aggression.533  Similarly, although 
JFK valued power in instrumental terms, he did not view force, as distinct from the ends force could be 
tasked to serve, as glorious or noble.
JFK was a cognitively complex and non-ideological person who understood the complexities of 
foreign policy and actively solicited contrary opinions in his decisionmaking; he was the antithesis of a 
dogmatic.534  His statement to the captive people of West Berlin in 1961, “Ich bin ein Berliner,” coupled 
with his great charisma, good sense of humor, and personal charm, evidence his need for affiliation and 
connection with others.535  Despite his lifelong poor health, and his concern that he would die at an early 
age from Addison’s disease,536 JFK had relatively high self-esteem.
In sum, JFK scores militaristic on six of thirteen subconstructs—nationalism, FAP, patriotism, 
military experience, competitiveness, and ambitiousness—and thus is scored a non-militarist.
ii.  anomism
Despite his general political conservatism, for JFK, law and morality were concepts applicable 
primarily to lesser persons.537  During his tenure in the White House, JFK’s view of law and morality
tended to be flexible in any circumstances. [He] also had no qualms about widespread wiretapping of his 
friends and enemies to plug leaks and to gather damaging evidence for use against suspected individuals.538
He was completely untroubled that his book, Why England Slept (1940), reached the best-seller list only 
because his father purchased the majority of the copies, nor did it disturb him that the award of the 
Pulitzer Prize for his book, Profiles in Courage (1953), was procured through the intervention of a 
journalist crony of his father and that the book itself was ghostwritten.539  Moreover, JFK took what can 
best be described as a very “casual view of his marriage vows[.]”540  Although JFK did not have any 
formal legal training, he was advised by his brother, Robert, whom he appointed Attorney General.  There 
is no evidence that either had any specific legal training in IHL.
In sum, JFK scores high on all five subconstructs of anomism and thus is scored an anomist.
iii. hostility
As his wiretapping of friends and foes alike evidences,541 JFK was a deeply suspicious person 
who was “fascinat[ed] . . . with sinister gimmicks and trickery as tools of presidential action.”542
Moreover, he was a “deeply hedonistic” and self-centered person who viewed others, particularly women, 
as objects to satisfy his needs.543  Although his high need for affiliation mitigated any tendency toward 
misanthropy, his experiences with Soviet leader Nikita Khruschchev and Cuban President Fidel Castro 
533
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exacerbated his cynicism and distrust and his sense that Communism, and communists, were invariably 
hostile to him personally and the free world more generally, and he developed the firm conviction that 
“any means was justified to bring down [Castro].”544  Strangely perhaps, JFK is cited for his great capacity 
to empathize even with political adversaries, particularly in his conduct of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
[“CMC”] wherein his ability to relate to Khrushchev’s concerns about U.S. missiles in Turkey and agree 
to a mutual withdrawal of missiles is regarded as the basis for the peaceful outcome.545  Finally, JFK’s 
selfless bravery in rescuing his crew members after the destruction of his vessel during World War II, 
coupled with his commitment of the U.S. to an enormous undertaking in defense of global liberty in his 
Inaugural Address and subsequent policy decisions, suggest that he scores high on the altruism as well as 
the internationalism subconstructs.
In sum, JFK scores high on five of ten subconstructs of hostility—distrust, narcissism, cynicism, 
hostility, Machiavellianism—and low on five subconstructs—misanthropy, ethnocentrism, lack of 
empathy, selfishness, and anti-internationalism.  JFK can thus be scored either as hostile or non-hostile; 
artful intuition counsels in favor of the former.
iv. adventurism
JFK took unwarranted risks, and psychobiographers describe him as lacking any agenda other 
than virulent anticommunism and the compulsive pursuit of glory.546  His response at the Bay of Pigs is 
generally characterized as an impulsive reaction with little forethought and little political will.547
Although his decisions during the CMC demonstrate learning, and although his advisors report that he 
was conscious of the desire to avoid miscalculation, he remained, in essence, a political gunslinger.548
Stress and anxiety were his constant companions: he lived under the shadow of disabling medical 
conditions, and “treated each day as if it were his last, demanding of life constant intensity, adventure, 
and pleasure.”549  Still, JFK retained a healthy measure of optimism, and believed he could assert 
significant control over events provided he mustered enough energy and attention to detail.550  JFK scores 
high on all seven subconstructs of adventurism and thus is scored an adventurist.
v.  summary of independent variables: JFK
JFK was a non-militaristic yet anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic decisionmaker.
b.  DVs: ASD and Cuban Missile Crisis
On 20 October 1962, the U.S., four days after acquiring credible intelligence that the Soviet 
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For JFK, crises were everywhere, and communism was at the root of it all.  See OFFERMAN-ZUCKERBERG, supra note 299, 
at 93 (“‘Crisis’ was a way of viewing the world for Kennedy.”).
545 See VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 14 (making this argument); GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 72 (“[I]f 
anyone is going to write after this, they are going to understand that every effort was made to find peace and every effort to give 
our adversary room to move.”) (quoting JFK comment to brother Robert during CMC).
546
 OFFERMAN-ZUCKERBERG, supra note 299, at 96 (anti-communism); VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 163-
75 (glory).
547
 GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 67-69.
548 See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS 40 (1967) (noting JFK did not want to enter a war out of “wounded pride”).
549
 GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 72.
550
 VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 163-75.
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Union was deploying medium-range nuclear-armed missiles ninety miles from U.S. shores in Cuba,551
demanded their removal and instituted a “pacific naval blockade,” an act of war under IHL,552 to prevent 
further shipments.  During a heated debate within the JFK Administration, senior officials of the 
Departments of Justice and State urged JFK to claim ASD as the legal justification for the blockade and 
subsequent airstrikes,553 and others counseled that to mount such an argument on the basis of the facts, 
which in their estimation could not support a claim that an “armed attack” had occurred or that a threat to 
the U.S. was imminent, would be to stretch the definition of ASD beyond reasonable bounds and 
“trivialize the whole effort at legal justification.”554  Although opponents of ASD could not convince JFK 
that the presence of missiles in Cuba did not constitute an imminent threat as a matter of policy,555 they 
prevailed on the question of legal justification, and JFK characterized the blockade not as an act of ASD 
under Article 51 but rather as regional action authorized by the Organization of American States556 under 
Articles 52 and 53 of the UN Charter557 and justified under his constitutional “duty to defend the security 
551
 The U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, produced photographic and documentary evidence establishing for the the 
Security Council the “smoking gun” that proved the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba and established the factual predicate for 
U.S. actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. KENNEDY, supra note 549, at 23, 105-10.
552 See Radio-TV Address of the President to the Nation from the White House (Oct. 22, 1963) (announcing the blockade). 
553 See Memorandum for the Attorney General, from Norbert A. Schlei, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: 
Legality under International Law of Remedial Action Against Use of Cuba as a Missile Base by the Soviet Union (Aug. 30, 
1962), at 2 (“The concept of self-defense in international law of course justifies more than activity designed merely to resist an 
armed attack which is already in progress.  Under international law every state has, in the words of Elihu Root, ‘the right . . . to 
protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself.’”).  For many administration 
officials, the presence of Soviet missiles a scant 90 miles from the U.S. transformed the relative capability of the Soviet Union so 
radically that this fact, standing alone, constituted a threat of such imminence that any proportional exercise of force would have 
been a permissible act of ASD under any legal standard.  See McGEORGE BUNDY, DANGER AND SURVIVAL 398 (1989) 
(describing views of Secretary of State Acheson and others).  Interestingly, even those administration officials who favored the 
blockade and airstrikes and would have defended these uses of force as legitimate acts of ASD considered providing limited 
advance warning to allies as well as target states on the belief that failure to do so would cause the U.S. to be “marked as a 
reckless aggressor and this Administration cursed forever as the force which opened the door to a world of catch-as-catch-can 
violence.”  See LAURENCE CHANGE & PETER KORNBLUTH (EDS.), THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: A NATIONAL 
SECURITY ARCHIVE DOCUMENTS READER 128-32 (1992) (reprinting a declassified document entitled “Air Strike 
Scenario for October 19, 1962”).  In other words, proponents of ASD in the context of the CMC recognized the obligation to 
justify its application lest failure to do so carry adverse legal and political consequences.
554 ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 65-66 (1974).  For Chayes and others, including a number of officials 
from the State Department, the Soviet deployment of missiles was not only not an imminent threat, it was not illegal, and to 
interpret their deployment as an armed attack to satisfy the requirements of Article 51 was simply unsustainable.  See JAMES G. 
BLIGHT & DAVID A. WELCH, ON THE BRINK: AMERICANS AND SOVIETS REEXAMINE THE CUBAN MISSILE 
CRISIS 40 (“[O]ur legal problem was that their [the Soviets] action wasn’t illegal[.]”).  Thus, to have asserted the doctrine of 
ASD under circumstances where not only could no objective imminent threat be openly identified but the action that would be 
claimed as haven given rise to an imminent threat was considered legal would have been to withdraw entirely the use of force in 
self-defense from the realm of international law:
No doubt the phrase “armed attack” must be construed broadly enough to permit some anticipatory response. But it is a 
very different matter to expand it to include threatening deployments or demonstrations that do not have imminent 
attack as their purpose or probable outcome. To accept that reading is to make the occasion for forceful response 
essentially a question for unilateral national decision that would not only be formally unreviewable, but not subject to 
intelligent criticism, either . . . . Whenever a nation believed that interests, which in the heat and pressure of a crisis it is 
prepared to characterize as vital, were threatened, its use of force in response would become permissible. In this sense, 
I believe an Article 51 defense would have signaled that the United States did not take the legal issues involved very 
seriously, that in its view the situation was to be governed by national discretion, not international law.
Id.
555 See John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 573 (2003) (noting that during the CMC the 
near-consensus among senior U.S. officials was that establishment of nuclear-armed missile bases in Cuba by the USSR 
constituted an imminent threat to U.S. security even absent proof of an “imminent” threat under the Caroline standard).
556
 The Organization of American States is a regional organization created in 1948 under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.  See
CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (1948).  On October 23, 1962, a resolution of the OAS 
General Assembly authorized member states to participate in the blockade of Cuba.
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 Sapiro, supra note 457, at 601.  Article 52 recognizes the existence of regional organizations with mandates for the 
maintenance of regional peace and security.  UN Charter, supra note 440, at Art. 52.  Article 53 contemplates that Article 52 
regional organizations may take enforcement action with the authorization of the Security Council.  Id. at Art. 53.
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of the United States”558 and to prevent a foreign power from extending its sphere of influence.559
In subsequent days the Security Council staged a parallel debate along Cold War lines over 
whether the blockade could be justified as a lawful act of ASD rather than an unlawful act of 
aggression.560  The expressed U.S. justification was largely ignored, reflecting the broad understanding 
that ASD provided the more legitimate, or even the sole defensible, position.  A number of states 
expressed strong opposition, alleging that the U.S. had adduced insufficient proof that the missiles had 
been emplaced for offensive purposes to meet the imminence threshold necessary to permit the exercise 
of ASD561 and that, as a consequence, the blockade was an unlawful exercise of force in violation of 
Article 2(4).  Others reached the opposite conclusion, judging the blockade a lawful act of ASD in 
response to an imminent threat posed by offensive missiles.562  Despite the intensity of the debate, 
however, the Security Council took no action,563 a fact U.S. officials interpreted as implied authorization 
for the resort to ASD.564  On October 28, the CMC ended with a public concession by the Soviet Union 
promising to withdraw all missiles from Cuba.565
Subsequent analysis has revealed a general agreement that the mere presence of Soviet missiles in 
Cuba did not constitute an imminent threat to the U.S. sufficient to satisfy the standard elaborated in the 
Caroline Case566 even though the U.S. response to the CMC is “widely accepted as legitimate.”567  The 
reason for the apparent gap between law and legitimacy may stem from the fact that many CMC scholars 
read into the silence of the Security Council on the question of the legitimacy of ASD a widespread 
implicit endorsement not only of the U.S. naval blockade but also of a more expansive legal basis for U.S. 
military action in self-defense than is provided by Article 53.568  JFK’s decision to institute a blockade is 
generally regarded as having been instrumental in forcing Khruschev to retreat from a reckless policy 
558 See Proclamation No. 3504, 27 FED. REG. 10,401 (1962).
559 See BESCHLOSS, supra note 545, at 447 (noting that JFK referenced the Monroe Doctrine in developing his theory of legal 
justification for intervention in Cuba).
560 See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 74-76 (1993) 
(characterizing Security Council debate over U.S. blockade as having been couched in terms of ASD).
561
 A bloc of states rejected the blockade as a violation of Article 2(4) not otherwise permissible under Article 51 on the ground 
that unless the U.S. could prove an offensive purpose for the missiles it could not demonstrate an imminent threat against which 
the lawful exercise of ASD could be maintained.   See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 17th Sess.,, 1023d mtg., at 19, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1023 
(1962) (statement of Quaison-Sackey, delegate of Ghana) (arguing that there was insufficient proof to conclude that the missiles 
had been emplaced for offensive purposes and that as a result the U.S. blockade was not in response to an imminent threat and 
therefor not lawful); see also Sean M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi Threat: A Critical 
Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, MIL. L. REV. 115, 134-35 (1999) (noting that the Soviet Union, Ghana, Romania, and the 
United Arab Republic led opposition to the U.S. blockade as an act of ASD).
562
 AREND & BECK, supra note 561, at 75 (listing states in support of the blockade as Chile, France, Ireland, Taiwan, the United 
Kingdom, and Venezuela).
563
 The Security Council took no action in respect of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE 
PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II, 217-18 (1997).
564 See Abram Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 550, 556 (1963) (“[F]ailure of the Security Council 
to disapprove regional action amounts to authorization within the meaning of Article 53.”); see also Leonard C. Meeker, 
Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM.J.INT'L L. 515, 522 (1963) (arguing that since the quarantine continued with the
knowledge of the Security Council, “authorization may be said to have been granted[.]”).
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 CHANG & KORNBLUH, supra note 554, at 347-400 (discussing the resolution of the CMC).
566 See Schmitt, supra note 454, at 488-89 (concluding that the “Soviets did not deploy missiles in Cuba in order to launch a war” 
but rather to achieve parity with the U.S.); Roberts, supra note 8, at 528-29 (contending that the presence of Soviet missiles in 
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 Wedgwood, supra note 465, at 584.
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 Several commentators have criticized the doctrine of implicit Security Council authorization of regional organizations as 
enforcement mechanism as inconsistent with the express terms of the UN Charter.  See, e.g. (note). 
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decision and in promoting enhanced dialogue and reduced superpower hostility.  As such, the decision to 
engage in ASD is one that contributed to world order and that JFK would have likely have made again 
under identical circumstances.
3.  Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and the Six Day War (1967)
a.  IVs: scores on personality constructs
i. militarism
Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol [“LE”] was a Zionist pioneer who dedicated his life to the 
enormously ambitious project of re-establishing Israel after two millennia of diaspora.  Although LE 
served in the Jewish Legion of the British Army during World War I,569 there were decided limits to his 
ambition, competitiveness, and militarism: compromise and finesse were his policy instruments of choice, 
and power was to be used only sparingly.570  He was an easy-going and flexible person who would labor 
to avoid disagreement and “[i]n every argument made an effort to see both sides of the coin[.]”571  LE was 
“warm and wise,”572 with a “great sense of humor,”573 and he was excellent at establishing good rapport 
and maintaining friendships with a wide range of people.574
In sum, LE scores as militaristic on only four of ten subconstructs of militarism—nationalism, 
patriotism, military experience, and ambitiousness—and thus is scored a non-militarist.
ii. anomism
Available data does not offer much insight into LE’s attitudes toward law and legal authority.  It 
is likely unfair to generalize from his violation of British Mandatory arms importation restrictions prior to 
the War of Independence in 1948.575  Moreover, LE had a traditonal Talmudic education and was raised 
by devout parents, and although he appears to have developed a more non-ideological approach576 to 
moral judgment than might be prescribed by his Orthodox ancestry577 he remained dedicated to being 
perceived personally, and to having Israel perceived, as “one of the good guys.”578  He had no formal legal 
training.  In sum, LE scores high on only two of five subconstructs of anomism—ignorance of law and 
ignorance of IHL—and thus is scored a non-anomist.
iii. hostility
Although the Russian pogroms “hung over [his] head all the time[,]”579 LE treated others as 
worthy of his trust until he had reason to believe otherwise, and as ends rather than as means.580  His 
569
 TERENCE PRITTIE: ESHKOL: THE MAN AND THE NATION 39 (1969).
570 See SHIMON PERES, SEVEN FOUNDERS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 79-80 (1968) (describing LE as “flexible”, 
dedicated to the “art of compromise[,]” and convinced that “without compromise life is impossible[.]”); PRITTIE, supra note 
570, at 39 (stating that LE “recoiled from militarism”).
571
 PERES, supra note 571, at 103.
572
 MICHAEL B. OREN, SIX DAYS OF WAR 98 (2002).
573
 PERES, supra note 571, at 79-80.
574 Id. at 90; PRITTIE, supra note 570, at 206.
575 See http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00fr0 (last visited Ap. 17, 2004); PRITTIE, supra note 570, at 54-55 (describing 
LE’s 1921 arrest by the British for gunrunning).
576 Id. at 13 (describing LE as a non-ideologue).
577 See supra at note 572 (discussing his flexibility and capacity to see and empathize with every point of view).
578
 OREN, supra note 573, at 123.
579
 PRITTIE, supra note 570, at 4.
580 See PERES, supra note 571.
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capacity to empathize and sacrifice his own interests for the benefit of others are well-chronicled,581 as is 
his commitment to constructive engagement with other states on behalf of his embattled nation.582 LE thus 
scores as hostile on none of the subconstructs of hostility and is scored as non-hostile.
iv. adventurism
LE was highly risk-averse and indecisive.583  Although he was comfortable in most social 
situations,584 the demands of crisis decisionmaking filled him with anxiety and rendered him, to some 
degree, paralyzed by fear of failure.585  Although he was optimistic generally, and although he remained 
outwardly calm,586 under conditions of high stress LE was decidedly pessimistic and fatalistic.587  In sum, 
LE scores as adventuristic on only three of seven subconstructs of adventurism—anxiety, stress, and male 
sex—and thus scores as a non-adventurist.
v. summary of independent variables: LE
LE is a non-militaristic, non-anomistic, non-hostile, and non-adventuristic decisionmaker.
b.  DV: ASD and the Six Day War
In May 1967, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, after months of hostile public statements 
expressing an intent to destroy Israel,588 evicted the UN Emergency Force in Sinai,589 closed the Gulf of 
Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping,590 and deployed Egyptian forces in an offensive posture 
on maximum alert status near the Israeli border.  Although Egypt conceded that the closure of the 
waterways was a belligerent act, Nasser justified the measure on the ground that Israel and Egypt had 
continued in a state of war since 1948 and that either party could engage in belligerency without altering 
the legal status quo.591  In response, LE, although he still believed Nasser did not intend war but merely 
wished to enhance his pan-Arab credentials by blustering against Israel,592 warned that Israel would regard 
the re-opening of the waterways as an act of self-defense.593  In turn, Egypt defended the closure as an act 
oriented toward ensuring the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.594  While Israel 
581 See, e.g., id.; PRITTIE, supra note 570, at 117 (describing LE’s great concern for and efforts on behalf of workers in his 
capacity as Secretary General of the Tel Aviv Labor Council); id. at 185 (describing LE’s gift for “understanding what was in a 
simple man’s mind, talking about it with him as an equal, making him feel that he mattered.”).
582 See infra at pp._ (discussing LE’s efforts to secure diplomatic support for Israeli in the weeks before the Six Day War).
583
 PERES, supra note 571, at 103; PRITTIE, supra note 570, at 183 (referencing jokes about LE as indecisive, such as that he 
was  a man whose slogan was, “Don’t postpone until the morrow what can be postponed until the day after tomorrow”).
584
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585 See OREN, supra note 573, at 89 (describing LE’s near emotional collapse in late May 1967).
586 PRITTIE, supra note 570, at 105.
587 See PERES, supra note 571, at 109 (describing LE’s general optimism as limited to routine conditions).
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589 Special Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/6669, at 1  (1967); Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in 
the Near East, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/7896 (1976).
590 See id. at  S/7906.
591 See Comment, The Arab-Israeli War and International Law, 9 HARV. INT’L L. J. 232, 245 (1968) (recounting the Egyptian 
legal justification for the closure of the waterways and the eviction of UN forces in Sinai).
592 See OREN, supra note 573, at 76-77 (stressing, however, that other members of his Cabinet were convinced that war was 
inevitable); see also id. at 83 (noting even Nasser calculated the probability of war as greater than 50 percent in late May).
593 See SAFRAN, supra note 589, at 269 (“Any interference with freedom of shipping in the Gulf and in the Strait constitutes a 
gross violation of international law, a blow at the sovereign rights of other nations, and an act of aggression against Israel.”) 
(statement of Prime Minister Eshkol).  IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin finalized plans for ASD against Egypt, code-named 
OPERATION MOKED, in late May.  OREN, supra note 573, at 79.
594 See AL AHRAM (Cairo), May 30, 1967 (“The issue today is not the question of Aqaba, or the Strait of Tiran, or U.N.E.F.  The 
issue is the rights of the people of Palestine, the aggression against Palestine that took place in 1948, with the help of Britain and 
the United States....  [Others] want to confine [the conflict] to the Strait of Tiran, U.N.E.F., and the rights of passage.  We say: 
We want the rights of the people of Palestine--complete.”) (statement of President Nasser to Egyptian National Assembly); see 
also U.A.R. Statement on Withdrawal of U.N.E.F. and Closing of Strait of Tiran to Israeli Ships, in part reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 573 
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dispatched emissaries to Western capitals to seek diplomatic assistance to resolve the brewing crisis,595
Egypt incorporated the armed forces of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq under its unified command and began 
flying combat air patrols in Israeli airspace.596
In the last days of May and the first weeks of June, a bitter schism divided the Israeli 
government.597  One camp, led by the IDF, was adamant that unless ASD was immediately employed 
against Egypt, Israeli survival was in jeopardy.598  A second, consisting almost exclusively of LE and a 
few aides, refused to approve ASD until efforts to secure diplomatic support had been exhausted and 
Israel could ensure “that the world knows that [sh]e waited long enough.”599  Only after Israeli diplomats 
in the U.S. and Europe were rebuffed did LE conclude that Israel could make this case.600 On the morning 
of June 5, 1967, Israel launched a decisive air campaign against the air forces of the UAR Unified 
Command, to which the Arab states, despite suffering complete tactical surprise and the destruction of 
their air forces, responded by attacking with ground forces across their borders with Israel.  In subsequent 
days Israel defeated combined Arab ground forces and captured the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and 
the Golan Heights, and by June 10 all parties had accepted a ceasefire.601  An intra-cabinet debate over 
whether to claim that Egypt had initiated hostilities was resolved in favor of the truth.602
In the aftermath of the brief but decisive conflict, Israel justified its attack under Article 51 in part 
on the premise that the closure of the Straits of Tiran constituted an “armed attack” justifying force in 
self-defense603 and in part on the basis that the presence of the troops of a hostile state on its southern 
border, coupled with the clearly expressed intent of that state to destroy Israel and convincing intelligence 
that an Egyptian attack was imminent, posed a serious and imminent threat to its national security 
justifying the exercise of ASD.604  The ensuing debate within the Security Council largely rejected the 
former argument and centered upon the reasonableness of the Israeli attack, inquiring whether under the 
circumstances the threat could have been considered sufficiently imminent to dispatch with the 
(1967) (excerpting speech by Nasser to UAR Air Force Advanced Command, May 22, 1967, and defending actions as on behalf 
of Palestinian people).
595
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requirement of an “armed attack” as a condition precedent to self-defense.605  As might have been 
expected during the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its Arab clients steered the discussion 
away from the threat Egypt and Syria had posed to Israel and focused formalistically on the text of Article 
51, defining the Israeli action as ipso facto illegal aggression in violation of Article 2(4) by virtue of the 
fact that Israel had been first to resort to the overt use of force. Predictably, the Russo-Arabic bloc 
categorically refused to engage on the question of the availability of ASD.606  In contrast, although little 
serious consideration was paid to the argument that the closure of the Straits of Tiran constituted an 
“armed attack,” the U.S. and other Western states defended the Israeli position that the imminence and 
magnitude of the threat justified the exercise of ASD, and this bloc shielded Israel from adverse legal 
judgment: although the Security Council did not make an official pronouncement upon the legitimacy of 
ASD in context, none of the three Resolutions that emerged from the aftermath of the Six Day War 
condemned Israeli actions.607
Although the question of whether the threat to Israel was in fact sufficiently imminent to justify 
ASD remains the subject of legal and political wrangling, most commentators view the Israeli claim that 
the threat justified the response to be reasonable.608 More importantly, commentators generally read into 
Security Council silence on the legitimacy of the Israeli ASD argument implicit support for the 
proposition that the right to ASD continues in force under the customary international law of the Charter 
era, particularly where the survival of a state is arguably at issue.609  Had LE not ordered ASD, it is likely 
that Israel would have ceased to exist and that the second Holocaust promised by Nasser would have 
materialized,610 and it is inconceivable that LE would have considered, in retrospect, that he had made 
anything other than the proper decision.
4.  Prime Minister Golda Meir and the October War (1973)
a.  independent variables: scores on personality constructs
i. militarism
605
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Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir [“GM”] dedicated her life to the resurrection of the Israeli state 
and the restoration of the Jewish people to freedom and independence.611  Although she preferred 
negotiated compromise to blunt force,612 loathed war,613 and had no understanding of martial matters,614 she 
was a tough authoritarian who “r[an] her Cabinet like a front-line officer, thumping the table for order, 
and making blunt and rapid decisions.”615   GM was a highly dogmatic leader who, although she would 
allow others to speak, did not appreciate subtlety and would move quickly to decisions from which she 
was immovable.616  Despite this, however, she was a friendly and gracious extrovert whose social skills 
were instrumental in raising funds for the Jewish State617 and who enjoyed lifelong friendships, 
popularity,618 and high self-esteem.619 In sum, GM scores as militaristic on six of thirteen subconstructs of 
militarism—nationalism, patriotism, authoritarianism, competitiveness, dogmatism, and ambitiousness—
and thus is scored as non-militaristic.
ii. anomism
Although there is little information as to whether GM was remarkable in her respect for law or 
her degree of moralism, as a child GM survived pogroms at the hands of the Cossacks, and from this 
experience developed a lifelong fear of and revulsion for authorities.620  Coupled with her lack of legal 
training, it is fair to conclude that GM must be scored as high on at least three of five subconstructs of 
anomism—lack of respect for legal authority, ignorance of law, and ignorance of IHL—and thus she is 
scored an anomist.
iii. hostility
After suffering persecution in Russia, it is unlikely that GM ever reacquired a significant degree 
of trust in others.  Nonetheless, GM did not become cynical or embittered, instead remaining a simple and 
unaffected person who, despite her personal strength and political power, retained great compassion for 
and sensitivity to others.621  Moreover, although she labored tirelessly on behalf of her own ethnic and 
cultural group, there is no indication that she developed a sense that Jews were superior to, rather than 
simple the equal of, other nations, and her foreign policy orientation reflected her desire for Israel to 
become an enmeshed member of the international community.  However, GM was well aware of the 
degree of hostility that others manifested towards Jews generally and Israel particularly.622   GM thus 
611 See PEGGY MANN, GOLDA: THE LIFE OF ISRAEL’S PRIME MINISTER 127-28 (1971).
612 See id. at 231 (lauding GM’s “tremendous” skill at negotiation and “realistic understanding of when and how to compromise”).
613 See id. at 242 (noting that GM’s public addresses frequently refer to her desire for peace and her abhorrence for war); id. at 
191 (“Can we envisage what a  state of peace between Israel and her neighbors during the past eight years would have meant for 
all of us . . . Substitute cooperation between Israel and her neighbors for sterile hatred and ardor for destruction, and give life and 
hope and happiness to all its peoples”) (quoting GM address to General Assembly).
614 See ABRAHAM RABINOVICH, THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 90 (2004) (stating that GM “had no idea what a division was.”).
615
 MANN, supra note 612, at 231.
616 See id. at 231 (referring to aides’ comments about her stubborness); id. at 187 (referencing her dislike for subtlety); RALPH G. 
MARTIN, GOLDA MEIR: THE ROMANTIC YEARS 29 (1988) (reporting description of GM by her sister as stubborn, unable 
to admit errors, unwilling to concede points in arguments)
617 See MANN, supra note 612, at 44 (linking her success as fundraiser for Jewish National Fund with her social skills).
618 Id. at 70, 203.
619
 VERTZBERGER, supra note 248, at 174; MENAHEM MEIR, MY MOTHER, GOLDA MEIR (1983).
620
 MANN, supra note 612, at 10; see also MARTIN, supra note 617, at 7-8, 15- 16 (“It doesn’t matter where it will be—it is the 
same story, the same story.”) (quoting GM on the inevitability of state-sanctioned repression).
621 See MANN, supra note 612, at 231 (“She has the best qualities of a women—intuition, insight, sensitivity, compassion—plus 
the best qualities of a man—strength, determination, practicality, purposefulness.” (quoting Simcha Dinitz).
622 See MARTIN, supra note 617, at 6. 67-68 (describing GM as particularly sensitive to and aware of anti-Semitism).
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scores as high on only two subconstructs of hostility—distrust and hostility—and thus is scored as non-
hostile.
iv. adventurism
GM disliked risk, and dreaded accession to the office of Prime Minister where she would be 
obligated to make momentous decisions: on becoming Prime Minister, she conceded that
I have always carried out the missions the state placed on me, but they have always been accompanied by a 
feeling of terror.  The terror exists now.623
GM was a deliberate and cautious decisionmaker who believed that if she worked hard enough she could 
be successful,624 and yet she carried around a sense of pessimism and fatalism that pervaded her 
administration.  GM often vented her emotions under the tremendous strain of her responsibilities.625
In sum, GM scores as high on only three of seven subconstructs of adventurism—internal locus of 
control, anxiety, and stress—and thus is scored a non-adventurist.
v. summary of independent variables: GM
GM is anomistic yet non-militaristic, non-hostile, and non-adventuristic.
b. dependent variables: ASD and the October War
After six years of low-intensity conflict post-Six Day War, tensions began to build in the early 
autumn of 1973, and Egypt stealthily began to deploy forces into the Sinai toward the Bar-Lev Line, the 
series of Israeli fortified positions constructed after the Six Day War to deter Egyptian aggression.  Syria 
accelerated military mobilization simultaneously.  By late September, Israeli intelligence was reporting 
plans for a Syrian attack in the Golan Heights, Israel and Syria had begun to escalate an ongoing aerial 
war,
626
 and evidence was beginning to mount of a planned Egyptian strike.627  GM, “confident that Israel’s 
geopolitical situation had never been better”628 after its overwhelming strategic victory of combined Arab 
armies in 1967 and advised by her senior military commanders that the chance of war with Egypt was 
“very low”629 but that if war came Israel would so decisively defeat her adversaries that “they’ll need five 
years to lift their heads up again,”630 did not respond to the Egyptian and Syrian mobilization.  GM is also 
reported to have commented that “there is always the possibility that [Israel] will need help, and if we 
strike first, we will get nothing from anyone.”631
At  2:30 A.M. on October 5, 1973, a Mossad agent reported that Egypt and Syria were going to 
initiate war in the “late afternoon” the next day, and at a cabinet meeting that morning Chief of Staff Dan 
Elazar, having already sent out orders to the IDF to prepare to engage Egypt and Syria, recommended that 
Israel engage in ASD in order to enhance the chance for survival and reduce casualties,632 while Minister 
of Defense Moshe Dayan counseled in favor of a limited mobilization on the ground that a preemptive 
623
 Cited in MANN, supra note 612, at 230.
624 Id. at 265.
625 Id. at 223 (noting that GM would not infrequently cry in public).
626
 RABINOVICH, supra note 615, at 51.
627 See id.  at 67-70 (presenting and evaluating evidence).
628 Id. at 11.
629 See id. at 23 (citing the assessment of Israeli intelligence as to war with Egypt); see also id. at 56-61 (discussing internal 
analysis of raw intelligence and debate over its significance within Israeli military intelligence).
630 Id. at 41 (quoting IDF Chief of Staff Elazar).
631
 SYDNEY BAILEY, FOUR ARAB-ISRAELI WARS AND THE PEACE PROCESS 307 (1990) (quoting GM).
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strike would portray Israel as the aggressor.633  GM, hoping diplomacy would avert war and that if the 
Arab states recognized they had lost the element of surprise they would not carry out their plans, and 
convinced that if Israel struck first “we won’t get help from anybody,”634 transmitted a message to Egypt 
and Syria through the U.S. advising that Israel would not engage in ASD but would meet and defeat an 
Arab attack.635  Expecting to continue the discussion on October 8th after Yom Kippur, the meeting 
adjourned.
By the next day it was too late.  Egypt launched OPERATION BADHR and Syria initiated 
OPERATION AL AWDA in the afternoon of October 6th, and by October 8th Arab armies were advancing 
and Israeli commanders were considering abandoning front-line defenses for fallback positions.636  GM 
was so despondent over the news that she contemplated suicide.637  By the end of the week Israel had 
turned the tide and staved off defeat, yet lthough she was absolved of responsibility for the near-disaster 
by the Agranat Commission in 1974, GM resigned as a consequence of the political fallout of her 
mistaken decisionmaking during the October War and left public life embittered.638  In retrospect, the 
failure to preempt Egyptian and Syrian threats was a cataclysmic error that, but for U.S. intervention on 
behalf of Israel, might have spelled the end of the Jewish state.
d. Prime Minister Menahem Begin and the Strike on Osiraq (1981)
a. independent variables: scores on personality constructs
i. militarism
Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin [“MB”] was a “deeply nationalistic” person whose 
political identity was shaped by his study of Zionist philosophers Theodor Herzl and Vladimir 
Jabotinsky.639  Power was not only the primary currency of his brand of Zionism but something to be 
hoarded and used in self-defense: MB was an aggressive force behind a new ideology of the Jews as a 
people who fought back against oppression rather than accepting their lot.640  According to MB,
From time to time [bullies] descended on me at school, but I learned to defend myself.  I never bowed my 
head.  If someone raised his hand to me, I paid him in the same coin.  There were times when I cam home 
bruised and bloodied—but with the feeling that my honor was intact.  As time went by I learned that the 
ones who hit me treated me with respect when I hit back.  They learned their lesson.641
In short, MB “truly believe[d] that Israel’s enemies w[ould] respect her only if they respect[ed] and 
recognize[d] her power.”642
In Palestine, MB joined the Irgun Zvi Leumi [“IZL”], an extremist paramilitary group opposed to 
British mandatory power, and led a series of missions at great personal risk to pressure the British and the 
632 See RABINOVICH, supra note 615, at 89 (noting that Elazar played upon GM’s “extreme sensitivity to casualties”).
633 See WALTER BOYNE, THE TWO O’CLOCK WAR 26 (2002) (describing debate at 5 October cabinet meeting); 
RABINOVICH, supra note 615, at 87 (“We’re in a political situation in which we can’t do what we did in 1967.”) (quoting 
Dayan on October 6th).
634 Id. at 89 (quoting GM).
635 Id. at 76; BOYNE, supra note 634, at 28.
636
 RABINOVICH, supra note 615, at 219.
637 Id. at 219-20
638
 EITAN HABER, MENAHEM BEGIN: THE LEGEND AND THE MAN 295 (L. Williams trans. 1978).
639 Id. at 22-26.
640 See ERIC SILVER, BEGIN: THE HAUNTED PROPHET 8 (1984) (“The defencelessness [sic] of the Jews [is] the real 
scourge of our life, for centuries . . . That must never happen again.”) (quoting MB).
641
 HABER, supra note 639, at 29.
642 Id. at 25.
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Palestinian Arabs to quit the country.643  For MB “conflict was essential to political transformation.”644
Moreover, MB was the paradigmatic dogmatist who could not be dissuaded from preconceptions,645 and 
human relationships were valuable to him only instrumentally.646  He was an insensitive and authoritarian 
leader and father647 who suffered from low self-esteem.648
MB scores as militaristic on all subconstructs of militarism and is thus scored a militarist.
ii. anomism
In reprisal for the execution of IZL guerrillas convicted of terrorism, MB, who attended law 
school at Warsaw University in the 1930s649 and was familiar with IHL,650 ordered the abduction and 
hanging of captured British soldiers, an act he knew was illegal but which he justified out of necessity:
I understand only too well the feelings of the . . . families [of hung British POWs], but what choice did we 
have?  We were in the midst of a war for our liberation.  The British regime threw its full military might 
against us.  They treated our fighters as if they were common criminals instead of prisoners of war.  When 
they sentenced men to death, we warned them that we would answer in kind.651
Despite his demonstrated lack of respect for law and legal authority, MB had a coherent internal moral 
code that prescribed, in effect, “an eye for an eye, and defend one’s honor no matter what the price.”652
He was an observant Jew who placed his faith before most other considerations.653  Moreover, MB 
believed that the Jews had a “natural right” to the land of Israel654 and that any activities in support of this 
right had divine imprimatur.655
MB scores as high on three of five subconstructs of anomism—disrespect for law, disrespect for 
legal authority, and moralism—and thus scores as an anomist.
iii. hostility
During World War I, Cossacks burned down the Begin family home,656 and the experience of 
pogroms and the Holocaust taught MB about the depths to which some would sink in expressing their 
antisemitism.  Although MB is not described in terms that would suggest any narcissism, he was just 
643 Id. at 143; see also id. at 255 (“I cannot forget the little I know of [MB’s] activity . . . the murder of scores of Jews, Arabs, and 
Englishmen in the demolition of the King David Hotel; the pogrom in Dir Yassin[.]”) (quoting David Ben-Gurion, the first Israeli 
Prime Minister).
644 Id. at 50.
645 Id. at 276 (reporting that “nobody could change [MB’s] mind”); id. at 284 (relating MB’s pronouncement that he would “cut 
off his right hand” before he would restore territory captured from Israel’s enemies).
646 Id. at 227.
647 Id. at 45, 239 (describing MB as anti-democratic” and “dangerous”); id at 300 (describing MB as a very strict father).
648 See NED TEMKO, TO WIN OR TO DIE: A PERSONAL PORTRAIT OF MENACHEM BEGIN 17 (1987) (noting that MB 
“ached to be liked” but “expected rejection” and “ended up a recluse” and an “object of pity”); id. at 297 (MB was a “hurt, 
insecure, angy shtetl Jew—an ugly child, a weakling, and a loner forced to find ways to prevail.”).
649
 HABER, supra note 639, at 37.
650 See TOMKO, supra note_, at 93, 102-03 (reporting that MB was adamant that, despite his bombing of the King David Hotel in 
Jerusalem in 1946 “the rules of Land Warfare . . . had been observed” inasmuch as the IZL gave short notice beforehand but that 
following British executions of captured IZL soldiers MB informed his forces they were “no longer . . . bound by the normal 
rules of warfare”).
651
 Cited in HABER, supra note 639, at 178; see also SILVER, supra note 641, at 65-76 (discussing MB’s anti-British activities).
652
 HABER, supra note 639, at 29.
653 See id. at 20 (relating that as a high school student MB failed Latin, a subject in which he excelled, because his teacher would 
not let him observe the Sabbath on which day the exam was scheduled); see also SILVER, supra note 641, at 6 (describing MB 
as an “Orthodox, but not a strictly observant, Jew.”).
654
 HABER, supra note 639, at 201.
655 Id. at 255 (quoting David Ben-Gurion as stating that MB would “sanctif[y] all means for the sake of the sacred end” of Israeli 
security).
656 Id. at 17.
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short of clinically paranoid657 and plainly cynical about the motivations of people in general.658  Moreover, 
MB was given to ethnocentric bias in his dislike and even hatred of certain groups, including Germans, in 
reference to whom he remarked that “[e]very German is a Nazi” and a “murderer,”659 and Arabs, whom he 
described as “no less evil than . . . Hitler.”660  Former Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in 1963 
unequivocally declared MB an amoral misanthrope:
Begin is clearly a Hitlerist type.  He is a racist willing to destroy all the Arabs for the sake of the 
completeness of the country, sanctifying all means for the sake of the sacred end—absolute rule.  I see in 
him a severe danger to the internal and external situation of Israel . . . These are not isolated acts, but a 
revelation of method, character, and aspiration.661
Whether this is the hyperbole of a political opponent is uncertain; nevertheless, MB, a hostile and 
belligerent Zionist, was plainly neither empathetic, altruistic, nor a committed internationalist.   In 
sum, MB scores high on all subconstructs of hostility save for narcisissm; he is thus scored as hostile.
iv. adventurism
As his years in the IZL make manifest, MB accepted risk as inherent in the project of political 
transformation.  His willingness to do so may have been a function of his optimism and his belief that, 
because he was engaged in a noble effort—the salvation of his nation and the performance of justice on 
earth—he could not fail, and thus what appeared as dangerous was in fact not truly so.662  Although MB 
experienced anxiety when contemplating the prospect that Arab states were scheming to attack Israel and 
that failure to preempt Arab plans might prove catastrophic,663 he planned strategy carefully, and when he 
engaged in ASD he did so with much forethought.664  In sum, MB scores high on all but one subconstruct 
of adventurism—impulsivity—and thus is scored an adventurist.
v. summary of IVs: MB
MB is scored as a militaristic, anomistic, and hostile adventurist.
b. DV: ASD and the Strike on Osiraq
By spring 1981, Iraq, with French assistance, was nearing completion of its Osiraq nuclear 
reactor facility, a project which, although the Hussein government publicly claimed it would be dedicated 
to peaceful research only, Israeli intelligence claimed to be a nuclear weapons production facility.665
When several months of Israeli efforts to alert the international community to the brewing danger and to 
secure condemnation of the Iraqi attempt to acquire WMD were unsuccessful, Israel responded with 
military force.  At sunset on June 7, 1981, 8 Israeli F- 16 aircraft accompanied by six F-15 escorts 
destroyed the Osiraq nuclear reactor with twelve two thousand pound bombs shortly before it could 
657 See id. at 29 (suggesting that MB, just as most Israelis, suffered from collective paranoia in part as a result of the historical 
experience of oppression and in part as a reflection of being bullied in Polish schools).
658 See YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI, ISRAEL’S FATEFUL HOUR 108 (1988) (labeling MB an extreme Machiavellian who 
transcends mere “dishonesty [and] demagoguery” and enters the realm of the “intolerable”).
659
 HABER, supra note 639, at 234.
660 Id. at 29; see HARKABI, supra note 659, at 111 (accusing MB of inciting “hatred” of Arabs).
661
 Cited in HABER, supra note_, at 255.
662
 HABER, supra note 639, at 272.
663 See id. at 245 (stating that as early as 1955 Begin believed “time was working in the Arabs’ favor and that if Israel hesitated to 
launch a preemptive attack, she might find herself in a position that would preclude such deterrent action ever again.”).
664 See infra at note_.
665 See Israeli and Iraqi Statements on Raid on Nuclear Plant [“Israeli and Iraqi Statements”], N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at A8 
(indicating that Israel claimed to possess intelligence from “sources of unquestioned reliability” that the Osiraq reactor would be 
in production of nuclear weapons within three months).
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become operational.666  MB personally defended the destruction of Osiraq as an act of ASD justified on 
the grounds that if Iraq, a state committed to the destruction of Israel, were permitted to acquire a nuclear 
reactor capable of producing weapons it would do so; that such weapons would certainly be used against 
Israel at the earliest possible juncture;667 and that therefore Israel, and in particular its civilian population, 
was subject to an immediate and direct threat by the existence of an operational, or nearly operational, 
reactor.668  MB claimed further that even if the reactor had not been fully operational, had Israel delayed 
until such time as it was fully operational before destroying it more Iraqi civilians would have been 
exposed to radiation leaking from the facility, a likelihood supporting the conclusion that the threat was 
already sufficiently imminent for purposes of Israeli compliance with IHL.669  In other words, the fact that 
the threat emanated from the proliferation of nuclear weapons to an enemy state determined to use them 
against Israel dictated a relaxed interpretation of imminence consistent with the magnitude and 
seriousness of the particular threat profile as perceived by the intended target of that threat.
Arab states swiftly and publicly condemned the attack,670 and the Security Council, with U.S. and 
UK support,671 followed suit, unanimously “condemn[ing] the military attack by Israel in clear violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct” and stating that Iraq was 
entitled to “appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered.”672  For most states, the fact that Israel 
666
 David K. Shipler, Israeli Jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at A1.  Most analysts believe the 
Osiraq reactor was either operational or nearly so: for a discussion of the operational status of the Osiraq reactor, see Louis Rene 
Beres & Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel’s Destruction of Iraq’s Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMPLE INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 437, 438 (1995) (contending the reactor was operational or very nearly so); George Russell, Attack—and Fallout; 
Israel Blasts Iraq’s Reactor and Creates a Global Shock Wave, TIME, June 22, 1981, at 24 (same); but see Anthony D'Amato, 
Israel’s Air Strike Against the Osiraq Reactor: A Retrospective, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 259, 261 (1996) (noting that the 
reactor was not operational at the moment of the attack).
667 See Attack-and Fallout, TIME, June 22, 1981, at 24, 30 (reporting MB claim that after an Iranian aircraft had attempted 
unsuccessfully to bomb Osiraq, Iraq had stated that “[t]he Iranian people should not fear the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which is not 
intended to be used against Iran, but against the Zionist enemy.”).  The Iraqi government had released numerous statements 
calling upon Arab states to develop nuclear weapons for the destruction of Israel.  See, e.g., IRAQI NEWS AGENCY (Baghdad), 
Aug. 19, 1980 (“President Saddam Hussein has stressed that a decision better than boycotting the states that move their 
embassies to Arab Jerusalem is to destroy Tel Aviv with bombs . . . The president concluded his speech by stressing that when 
the time comes for Iraq to vent its anger on the Zionist entity, it will do so.”).
668 See Israeli and Iraqi Statements, supra note 666, at A8 (“We were therefore forced to defend ourselves against the 
construction of an atomic bomb in Iraq, which itself would not have hesitated to use it against Israel and its population centers.” 
(official statement of Israel); see also id. (“[The reactor was] intended . . . for the production of bombs.   The goal for these 
bombs was Israel.  This was explicitly stated by the Iraqi ruler. After the Iranians slightly damaged the reactor, Saddam Hussein 
remarked that it was pointless for the Iranians to attack the reactor because it was being built against Israel alone.”(referencing an 
earlier Iranian attempt to destroy the reactor).
669 See David Shipler, Begin Defends Raid, Pledges to Thwart a New “Holocaust,” N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1981, at A12 (“We 
faced a terrible dilemma.  Should we now be passive, and then lose the last opportunity, without those horrible casualties 
amongst the Baghdad population, to destroy the hotbed of death?”) (arguing that the threat posed by the reactor was already 
imminent due to the increased civilian casualties that were certain to occur had Israeli waited to strike); Statement of Permanent 
Representative of Israel to the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2280th mtg. at 57-60, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280  (1981) 
(arguing that had Israel failed to strike immediately the Iraqi civilian casualties would have been unacceptably high and that as a 
consequence the threat was imminent as a matter of law); Excerpts from Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of June 
15, 1981) (“[I]n removing this terrible nuclear threat to its existence, Israel was only exercising its legitimate right of self-defence 
within the meaning of this term in international law and as preserved also under the United Nations Charter.”).  In other words, 
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therefore unlawful, use of force. See Schmitt, supra note 454, at  532-33 (describing the Israeli strike on Osiraq as a “surgical[] 
exterminat[ion] of the threat due to its limited scope and duration and the absence of civilian casualties).
670 See Arabs Assail Raid as “Peak of International Terrrism,” N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at A1.
671 See Roger K. Smith, The Legality of Coercive Arms Control, YALE J. INT’L L. 455, 485-87(1994) (“Armed attack in such 
circumstances . . . represents a grave breach of international law.”) (remarks of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher); Judith 
Miller, U.S. Officials Say Iraq Had Ability to Make Nuclear Weapon in 1981, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at A9 (reporting U.S. 
condemnation and suspension of arms shipments to Israel in response).
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 U.N. S.C.Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at 58, U.N.Doc. S/PV.2288 (1981).  The General Assembly joined in 
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could not prove that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons it intended to use in the very near future against 
Israel and that therefore the Iraqi threat was not so imminent that it left “no moment for deliberation” and 
created an immediate and overwhelming necessity to attack the reactor—a determination subsequently 
reinforced by evidence that Israel had initiated preparations and planning for the destruction of the Osiraq 
reactor at least as early as March 1981673—vitiated the Israeli claim of lawfulness674 and suggested that the 
strike was a premeditated act in violation of Article 2(4).675  Although the Security Council imposed no 
sanctions, it rejected the Israeli claim to ASD because the threat, viewed in light of the traditional rule 
rather than in terms of the relaxed standard propounded by Israel, was deemed simply too prospective to 
justify the use of force.
In the main, the contemporaneous judgment of the legal academy affirmed the Security Council 
assessment that the Israeli attack could not be justified under the international law of self-defense on the 
grounds that Israel had neither satisfied the imminence requirement676 nor exhausted peaceful means of 
dispute resolution prior to engaging in self-help.677  At least one scholar drew the still-broader conclusion 
that even if ASD had survived the entry into force of the Charter it could not be exercised except with the 
prior approval of “some community of states.”678 In other words, the Israeli air strike in 1981 stood for the 
proposition that the unilateral resort to force, however otherwise justified, was now incompatible with the 
framework of the Charter.  However, with the benefit of two decades’ hindsight some now question 
whether, in light of the revelation of new information regarding the extent of the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
program developed during the period from the Gulf War to the present, the Israeli claim that the threat 
posed by Iraq was imminent might have justified the attack on Osiraq as an act of ASD despite the 
absence of an “armed attack.”679  Only the most restrictivist of commentators do not yet concede that “it 
673 See Smith, supra note 672, at 487 (noting MB conceded that Israeli preparations for the attack had commenced in March 1981 
and noting further that Israel began developing intelligence about the reactor as a potential target as early as 1979).
674 See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2282 mtg, at 106; U.N. Doc. S/PV/2282 (1981) (“It has been argued that the Israeli attack 
was an act of self-defence.  But it was not a response to an armed attack on Israel by Iraq.   There was no instant or 
overwhelming necessity for self-defence.   Nor can it be justified as a forcible measure of self-protection.   The Israeli 
intervention amounted to a use of force which cannot find a place in international law or in the Charter and which violated the 
sovereignty of Iraq.”) (statement of Sir Anthony Parsons, UN Permanent Representative of United Kingdom).
675 See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2283d mtg. at 145, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2283 (1981) (evaluating Osiraq strike as having failed to 
satisfy the Caroline standard) (statement of Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone).  For many states, however, the 
unlawfulness of the Israeli strike rested solely on the lack of an imminent threat—had it been clear that Iraq would produce 
nuclear weapons that would be imminently used against Israel, the Israeli strike might well have avoided condemnation.  See 
Condron, supra note 562, at 137-39 (analyzing Council debates and reaching this conclusion).
676 See  D’Amato, supra note 667, at 260 (evaluating scholarly reaction to the Israeli attack on Osiraq).
677 Smith, supra note 672, at 486-87; Sapiro, supra note 457, at 601.
678 See Smith, supra note 672, at 495-96 (“The condemnation of Israel in 1981 . . . suggests that the invocation of support from 
some community of states is an essential prerequisite for the permissible exercise of coercive arms control[.]”).
679 See Graham, supra note 465, at 10 (suggesting that the Israel attack may well have been justified as ASD on the ground that 
subsequent UN weapons inspections revealed the extent of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program was far closer to the Israeli 
estimate than to the international consensus and that had Israel permitted the Osiraq reactor to become operational the likelihood 
that Iraq would have developed weapons that could have destroyed Israel in the 1980s was great); Harold Hongju Koh, On 
American Exceptionalism, STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1516 (2003) (conceding that Israel faced an imminent threat in 1981 due to 
Iraqi progress toward completing nuclear weapons technologies).  Interestingly, although the U.S. joined in the Security Council 
condemnation of Israel, as early as 1981 the U.S. confirmed that an important element of the factual predicate upon which Israel 
relied in destroying the Iraqi reactor—that Iraq had or would soon have nuclear weapons—was accurate.  See Judith Miller, U.S. 
Officials Say Iraq Had Ability to Make Nuclear Weapon in 1981, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at A9 (reporting that U.S. 
intelligence officials “believed that Iraq had acquired enough enriched uranium and sensitive technology to make one nuclear 
weapon by the end of [1981].”).
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was unquestionable that Israel was the target of nuclear weapons”680 and that the attack on Osiraq was not 
an unlawful act of aggression but rather a “heroic and indispensable act of law enforcement[.]”681  Had 
Israel failed to destroy Osiraq in 1981, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 it might well have been in 
possession of nuclear weapons, and it is not inconceivable that a nuclear-armed Iraq might have been able 
to retain the fruits of its illegal aggression and fulfill its objective of becoming a regional superpower.  It 
is fair to suggest that at least some actors now regard the attack on Osiraq as a lawful and legitimate act 
that prevented the further destabilization of the Middle East.  It would seem undeniable that MB would 
not now decide the question of ASD any differently.
e. President Ronald W. Reagan and Libya (1986)
a.  independent variables: personality constructs
i. militarism
President Ronald W. Reagan [“RWR”] believed the U.S. had a moral obligation not only to 
marshal its military force to fight evil in the world but to support friends and allies in this quest,682 and in 
support of this mission he presided over the largest peacetime increase in military spending in history.  
RWR had an abiding belief in the inherent goodness, even superiority, of the U.S., and was adamant in 
his refusal to allow any supranational form of government to reduce U.S. sovereignty.683  Still, RWR so 
disliked confrontation that he would retain aides long after he desired to terminate them and compromise 
with his political opponents whenever possible.684  However, RWR abhorred undisciplined or 
nonconformist behavior,685 was habitually early,686 and considered authorizing the CIA to conduct 
domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens suspected of disloyalty.687  These elements of personality suggest a 
streak of authoritarianism.  Furthermore, despite his own lack of military service, RWR was fascinated 
with war and all that it entails,688 and he was “fierce[ly] patriot[ic].”689
That RWR became President is perhaps surprising, as he was a relatively uncompetitive person 
who achieved success less by dint of aptitude and hard work than through good fortune and charm.690  His 
success may be attributable in part to his ambitious approach to life: RWR believed very sincerely that 
anything was possible, and he set lofty goals in his presidency, including victory in the Cold War and the 
dismantling of the regulatory state.  Although he was the consummate “black and white thinker” 
inasmuch as for him every problem had a simple solution and all life was a struggle of good against evil 
in which all morality is on the side of the U.S. and liberalism is merely a stage on the road to 
680
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communism,691 RWR was a secure, confident, tremendously extroverted,692 and gregarious person who 
placed great value on friendships and the goodwill of others.693  He had enormously high emotional 
intelligence and good self-esteem.694  In sum, RWR scores high on seven of thirteen subconstructs of 
militarism—nationalism, FAP, patriotism, authoritarianism, militarism, dogmatism, and ambitiousness—
and thus is scored a militarist.
ii.  anomism
RWR was morally inflexible and absolutely rejected lying, cheating, stealing, homosexuality, and 
premarital sex on religious and ethical grounds.695  He was very much a traditionalist in terms of moral 
values.696  Although RWR lacked formal legal training, respect for law and legal authority were part and 
parcel of his abiding moral commitment to social conformity.697  Accordingly, RWR scores high on only 
one subconstruct of anomism—moralism—and thus is scored a non-anomist.
iii. hostility
RWR was so trusting of others that it “never occurred to him that anyone would give him 
incorrect information.”698  His powerful and abiding sense of right and wrong, together with his generally 
positive view of humanity, his remarkable empathy, and his facility in interpersonal relationships, 
precluded narcissism, cynicism, misanthropy, and Machiavellianism.699  However, RWR, as exemplified 
by his adamant opposition to the Voting Rights Act, most civil rights legislation, and the teaching of 
students in languages other than English, created the impression that RWR was at the very least racially 
insensitive; in the words of columnist William Raspberry, “[t]he impression . . . is that Reagan is not a 
racist...but that he simply does not give much of a damn one way or another.  In practical effect it 
amounts to the same thing.”700  Moreover, his image of the Soviet Union as the “Evil Empire”701 suggests 
that he perceived, whether accurately or not, that a powerful external actor maintained a highly negative 
image of and intention toward the free world.702
Still, RWR was committed to an international approach to the containment of Communism, and 
thus cannot be scored as an anti-internationalist.  Nevertheless, despite his commitment to the defense of 
U.S. allies, there is inadequate information to conclude that RWR was an altruist rather than simply 
committed to alliances on instrumental grounds.  In sum, RWR scores high on three of ten subconstructs 
of hostility and is thus a non-hostile decisionmaker.
iv. adventurism
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Although RWR established a bold agenda, he did not believe it necessary to take great risks as he 
reposited great faith in good fortune and regarded his endeavors as ordained to succeed by a higher 
power.703 RWR harbored extreme optimism and believed that “technology ha[d] a solution for 
everything.”704  He delegated responsibility for major policy initiatives to subordinates and acted 
deliberately on the basis of their recommendations,705 and although stress accompanied his 
responsibilities, RWR was so confident in success that it is unlikely he experienced its effects to the 
degree others in his position would have.706  In sum, RWR scores high on three of seven subconstructs of 
adventurism—tolerance of risk, optimism, and male sex—and thus is scored a non-adventurist.
v.  summary of IVs: RWR
RWR is a militarist who is neither anomistic, hostile, nor adventurist.
ii. DVs: ASD and Libya
On April 5, 1986, one day after U.S. intelligence intercepted a cable indicating Libyan terrorists 
would attack a target in Berlin the next day, a bomb detonated in a West Berlin nightclub known to be 
frequented by U.S. military personnel, killing two U.S. nationals and wounding 78 others.707 Nine days 
later, on April 14, U.S. FB-111 fighter-bombers departed from bases in England and attacked five 
military and regime targets in Libya.708  In his address to the nation, RWR indicated that the U.S. 
possessed “clear evidence that Libya is planning future attacks” and stated that the “preemptive action” 
was intended to “preempt and discourage Libyan attacks on innocent civilians in the future.”709  Although 
in subsequent statements administration officials made reference to other claims to legal justification for 
the attack, including as a reprisal for the terrorist bombing of April 5th and as an exercise of self-defense 
against ongoing attacks on U.S. nationals and embassies abroad,710 the official legal justification posited 
that Libya was actively planning future attacks against the U.S.,711 that no diplomatic resolution was 
possible, and that the U.S. action constituted an exercise of the inherent right of ASD to preempt these 
future attacks consistent with Article 51 of the Charter.712
Although the UK, France, Australia, and Denmark joined the U.S. in preventing Security Council 
condemnation of the U.S. attack on Libya,713 many states judged the response to have been an unlawful 
reprisal,714 as did the General Assembly.715  Furthermore, a great many states and commentators found the 
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facts alleged in support of the argument that future attacks against which force had been directed were 
imminent to be insufficient to support the claim of self-defense,716 and still others concluded that the 
magnitude of the response was disproportionate to the alleged threat.717  Despite British support for the 
notion that the exercise of the inherent right to self-defense “plainly includes the right to destroy or 
weaken the capacity of one’s assailant, reduce his resources, and weaken his will so as to discourage and 
prevent future violence[,]”718 the general conclusion within the international community was that the U.S. 
attack on Libya was difficult to characterize as anything but a reprisal and that, as such, the question of 
ASD had not arisen.
In retrospect, the sustained diplomatic and economic pressure on Libya since the 1986 strike has
contributed to the recent Libyan concession that it had in fact developed an extensive chemical weapons 
program and the commitment to surrender those weapons;719 it is fairly arguable that, without the credible 
threat of future military sanctions that the 1986 strike made possible, the Qadhaffi regime would not have 
been motivated to refrain from terrorism in the intervening decades and to normalize relations with the 
international community.  It seems also clear that RWR would consider his judgment to engage in ASD to 
have been well-advised.
f. President George H.W. Bush and Panama (1989)
a.  independent variables: personality constructs
i. militarism
At 17, the forty-first U.S. president, George H.W. Bush [“41”], volunteered for service as the 
youngest U.S. Navy pilot in World War II and distinguished himself in action against Japan in the South 
Pacific.  Although he was no militarist and recognized that the human cost of war was great, he proved 
himself willing to employ U.S. military forces to accomplish objectives in Panama, Iraq, and Somalia, 
and his positive attitude toward force is further reflected in his judgment that gun control is “not the 
American way.”720  41 insisted that the U.S. was the dominant world power and that he would 
“ferociously defend that role against all comers at home and abroad.”721  His withering attacks during the 
1988 campaign, his fondness for practical jokes,722 and his tendency to be angered by criticism723 are 
indicators of aggression,724 even if he is generally described as opposed to “jugular politics.”725  During his 
political career, 41 was fueled by a driving ambition and would “fight like a junkyard dog to get what he 
wanted.”726  He thrived on competition and hated to lose,727 and his lifelong desire to emulate his father as 
715 See G.A. Res. 41/38, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 23), at 34-35 (condemning the U.S. attack as an unlawful act).
716 See Romano, supra note 465, at 1041 (surveying international commentary on the U.S. attack on Libya and concluding that 
“the international community, in significant part, repudiated [the U.S. strike]”).
717 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 448, at 730-31 (arguing that 1) the U.S. introduced insufficient factual support for its assertion that 
future armed attacks were imminent and that 2) even if such attacks were certain it was not clear that U.S. action against Libyan 
targets, rather than defensive measures to protect intended U.S. targets, was the more proportionate and direct measure).
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well as his strong drive to fashion order, both personal and international, lead experts to identify 
heightened authoritarianism in his personality.728
Still, if he lacked the “vision thing”729 and could sometimes be intellectually lazy or lack direction 
and ambition,730 41 is considered a cognitively complex person731 who solicited the contrary views of his 
advisors732 and could untangle thorny issues and easily assimilate new and varied information. 
Furthermore, 41 is an extroverted “man of action”733 and a “social animal” for whom “there is simply no 
event that can’t be improved by the addition of more people.”734  The great value he places on 
relationships,735 and the emphasis and skill be demonstrated in regard to multilateralism and coalition-
building in his foreign policy,736 evidence the absence of isolationism and anti-internationalism 
respectively.  However, despite his great emotional intelligence and stable temperament, 41, perhaps 
struggling to overcome others’ perception of him as a coddled “wimp”737 and to live up to his father’s high 
expectations, suffers from fragile self-esteem.738
In sum, 41 scores as high on eight of thirteen subconstructs of militarism—nationalism, FAP, 
patriotism, aggression, military experience, competitiveness, ambitiousness, and low self-esteem—and 
thus is scored a militarist.
ii. anomism
Commentators offer little insight into the personality of 41 in terms of the subconstructs 
“disrespect for law” and “disrespect for legal authority.”  That his was an administration largely free of 
scandal and that he was appointed as Director of the CIA in order to supervise major reforms designed to 
render that agency more legalized and transparent suggest he is perceived as one who is neither 
disrespectful of law nor legal authority.  Moreover, 41 placed much emphasis upon “family values” in his 
domestic policy agenda and implemented moral criteria to assess the acceptability of policy options.739
Although 41 had no formal legal training, he scores high on only two of five subconstructs—ignorance of 
law and ignorance of IHL—and thus is scored a non-anomist.
iii. hostility
Although he is a friendly and extroverted person, 41 believes we live in a dangerous world in 
which many harbor harmful intentions toward the U.S.740  Even in the waning years of the Cold War, 41 
considered the Soviet Union a threat, and 41 regards political change, even when for the better, with 
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suspicion and a healthy dose of cynicism.741  Still, he is a self-effacing “team player” who is “born to 
please”742 others, rather than a narcissist or a misanthrope, and while he is a pragmatic and flexible leader 
his moral foundation, his patrician sense of duty, and his great loyalty to subordinates743 suppress any 
tendency toward Machiavellianism.  His support for the Civil Rights Act of 1990, his support for the 
marriage of his son Jeb to a Mexican-American woman, and his nomination of Colin Powell as Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that it is very unlikely 41 is a racist or an ethnocentric.  Finally, his 
eagerness to engage other states in the process of peace enforcement in Iraq, and afterward in the 
negotiation toward a more comprehensive Middle East peace agreement, support the assertion that 41 was 
no anti- internationalist.  Thus, 41 scores high on only three of seven subconstructs of hostility—distrust, 
cynicism, and hostility—and is scored a non-hostile decisionmaker.
iv. adventurism
41 is a patient person who is willing to take measured risks if the expected payoff is great enough 
but is generally cautious.744  His overriding concern was to “first, do no harm” and “not to make things 
worse,” and he revealed that he would “rather be called cautious than I would be called reckless.”745  Still, 
as President 41 believed that there was a relationship between the selection of policies and outcomes, and
he had the “quiet confidence that there [wa]s nobody better qualified to make . . . the kind of high stakes, 
history-making decisions”746 that faced him.  If he was sometimes hasty747 or failed to consider alternatives 
to, and consequences of, his decisions,748 he was also sometimes indecisive; above all, once 41 made a 
decision he was confident and did not suffer from anxiety.749  In sum, 41 scores high on three of seven 
subconstructs of adventurism—internal locus of control, optimism, and male sex—and thus is scored non-
adventuristic.
v.  summary of IVs: 41
41 is a militarist who is neither anomistic, hostile, or adventuristic.
b. DVs: ASD and Panama
By 1988, the regime of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, who had been indicted in February 
in the U.S. for narcotrafficking, was engaged in a systematic pattern of violence and intimidation against 
U.S. military and civilian personnel in Panama.750  41, who during the presidential campaign had 
adamantly refused to accept any other solution to mounting tensions other than for Noriega to leave 
power and stand trial, concluded in the summer of 1989 that military action would be necessary to install 
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the democratically-elected Guillermo Endara whom Noriega had deposed.751  By September 1989, U.S. 
officials deemed an invasion of Panama a “very high probability,” and in October Noriega ordered the 
Panamanian Defense Forces to shoot down any and all U.S. aircraft in Panamanian airspace.  An abortive 
October coup caused embarrassment to 41, as Congress, including members of his own party, criticized 
his failure to support the rebels and resurrected the question of the “wimp factor.”752  By late October, the 
commander of the U.S. Southern Command described U.S.-Panamanian relations as a “state of war.”753
On 15 December 1989, Noriega declared that “[t]he republic of Panama [was] in a state of war 
[with the U.S.]”754 and later that evening PDF soldiers shot and killed a U.S. officer at a roadblock and 
kidnapped and tortured a second officer and his wife.755  With that, 41 reached the decision to intervene, 
claiming that U.S. citizens in Panama were in “grave danger” and that “every other avenue was 
closed[.]”756  OPERATION JUST CAUSE [“OJC”], launched for the stated objectives of capturing 
Noriega, preserving the safety of U.S. citizens, and protecting the Panama Canal treaties,757 and justified 
on the ground that Noriega had declared war upon the U.S.,758 was initiated on 20 December, and within 
two weeks Noriega was in custody and Endara was empowered in Panama.  In the immediate aftermath, 
41 formally justified OJC as an exercise of ASD consistent with Article 51 of the Charter.759
In the main, international response was favorable.  In May of 1989, the OAS had demanded 
Noriega’s resignation and removal from power,760 and international criticism upon the capture of Noriega 
was largely absent.  A Soviet-sponsored resolution that would have labeled OJC “a flagrant violation of 
international law” was swiftly opposed and defeated by Great Britain, France, and Canada in the Security 
Council,761 and the General Assembly abstained from the question.  Scholars were more critical of the 
assertion of ASD in conjunction with OJC; although some a number lauded 41’s decision to use force to 
protect U.S. nationals,762 others regarded any threat to U.S. nationals as the consequence of U.S. pressure 
751 See id. at 163, 188-89 (describing transformation of 41’s Panama policy in light of Noriega’s refusal to permit Endara to 
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upon the Noriega government and thus rejected as unnecessary the use of force to protect U.S. nationals 
endangered by, in effect, the actions of the U.S.;763 still others suggested that the threat lacked sufficient 
imminence to justify ASD764 or criticized OJC as a disproportionate employment of force;765 the most 
absolutist regarded OJC as an ipso facto violation of Article 2(4).766  Still, the ouster of Noriega, and his 
subsequent conviction and imprisonment for narcotrafficking,767 raised little criticism outside the confines 
of the legal academy.768
In retrospect, most would likely conclude that OJC contributed to the stability of Central America 
and to the reduction in international narcotrafficking,769 and the successful prosecution of Noriega, 
coupled with the preservation of free transit through the Panama Canal, suggests strongly that 41 would 
not be dissuaded from deciding to launch OJC again under identical circumstances.
g. President William J. Clinton and Afghanistan/Sudan (1998)
a. IVs: personality constructs
i. militarism
President William Jefferson Clinton [“WJC”] is the incarnation of the modern internationalist 
who envisions the U.S. as one state among many.  Although he has a respect for and appreciation of the 
importance of power in international relations,770 WJC is not a patriot, and when called to military service 
was skillful in avoiding the discharge of his duty.  He is an aggressive person subject to fits of anger771
who, although capable of compromise,772 tends to “lash out against institutions or groups who opposes his 
policies,” and when others criticize him he “disowns them and turns against them angrily.”773  Although 
he is a dogmatist convinced he knows what is right and best for others and that those who do not embrace 
his views are misguided at best and driven by “base motives” at worst,774 WJC is far too much a man of 
expedience and moral relativism to be labeled an authoritarian.  Furthermore, his avoidance of military 
service disqualifies him as a militarist.  That said, WJC is intensely competitive and ambitious (even to a 
the Noriega regime, “the U.S. action in Panama was not inconsistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of the UN 
Charter and the rule of law.”) (statement of Professor John Norton Moore).
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 Rahman, supra note 755, at 193 (reporting statement of Professor Jordan Paust); Agora, supra note 763, at 497 (same) 
(opinion of Professor Ved Nanda).
766 See, e.g., Rahman, supra note 755, at 189 (describing U.S. justifications as a “bad faith interpretation, incompatible with the 
primary object and purpose of the UN Charter[.]”) (statement of Professor Maria Frankowska).
767 See U.S. v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (convicting Noriega on numerous counts of drug trafficking).
768
 Most of the criticism of OJC has centered not upon the lawfulness of the intervention but upon the claim that the U.S. violated 
the principles of proportionality and distinction and as a consequence produced unnecessary civilian casualties.  See, e.g., 
RAMSEY CLARK (note); but see John Embry Parkerson, United States Compliance with Humanitarian Law Respecting 
Civilians During Operation Just Cause, 133 MIL. L. REV. 31 (1991) (rebutting such claims).
769 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 556, at 563 (reaching this conclusion).
770
 POST, supra note 232, at 319.
771 See GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 186.
772
 POST, supra note 232, at 315 (stating that under some circumstances WJC views politics as requiring compromise and 
consensus).
773 Id. at 291.
774 Id. at 286.  WJC is generally regarded as cognitively complex. See, e.g., GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 187.  However, 
some analysts believe that despite his great intellect WJC is neither cognitively and nor particularly adaptable to the environment 
and that his analysis is frequently underdeveloped.  POST, supra note 232, at 322; see also GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 
188 (stating that WJC is very intelligent but unable to reach a balanced net assessment of a problem and that he analyzes issues 
with the “speed of oil covering water, but sometimes does so at the same depth.”).
.  Given the lack of consensus, and in light of his authoritarianism, WJC is scored for purposes of this study as dogmatic.
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fault),775 tremendously energetic and articulate, and extroverted.  He is a charming person interested in 
fellowship776 and wins friends easily, although he does not always inspire their loyalty.777 WJC is a self-
confident person with high self-esteem.778  WJC thus scores as high on four of thirteen subconstructs of 
militarism—aggression, competitiveness, dogmatism, and ambitiousness—and is scored a non-militarist.
ii. anomism
Although he has a law degree from Yale University, WJC was disbarred by the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas for perjury in the civil suit brought against him for sexual harrassment by a former state 
employee.  He is described as an “emotionally challenged” person with major “psychic shortcomings”779
and as a “skilled liar.”780  WJC does not behave as if he has any coherent moral principles save for self-
interest, and cannot be relied upon to adhere to his commitments.781  In short, WJC scores high on all 
subconstructs of anomism save for ignorance of law and ignorance of IHL, and thus is scored an anomist.
iii. hostility
Although he is a committed internationalist,782 WJC sees the political universe as hostile,783 and as 
President believed his opponents were “out to get” him and prevent him from accomplishing an 
“important, major, or unusual” mission that he was valiantly struggling to accomplish.784  In short, WJC is 
a narcissist who self-defines his modest achievements as “grandiose” accomplishments and who believes 
he is special and therefore entitled to dispensations from the rules that govern others.785  He is incapable of 
admitting even the slightest errors.786  Still, WJC is neither cynical nor misanthropic: he has a much 
greater-than average capacity to empathize787 and actively enjoys his many affiliations.  Nor is he an 
ethnocentrist: WJC, our “first black President,”788 is famously comfortable with persons of other races and 
nationalities and made improving race relations a centerpiece of his domestic agenda.789  However, his 
mendacity, infinitely flexible moral code, and overweening concern with self-interest brand WJC a selfish 
Machiavellian.  In sum, WJC scores as high on all but three of ten subconstructs of hostility—
misanthropy, ethnocentrism, and lack of empathy—and thus is scored as hostile.
iv. adventurism
775
 POST, supra note 232, at 288 (ambitious); GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 177 (suggesting that WJC advanced more policy 
initiatives than he could possibly manage); POST, supra note 232, at 297 (competitive).
776
 POST, supra note 232, at 279.
777
 GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 186 (noting that WJC is neither loyal nor inspiring of loyalty).
778
 POST, supra note 232, at 308.
779
 GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 188.
780 Id. at 184; see also POST, supra note 232, at 286 (noting that WJC typically lies by omission or bends the truth to support a 
“self-idealized view of his behavior” that is at odds with the facts).
781 See id. at 286 (suggesting that WJC’s early life experiences with an abusive stepfather and a narcissistic mother taught him that 
“those on whom you should be able to count are often unreliable” and that he need not maintain “fidelity to his commitments to 
others[.]”).
782 See supra at p._.
783
 VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 55-56.
784
 POST, supra note 232, at 286, 295.
785 Id. at 296-99.
786 See id. at 298 (noting WJC cannot admit even the slightest mistakes, including experimentation with drugs or minor personnel 
errors); id. at 292 (WJC “appears to believe the best of himself and either to avoid or discount evidence from his own behavior 
that indicates all is not as he believes it to be” and that “[a]ny attention called to a number of discrepancies between his real 
behavior and his view of it . . . was met with denial, exculpatory explanations, mostly long but sometimes short answers that did 
not deal directly with the point, and, when all else failed, unconcealed frustration and anger.”).
787
 GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 175.
788
 Toni Morrison, The New Yorker, Oct. 1998.
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WJC is a “breathtakingly reckless”790 and undisciplined person who was nearly forced from office 
for lying under oath in a civil deposition about his relationship with a White House intern.  Although he is 
above-average in his belief that he is capable of asserting positive control over the world about him and 
discounts the role of chance,791 his impatience and impulsivity frustrate his designs.792  Nonetheless, WJC 
is an optimist793 who does not experience the degree of stress or anxiety that would be expected of an 
individual as impulsive as he, and even after setbacks he continues to perceive his prospects for attaining 
his objectives as extremely high.794  WJC thus scores as high on five of seven subconstructs of 
adventurism—tolerance of risk, internal locus of control, impulsivity, optimism, and male sex—and is 
scored an adventurist.
v. summary of independent variables
WJC is scored as a non-militarist who is anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic.
b. dependent variable: ASD and Afghanistan/Sudan 
On August 20, 1998, twelve days after the al Qaeda terrorist group attacked and destroyed the 
U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and during the height of a Congressional inquiry into presidential 
misconduct that would eventually lead to his impeachment, WJC ordered cruise missiles launched at 
several al Qaeda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and at the al Shifa factory in Sudan, alleging the 
latter was a production facility for chemical weapons intended for al Qaeda.795  Although various 
Administration officials hinted that the action had been undertaken in retaliation for the embassy 
bombings,796 the U.S. invoked ASD as the legal justification for its attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan, 
contending that the application of military force had been necessary to prevent specific imminent terrorist 
attacks about which it possessed clear and credible intelligence.797
Some restrictivist scholars argued that the U.S. failed to established that the threat posed by al 
Qaeda was sufficiently imminent as to be necessary for purposes of analysis under the Caroline standard, 
and that the action must consequently be examined not as an exercise of ASD but rather as an act of 
789 See E.O. No. 13,050, 3 C.F.R. 207, 207-08, 62 Fed. Reg. 32987 (1997) (directing President’s Advisory Board on Race to
“advise the President on matters involving . . . racial reconciliation”).
790
 GREENSTEIN, supra note 227, at 182; see also POST, supra note 232, at 295 (scoring WJC as moderately high on risk 
propensity relative to other former Presidents).
791 See VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 56 (comparing WJC to other Presidents); POST, supra note 232, at 319 
(same).
792 Id. at 308.
793
 POST, supra note 232, at 309; VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 55-56.
794
 POST, supra note 232, at 320.
795 James Bennet, U.S. Cruise Missiles Strike Sudan and Afghan Targets Tied to Terrorist Network, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, 
at A1.
796 See, e.g., Bradley Graham, Bin Laden Was at Camp Just Before U.S. Attack, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1998, at A1 (quoting 
U.S. officials that plans for strikes were conceived as retaliatory measures to potential terrorist attacks before the embassy 
bombings); Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Remarks during Appearance on This Week (Aug. 23, 1998) (available at 1998 
WL 6392416 at 4) (stating that the embassy bombings “had a huge part” in prompting attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan).
797 See Bennett, supra note 796 (reporting that the Clinton Administration justified the strikes on the grounds that al Qaida was 
responsible for these and other acts of terrorism and had declared its intention to conduct additional attacks  and that “key 
terrorist leaders” were gathered at the headquarters, establishing the imminence of a continuing threat to U.S. nationals); “We 
Acted to Preempt Terrorist Acts”, WASH POST., Aug. 21, 1998, at A19 (describing strikes as oriented toward “do[ing] 
something that would disrupt Osama bin Laden and his organization’s ability to conduct additional terrorist activities[.]”) 
(quoting Secretary of State Albright); id. (quoting National Security Adviser Sandy Berger to the effect the U.S. “had very 
specific information about very specific threats with respect to very specific targets[.]”).
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reprisal for the embassy bombings.798  To some degree, criticisms of the U.S. ASD justification hinged on 
the sufficiency of the evidence offered in support of the claim: some commentators, otherwise supportive 
of the inherent right of states to engage in ASD, questioned its applicability given the absence of 
sufficient proof of imminence,799 while others, although generally hostile to ASD, evaluated the U.S. 
claim on its merits while nonetheless concluding that the “questionable nature of some of [the U.S.] 
factual assertions, and the circumstances surrounding the strikes, render the success of its legal 
justification very unique.”800  Although the U.S. countered reports that the factory and the camp had been 
developed by U.S. intelligence and military officials as a potential targets many months before their 
destruction801 by releasing some of the intelligence upon which it had relied in reaching its decision to 
destroy the sites,802 restrictivists seized upon these reports and other indications that the factory may not 
have in fact been a chemical weapons production facility803 as proof that the strikes were indefensible as 
acts of ASD inasmuch as any threats that had existed for months without necessitating a U.S. attack were 
not suddenly invested with imminence by the destruction of the U.S. embassies.
Nevertheless, despite widespread and general dissatisfaction with the evidentiary support for the 
U.S. strikes, the Security Council took no formal action,804 nor did the attacks or the justification therefor 
confront substantial political opposition internationally.805  Although some commentators consider the 
muted international response a reflection of the distaste for al Qaeda and grudging tolerance of 
incomplete disclosure of intelligence sources and means in the particular case at issue, rather than an 
affirmation of a right to ASD,806 pragmatists suggest that the U.S. strikes on Sudan and Afghanistan 
demonstrate that the right of states to engage in ASD is, if not already a norm of customary international 
798 See Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 533, 
536 (2002) (suggesting that, although the strikes may well have been directed towards future unspecified but anticipated al Qaida 
attacks., the threats posed by such potentialities was not sufficient to constitute imminence for purposes of evaluation as an act of 
ASD); Lacey, supra note_, at 296-97 (contending that on the evidence offered it is impossible for the U.S. to argue that the 
destruction of its embassies required an instant, overwhelming response against the targets selected and that it had “no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation.”) (citing the Caroline standard).
799 On the basis of evidence made available for review it was difficult for commentators to comprehend precisely how the 
destruction of the Sudanese factory was necessary to prevent imminent terrorist attacks, for if the attacks were in fact imminent it 
was unlikely terrorists would receive weapons produced by the factory in the near-term future and any imminent attacks would 
be conducted with weapons already in possession.  See, e.g., Guy B. Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A 
Legal Regime for Enforcing the Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 483, 535 (1999) (accepting ASD in principle but rejecting application to Sudan on the ground the U.S. had failed to 
“convincingly explain that acquisition [of chemical weapons] and use was imminent.”).
800 Romano, supra note 465, at 1041.
801 See Vernon Loeb & Bradley Graham, Sudan Plant Was Probed Months Before Attack, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1998, at A14 
(factory); Bradley Graham, Bin Laden Was at Camp Just Before U.S. Attack, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1998, at A1 (camp).
802 See Linkie, supra note_, at 569 (noting that the U.S. produced physical evidence that the al Shifa facility had been producing 
chemical precursors for VX nerve gas).  For further discussion of the U.S. evidence, see Pentagon and C.I.A. Defend Sudan 
Missile Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1998, at A5.
803 See David L. Marcus, Franck Criticizes Bombing of Plant in Sudan, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 25, 1998, at A9 (stating that 
newly-released evidence suggests the Sudanese factory was in fact either a pharmaceutical plant or an animal feed plant as 
claimed by Sudan).
804
 Yoo, supra note 556, at 573.  In a letter to the  President of the Security Council justifying the U.S. attacks, the U.S. claimed to 
have acted only after repeated warnings to Afghanistan and Sudan to “shut down terrorist activities and cease cooperation with 
the Bin Ladin Organization[.]”  U.N. Daily Highlights, Aug. 21, 1998. 
805 See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Raids Provoke Fury in Muslim World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at A6 (discussing reactions to 1998 
strikes and reporting that most of the hostility was confined to Islamic states); Romano, supra note 465, at 1041 (noting that the 
justification of ASD was received “with scant objection from the international community.”).
806 See id. (“Perhaps the relatively passive international response is best explained by the wealth of intelligence information the 
United States had amassed linking Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network to the embassy bombings and other past terrorist plots.”).
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law that predates and survives the Charter, emerging as lex ferenda.807  Few states or commentators 
conclude that the attacks were either lawful or legitimate, and it is doubtful, given the insufficiency of the 
evidence and the lack of support for the action, that WJC would make the same decision again. After the 
spectacular disaster of September 11th, 2001, it is impossible to say that the attacks of 1998 contributed to 
world order by promoting a credible deterrent regime.
h. President George W. Bush [“43”] and Iraq (2003)
a. independent variables: personality constructs
i. militarism
President George W. Bush [“43”] is a nationalist and a patriot who has declared that his life’s 
mission is to “wag[e] [a] struggle for freedom and security for the American people” against international 
terrorism.808  Power, and in particular military power, is the primary instrument of his foreign policy, and 
he enjoys wielding it to accomplish his objectives.809  43 is an aggressive personality who is concerned 
that a failure to meet force with force will communicate the lesson of a “not very tough [U.S.]” and that 
the enemies of the U.S. must feel threatened by U.S. power.810  While not an authoritarian or a militarist, 
43 is an assertive and competitive personality811 who served as an Air National Guard fighter pilot.
43 tends toward low cognitive complexity, superficial thinking, and low introspection,812 although 
he “exhibits depth of comprehension,” “visualize[s] alternatives and weigh[s] long term consequences,” 
and “keeps himself thoroughly informed” on policy issues.813  He is an engaging and gregrious extrovert 
who makes and keeps friends with ease and is inclusive in his social life.814  Although not particularly 
high in his need for achievement,815 43 has embraced the “ambitious reordering of the world”816 to, in 
effect, make the world safe from terrorism.  Although his self-confidence is only moderate, 43 has high 
self-esteem.817  In sum, 43 scores high on eight of thirteen subconstructs of militarism—nationalism, FAP, 
patriotism, aggression, military experience, competitiveness, dogmatism, and ambitiousness—and thus is 
scored a militarist.
ii. anomism
Although he cannot be described as an outlaw, 43 has a personal history of minor brushes with 
the law, including driving under the influence, and his disdainful statement in regard to the applicability 
of international law to the awarding of contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq—“International law?  
807 See, e.g., id. at 1040 (suggesting that the largely absent criticism of the U.S. strikes bespeaks “growing acceptance” of ASD).  
The most pragmatist scholars insist that because the threat posed by WMD-armed terrorists requires a transformed imminence 
standard the strikes were perfectly legitimate.  See, e.g., Addicott, supra note 444, at 772.
808
 BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 108 (quoting 43 in his address to the nation shortly after September 11th, 2001).
809 See VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 41, 98-99, 101 (stating that 43 “enjoys the power to direct others and to 
evoke respect”).
810
 WOODWARD, supra note 809, at 38.
811 See VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 98-99 (describing 43 as “authoritative without being authoritarian”); id. 
(noting that 43 “creates rules and expects subordinates to follow them, though within reasonable limits”).
812 See id. at 98-99 (describing 43 as “anti-introspective and unwilling to acknowledge disturbing emotions, denying personal 
difficulties or covering inner conflicts with self-distraction.”).
813 Id. at 93-95, 100.
814 See id. at 90, 98-99 (describing 43 as “[d]isarmingly affable and charming”).
815 Id. at 90.
816
 WOODWARD, supra note 809, at 341.
817
 VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 95-96.
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Nobody told me about that.  I better call my lawyer.”818—belies a general lack of respect for law and legal 
authority.  Still, 43 believes that the U.S. is engaged in a “monumental struggle between good and evil” 
against terrorism819 and that U.S. foreign policy, particularly the liberation of the Afghani and Iraqi 
peoples, is a moral obligation predicated upon a “value system that cannot be compromised—God-given 
values.”820  43 has no formal legal training.  43 scores high on all subconstructs of anomism save for 
amoralism and is thus scored an anomist.
iii. hostility
For the most part, 43 sees the world as more cooperative than conflictual, and he harbors 
relatively low distrust.821  Although he sees himself as a visionary who “seize[d] the opportunity to 
achieve . . . world peace” through the defeat of terrorism,822 psychobiographers rate 43 moderately low on 
narcissism indices.823  He is neither a cynic nor a misanthrope; rather, he is a “generally benevolent and 
approval-seeking”824 person who enjoys cooperative relationships and is possessed of great emotional 
intelligence.825  However, 43 believes that many domestic critics view him as “the toxic Texan”826 and that 
the U.S. is the target of a vast consortium of international terrorists, and he has proven “willing to scheme 
in calculated fashion to realize personal ambitions,”827 suggesting elevation on the Machiavellianism 
subconstruct.  Moreover, although 43 prefers multilateralism, his post-9/11 approach to foreign policy 
suggests a strong anti-internationalist bent that is difficult to reconcile with his more stable cooperative 
preference.  There is little evidence to suggest elevation on the selfishness subconstruct, although it is 
possible to score 43 high without altering the global score on the hostility construct.
43 scores high on only three of ten subconstructs of hostility—hostility, Machiavellianism, 
selfishness, and anti-internationalism—and thus is scored a non-hostile decisionmaker.
iv. adventurism
43 is a cautious and risk-averse person who nevertheless believes that he has a duty and the 
capacity to lead the U.S. on a mission to make the world safe from terrorism, and he is highly 
impulsive.828  Nevertheless, 43 is an optimist whose faith insulates him from significant stress or 
anxiety.829  In sum, 43 scores as high on four of seven subconstructs of adventurism—internal locus of 
control, impulsivity, optimism, and male sex—and thus is scored as an adventurist.
v. summary of IVs: 43
43 is a militarist who is anomistic and adventuristic but not hostile.
b. DV: ASD and Iraq
818 See (note).
819
 WOODWARD, supra note 809, at 45 (quoting 43).
820
 Id. at 131 (quoting 43 in regard to the universalism of the moral values upon which U.S. foreign policy rests).
821
 VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 90-96.
822
 WOODWARD, supra note 809, at 282.
823 See VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 91-93.
824 Id. at 98-99.
825
 VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 99-101 (describing 43’s “keen ability to read others’ motives and desires”).
826
 WOODWARD, supra note 809, at 44.
827
 VALENTY & FELDMAN, supra note 226, at 99.
828 Id. at 95-96 (caution); id. at 102 (impulsivity).
829 Id. at 98-99.
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In the aftermath of the horrific events of September 11th, 2001, the sobering prospect that 
enormously destructive nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons might be brought to bear upon its 
civilian population830 by suicidal terrorists living within its midst prompted the U.S. to undertake a 
dramatic revision of its national security strategy.831  The September 2002 National Security Strategy of 
the United States of America832 [“NSSUSA”], also known as the Bush Doctrine, warns transnational 
terrorists and rogue states that the U.S. has abandoned deterrence in favor of a robust and proactive 
strategic doctrine that sanctions the use of military force to eliminate threats posed by the intersection of 
WMD and an emerging breed of undeterrable adversaries833 before they can materialize.  Specifically, the 
Bush Doctrine unmistakably claims the legal right to unilaterally preempt an incipient threat that, even if 
not yet operational, will, if permitted to mature, be reducible only at a much greater cost in lives and 
treasure.834  Immediately upon its promulgation the Bush Doctrine sparked a legal debate over whether the 
use of military force to prevent megaterrorism constituted one of the permissible exceptions to a general 
prohibition on the use of force in international relations.835  Iraq provided the test case.
In September 2002, 43 advised the UN that it might become necessary to employ force against 
Iraq to enforce existing Security Council resolutions and eliminate a threat to international peace and 
security.836  In response, the Security Council in November of that year adopted Resolution 1441, finding 
Iraq in “material breach” of obligations incurred under ceasefire agreements codified in a series of 
seventeen earlier Security Council resolutions,837 including the obligation, under Resolution 687, to 
disarm of weapons of mass destruction [“WMD”].838  For nearly a dozen years, Iraq had frustrated UN 
weapons inspectors and flouted the terms of the ceasefire,839 and with Resolution 1441 the UN threatened 
830
 Fear that the terrorists responsible would attempt further attacks shaped the perceptions of the public and government 
decisionmakers in the aftermath of September 11th. WOODWARD, supra note 809, at 349.
831
 It may be impossible to overestimate the severity of the threat posed by the intersection of transnational terrorism and the 
proliferation of WMD.  See KATHLEEN BAILEY, DOOMSDAY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF MANY 6 (1991) 
(describing this intersection as the gravest threat ever posed to U.S. national security); Roberts, supra note 800, at 483-84 (“The 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . . . is one of the most significant and protracted threats to international security . . . 
ever faced by mankind.”).
832 See National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) [“NSSUSA”], available at www. 
whitehouse.gove/nsc/nss.pdf.
833
 The Bush Doctrine contends that deterrence, predicated upon the maintenance of the threat that attacks against the U.S. will be 
met with an overwhelming response and thus redound to the detriment of the attacker, is ineffective against terrorists and rogue 
states who have no values against which the threat of force in response might counsel restraint.  See id. at 15 (contending the 
“deadly threat of Islamic terrorists whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called 
soldiers seek martyrdom in death,” is not susceptible to deterrence).
834 See id. (stating that the “immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our 
adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit . . . let[ting] our enemies strike first.”); see also NATIONAL STRATEGY TO 
COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 3 (Dec. 2002), at http:/www.whitehouse.gove/response/index/html 
(“Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces 
and civilian population, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-
armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures.”); David E. Langer, Bush Renews Pledge to 
Strike First to Counter Terror Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2002, at A3 (reporting message from President Bush to U.S. troops 
in Afghanistan stating that the U.S. will preemptively strike against states developing WMD and that “America must act against 
these terrible threats before they’re fully formed[.]”).
835 See Paust, supra note 799, at 533 (describing debates).
836 See George W. Bush, UN General Assembly in New York City Address (Sept. 12, 2002), 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
1529 (Sept. 16, 2002).
837
 SC Res. 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002), 42 ILM 250 (2003).
838 See SC Res. 687 (Apr. 3, 1991), 30 ILM 846 (1991) (obligating Iraq to surrender its WMD and submit to verification 
inspections).
839
 In 1998, Iraq expelled UN weapons inspectors, and from 1998-2002 no enforcement was undertaken despite Security Council 
condemnation of the Iraqi expulsion.  See SC Res. 1205 (Nov. 5, 1998) (condemning the expulsion as a “flagrant violation of 
resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions.”).  For a comprehensive discussion of efforts undertaken from 1991 to 1998 to 
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“serious consequences” while allowing Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament 
obligations[.]”840  Resolution 1441 required Iraq to submit, by 8 December 2002, “a currently accurate, 
full, and complete declaration” on its WMD programs, demanded that Iraq cooperate “immediately, 
unconditionally, and actively” with the UN, and stated that failure to do so would constitute an additional 
material breach.841  When Iraq failed to make the requisite declaration,842 Secretary of State Colin Powell, 
in February 2003, notified the Council of ongoing Iraqi efforts to obtain WMD.843
Despite the incontrovertible fact of the Iraqi material breach, U.S.-led efforts to prod the Security 
Council into further action were unsuccessful.844  A bloc led by France, Germany, and Russia insisted that 
yet another authorizing resolution was necessary to render an invasion of Iraq lawful on the theory that 
1441 did not specifically authorize such an invasion and that the threat from Iraq was not sufficiently 
imminent as to justify military action.845  Quite simply, 43 disagreed and issued an ultimatum, stating that 
because “the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over” if 
enforcement action was not taken, the U.S. “choose[s] to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it 
can appear suddenly in our skies and cities.”846  When the Hussein regime offered no response, on 19 
March 2003 the U.S., under the code name OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM [“OIF”], led an ad hoc 
coalition of the willing of about forty states into Iraq, defeated the Iraqi armed forces, and deposed the 
Hussein regime.847  On 1 May 2003, 43 announced the end of major combat operations, although low-
intensity conflict continues at the time of this writing. The U.S. and allied states are currently in 
occupation of Iraq and preparing for a transfer of power and sovereignty to an elected Iraqi government 
on 30 June 2004.  The Security Council has not imposed sanctions on participating states.
 Even as it unfolded, OIF became the most hotly debated and contentious issue in international 
law, as well as the spark for mass public demonstrations.848  Scholars divided sharply.  One camp was 
adamant that the threat posed by an Iraq armed with WMD, “either directly or through Iraq’s support for 
terrorism, was sufficiently imminent to render the use of force necessary to protect the United States, its 
enforce relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, see Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security 
Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 576. 579-81 (2003).
840
 SC Res. 1441, supra note 838, at para. 2.
841 Id. at para. 4.
842 See Yoo, supra note 556, at 566 (describing Iraqi WMD declaration as “incomplete, inaccurate, and composed mostly of 
recycled information”); id. ((“The conclusion is inescapable that at the time of the outbreak of the 2003 conflict, Iraq had decided 
to refuse to comply with its disarmament obligations.”).
843 See U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses U.N. Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehous.gov/news/releases/2003/03/200302305-1.htm.
844
 Had the U.S. sought an additional authorizing resolution, there were inadequate votes in the Council.  See Tom. J. Farer, The 
Prospect for International Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 624 (2003) (indicating that fewer than 9 
of the members of the Council would have voted in favor).  France, Russia, and Germany were insistent that an additional 
resolution was necessary on the theory that the initial authorization, provided by Resolution 687, had expired at some point 
between 1991 and 2003, and that 1441 did not specifically provide that additional authorization.  See Yoo, supra note 556, at 567 
(discussing this position and arguing that it is incorrect as a matter of law).  Security Council paralysis was thus the result of 
Franco-German and Russian insistence that yet another Resolution was required to authorize force in response to Iraqi failure to 
adhere to 1441, which resolution this triumvirate was certain to veto if proffered, and U.S. refusal to accept this position and seek 
another authorization.  See Wedgwood, supra note 840, at 580. 
845 See generally Yoo, supra note 556 (describing the Franco-German-Russian legal arguments).
846
 Address to the Nation on Iraq, Mar. 17, 2003, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 338, 340 (Mar. 24, 2003).
847
 In launching the (re)invasion of Iraq, 43 pronounced that “The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its 
responsibilities, so we will rise to ours.”  WOODWARD, supra note 809, at 354.
848
 Richard Falk, What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 590, 592 (2003).
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citizens, and its allies.”849  Another held that the nature of the Iraqi threat was neither sufficiently 
imminent nor necessary to justify the use of force,850 that existing resolutions did not confer legal 
authority for invasion of Iraq,851 and that OIF thus “has about it an aura of ominous implication for 
international order[.]”852  Although OIF was arguably predicated upon far less controversial legal 
justifications,853 the characterization of the grounds for intervention for domestic political consumption by 
43 as ASD,854 along with a widespread perception that intervention could not be legally justified on any 
other basis, has thrust the ASD question to the fore; several commentators query whether OIF stands as 
an “international constitutional moment”855 that will prove decisive for the future of international law.856
Whereas, without conceding that intervention in Iraq was an act of preventive war, the U.S. and allied 
849
 Yoo, supra note 556, at 574; see also Wedgwood, supra note 840, at 578 (defending use of force against Iraq as an exercise of 
ASD as well as “by the continuing effect of Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687”); Jane Stromseth, Law and Force After 
Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 628, 629 (2003) (characterizing this legal rationale as a “plausible argument”); 
MOORE, supra note 70, at 16 (concluding that the Iraqi failure to account for its WMD as required, its demonstrated use of 
WMD in the past, and its support for terrorism taken together justify invasion as a “defensive” measure); Bradford, supra note_ 
(arguing that 43 had a natural legal duty to defend U.S. nationals by invading Iraq).
850 See, e.g., Falk, supra note 849, at 598; Sapiro, supra note 457, at 603.
851 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good Reasons for Going Around the U.N., N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2003, at A31 (opining that 
“[m]ost international lawyers will probably reject this claim and find the use of force illegal under the terms of the [UN] 
Charter.”); Thomas Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 613 (2003) (““Neither 
the text nor the debates on the adoption of Resolution 687 reveal the slightest indication that the Council intended to empower 
any of its members, by themselves, to determine that Iraq was in material breach.”).
852
 Farer, supra note 845, at 626.
853
 Neither 43 nor the United Kingdom defined the March 2003 intervention against the Hussein regime as ASD but rather as a 
Chapter VII enforcement action with legal authority claimed under prior United Nations Security Council resolutions, 
specifically Resolutions 678 and 687 requiring, as a condition of the ceasefire negotiated in 1991, that Iraq permit inspections to 
verify disarmament.  See President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq within 48 Hours: Remarks by the President in Address 
to the Nation, March 17, 2003, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html   [“March 17th
Address”](“Under Resolutions 678 and 687—both still in effect—the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in 
ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction.”); Frances Gibb, Attorney-General Gives MPs Legal Basis for War, LONDON 
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at 1 (quoting Attorney-General of the United Kingdom as stating “the government would be legally 
justified in declaring war on Iraq because of the combined effect of three UN resolutions[.]”); Letter from U.N. Ambassador John 
Negroponte to Ambassador Mamady Traore, President of the Security Council (Mar. 20, 2003), 
http://www.usembassy.it/file2003_03/alia/A3032109.htm (providing U.S. position on legal justification and indicating primary 
focus on material breach of resolutions). Iraqi refusal to permit weapons inspections thus constituted a breach of the 1991 
ceasefire and, under international law governing armistices, permitted belligerent parties to resume hostilities to secure the 
objectives specified under Resolutions 678 and 687.  See Yoo, supra note 556, at 565-69 (analyzing international law of armistice 
and justifying OIF on the basis of Iraqi material breach of UN resolutions, by its refusal to permit good-faith inspections in 2002-
2003, creating the conditions of the ceasefire) (referencing Iraqi ejection of weapons inspectors in October 1998 by the Security 
Council as a “flagrant violation of resolution 687 . . . and other relevant resolutions[.]”) (referencing SC Res. 1205, Nov. 5, 
1998).  Legal counsel for the U.S. Department of State supported these interpretations.  See William H. Taft IV & Todd F. 
Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 557, 573 (2003) (describing OIF not as ASD but as the 
result of Iraqi material breach of resolutions, violation of ceasefire agreement, and the “final episode in a conflict initiated more 
than a dozen years earlier by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait”).  Others disagree, suggesting, without conceding its lawfulness, that 
OIF cannot possibly be justified on any grounds other than ASD.  See, e.g., Falk, supra note 849, at 592.  For a thorough 
examination of the sources of legal support for OIF and for an argument that 43 did not characterize its action as ASD, see Sean 
D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L. J. _ (forthcoming 2004).
854
 In his address to the nation on March 17, 2003, President Bush, although he referenced humanitarian considerations and self-
defense arguments as well as Iraqi violations of the 1991 ceasefire, rested his justification for the intervention largely on the 
ground that “[i]n 1 year, or 5 years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over” 
and that failure to “meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities” would be an act of 
national “suicide.”  President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq, Mar. 17, 2003, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
338, 340 (Mar. 24, 2003).
855 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (“Just as in 1945, the nations 
of the world today face an international constitutional moment.”) (writing in response to the debate over the Bush Doctrine of 
preventive war in the context of the then-proposed Iraqi intervention).
856 See Kofi Annan, Excerpt from Speech at the General Assembly, Sept. 23, 2003, at A11, available at 
http://www,nytimes.com/international (stating that the assertion of the right to engage in preventive war stands as “a moment no 
less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded.”).  Many observers concur with the assessment that the 
advent of the Bush Doctrine is, “[w]ithout question, the most pressing issue in the international realm.” Addicott, supra note 444, 
at 754.  See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 856, at 2 (“Few events in global history can have galvanized the international system to 
action so completely in so short a time.”) (quoting UK Foreign Secretary Straw).
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states claim the forcible ouster of the Hussein regime as a triumphal success that liberated the Iraqi people 
and rescued the credibility of the UN after an ignominious decade marked by failures to prevent famine, 
end genocide, and enforce the disarmament of rogue states, a chorus excoriates the decision to intervene 
absent Security Council imprimatur as a jurispathic act posing a grave threat not only to a half-century-
long commitment to multilateralism857 but to the international rule of law.858  Although the legality of OIC 
remains contested, ultimately the legitimacy of OIF, which has produced decidedly positive effects such 
as the ouster and capture of Saddam Hussein and the liberation of the Iraqi people from Ba’athist 
dictatorship, may turn on the success of the transition to Iraqi sovereignty: as Falk suggests, “If the 
American occupation is viewed as successful, then [OIF] is likely to be treated as ‘legitimate[.]’”859
B. Analysis
1. Methodological Considerations and Limitations
Although the relative underdevelopment of the field of international legal compliance dictates 
that the generation, rather than the analysis, of theories is the predominant focus at this stage of research, 
the ultimate objective remains the specification and testing of a theory with explanatory and predictive 
potential.  However, generalization and testing of theories in social science typically require a large 
number of cases, and as a rule, as theoretical specificity and/or the complexity of the phenomenon under 
investigation increases, the number of cases available for analysis decreases.860  Some phenomena, 
including ASD, are so rare that there are insufficient cases to support the testing of general propositions 
with traditional methods of quantitative analysis;861 indeed, the universe of data available to answer the 
specific research questions posed by the present study is limited to ten cases.  Moreover, phenomena that 
are causally linked to human agency and social processes are so complex or so rooted in specific contexts 
that quantitative methods “necessarily brush[] over the nuances”862 and render barren descriptions and 
inadequate explanations.863
857 See Annan, supra note 857, at 11 (insisting that U.S.-led intervention against the Hussein regime has posed a “fundamental 
challenge” to multilateralism and to the role of the UN in preserving peace and security); see also Steven R. Weisman, An 
Audience Unmoved, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2003, at A1 (reporting that French President Jacques Chirac has termed the legal 
division over the 2003 intervention as “one of the gravest threats to multilateral institutions in modern times”).  Some go so far as 
to accuse the U.S. of seeking to “disable the United Nations” the better to rid the U.S. of “an international regime that is 
insufficiently responsive to both America’s needs and the reality of U.S. disproportionate power” and establish an “American 
protectorate” in its stead.  Franck, supra note 852, at 616, 617; Stromseth, supra note 850, at 637 (suggesting the Bush Doctrine 
will circumscribe the UN).  Thus, for Franck et al., the Bush Doctrine represents a mortal threat to the international legal regime 
governing the use of force.  Id. at 610 (blaming the U.S. for the “death” of international law governing the use of force); Bilder & 
O’Connell, supra note 610, at 446 (resurfacing the suggestion that the international law governing the resort to force is moribund 
as a result of the Iraq intervention).
858 See Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Editor’s Introduction, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97 
AM. J. INT’ L. 553, 553 (2003) (contending that “military action against Iraq in spring 2003 is one of the few events of the UN 
Charter period holding the potential for . . . destruction of the system of law governing the use of force[.]”).  The effect of 
noncompliance upon the continued vitality of international law, an issue raised but by no means answered by OIF, is the “most 
profound epistemological question” in the international law academy. Farer, supra note 845, at 621.
859
 Falk, supra note 849, at 594.
860 See generally CHARLES TILLY, BIG STRUCTURES, LARGE PROCESS, HUGE COMPARISONS (1984).
861
 For reasons beyond the scope of this Article, a sample size of at least 30 cases is required if one hopes to place confidence in 
the results of multivariate statistics.  Where there are too few cases to permit statistical analysis, as often there are in the study of 
international relations and foreign policy, other methods are necessary.  See FALKOWSKI, supra note 242, at 104 (discussing 
the “n” problem in foreign policy and international relations research).
862
 Hathaway, supra note 12, at 1939-40.
863 See KENNETH WALZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 12 (describing quantitative methods as “inadequate” to 
the study of international relations due to its complexity and degree of organization). 
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Although the behavioralist revolution of the 1950s continues to exert subtle pressure upon social 
scientists to transform these complex and contextually-sensitive social phenomena, including the general 
study of legal compliance,864 into empirical research questions “answerable” with multivariate statistics,865
quantitative analysis is not always appropos.866  Admittedly, quantitative, or variable-oriented, analysis 
does afford a rigorous method whereby to assess broad patterns of covariation across a wide range of 
cases.
867
  However, variable-oriented analysis is an inferential process that does not regard cases 
holistically or compare them directly to each other but rather treats them as the aggregates of a limited 
number of variables868 and generalizes from identifiable patterns of variance derived from the study of 
samples of relevant cases.  By drawing a limited number of independent variables from their natural 
contexts and relegating all others to theoretical irrelevance, variable-oriented analysis forfeits the 
opportunity to develop an appreciation for and understanding of the role of human agency in the chain of 
causation.869  Moreover, the importune application of quantitative methods of analysis is deleterious to the 
accessibility and impact of the scholarly enterprise more generally: by displacing “softer” methods more 
appropriate to particular research agendae, variable-oriented analysis has played no small part in 
“detach[ing] [social science] from its surroundings and from audiences.”870
One of the most fundamental canons in the social and natural sciences is that the nature of the 
research question, rather than a particular methodological preference, should drive the design of 
experiments and the selection of methods of data analysis.   When the subject of investigation is such that 
few cases exist, when the hypothesized chain of causation involves human agency and the social 
processes surrounding decisionmaking, and when outcomes are framed as the consequences of specific 
choices at unique decisional moments, a case-oriented approach, which treats cases, rather than variables, 
as the proper subjects of investigation, is best suited to the identification and incorporation of the broadest 
range of important independent variables in the development and testing of theories. Scholars of IHL 
compliance, a data-poor field in its infancy, are thus well-advised to heed those who urge researchers in 
pursuit of the relationship between law and decisionmaking to “discard . . . statistical modeling” in favor 
of a “softer kind of empiricism.”871  The herculean challenge for those who do is to identify a method that 
systematizes their labors and yields some degree of explanatory and predictive power while retaining 
rigor, logical consistency, communicability, generalizability, and parsimony. 
2.  The Comparative Method
864 See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 139, at 58 (describing studies that applied multivariate statistical models to test the relationships 
between several independent variables and legal compliance).
865 See MONROE, supra note 81, at 75 (describing paradigmatic shifts in empirical social science research from normativism to 
behavioralism and post-behavioralism).
866 See Robert O. Keohane, Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 307, 315 
(criticizing the “hubris” of researchers “who believe that their command of mathematically difficult techniques provides them 
with a unique key to the nature of social reality.”).
867 See CHARLES RAGIN, THE COMPARATIVE METHOD 53 (1987) (describing the virtues of quantitative, or “variable-
oriented,” methods of social science).
868
 The structural limitations of variable-oriented analysis are such, for reasons beyond the scope of this Article, that it cannot 
exhaust the entire range of IVs and must instead select a limited number for statistical analysis.  See id. at 59 (discussing the 
selectivity that variable-oriented analysis must employ in the study of IVs).
869 Id. at 53, 62-70 (discussing the shortcomings of variable-oriented analysis).
870 Id. at 171.
871
 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 15, at 184.
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The case-oriented approach, also known as the “comparative method,” fosters an extensive 
dialogue between ideas and data by relying upon comprehensive historical research and interrogation of 
data to guide the identification of important causal factors while simultaneously regarding each case as a 
holistic entity and comparing it directly with every other case.872  Comparative researchers compare and 
contrast combinations of casual factors in one case setting with different combinations in another setting 
and, through a process of systematic “eyeballing,” identify patterns of similarity and difference in the 
distribution of outcomes associated with various factorial combinations.873  Comparativists then apply the 
“method of agreement” to identify which of the possible causal factors is constant across all cases of a 
particular outcome or phenomenon and thereby discover degrees of isomorphism between seemingly 
unrelated cases.  While the comparative method does not necessarily prove a cause and effect 
relationship, it does create an important point of departure for experimental research.874  As formalized 
and applied to the present study, the comparative method treats each personality construct as a causal 
factor/independent variable and each outcome as a dependent variable. 
3.  Formalization: Qualititative Comparative Analysis
a. introduction
In the natural scientific community it has long been regarded as axiomatic that events do not 
simply happen but instead occur only under certain precisely delimited conditions.  Formal scientific 
methods, including laboratory experimentation, led researchers to find that the outcome of combustion 
requires the presence of oxygen, that microbes were responsible for infectious disease, and that an 
absence of Vitamin C caused scurvy.  Similarly, Qualititative Comparative Analysis [“QCA”] rests upon 
this fundamental axiom of causation that undergirds the scientific method.  QCA is constructed upon the 
premise that, short of formal experimentation, which is nearly impossible in the social sciences due to 
ethical and logistical constraints, formal logic, particularly the process of induction, is essential to 
determine the necessary and sufficient causal factors of particular outcomes in research settings 
characterized by a scarcity of cases.
b.  causal factors and outcomes
Specifically, QCA, an analytical methodology developed to aid the investigation of social science 
questions grounded in human agency and beset with methodological problems resulting from a paucity of 
cases, permits the investigator of a particular DV, or “outcome,” to identify, through detailed historical 
research and interpretation of all existing cases of the outcome, a broad number, “n”, of probable IVs, or 
“causal factors.”875  In QCA, these causal factors are measured dichotomously across the universe of 
872 See generally RAGIN, supra note 868 (presenting the first comprehensive description of the case-oriented method as a method 
of analysis in the social science under the rubric “the comparative method”)..
873 Id. at 13.
874 Id. at 36.
875
 The term “causal factor” is a misnomer, since although it is possible to establish associative relationships between independent 
and dependent variables through application of QCA it is difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate causation.   An associative 
relationship is simply a statement that the presence of an independent variable tends to occur in connection with the presence of a 
dependent variable; it does not mean that the dependent variable is necessarily caused by the independent variable, although a 
causal inference may be drawn.  Proof of causation, however, requires controlled experimentation to prove that the independent 
variable, rather than some intervening or confounding variable, causes the dependent variable to occur and that the association 
between variables is not simply one of covariance.  See generally David Freedman, From Association to Causation: Some 
Remarks on the History of Statistics, Technical Report No. 521 (Jan. 2002), available at http://stat-
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cases.  Each case is examined for the presence or the absence of the causal factor; the presence of the 
causal factor is indicated by a capital letter, e.g., “A,” while the absence is indicated by a lower-case 
letter, e.g., “a.”876  In any QCA analysis, the possible number of combinations of causal factors is thus 2n.
c.  necessary and sufficient conditionality
Each of the 2n cases is placed in a matrix, known as a “truth table,” that illustrates the 
associations of particular outcomes with particular combinations of causal factors that manifested in 
actual historical cases.  Where cells in the truth table are unfilled due to an absence of the particular 
combination in the historical record, experimental research is required to augment history and exhaust all 
possible combinations of causal factors.877  While it is asking too much of the method to expect it to yield 
completely unproblematic and generalizable laws on the basis of very few cases, QCA nonetheless 
specifies relationships of necessity and sufficiency between causal factors and outcomes that hold across 
the entire universe of extant cases and that in turn serve as the basis for future experimentation.  A 
“necessary” causal factor is one that always precedes a given outcome/effect and in the absence of which 
the outcome/event cannot occur, while a “sufficient” causal factor is a factor in the presence of which a 
given outcome/effect must occur.878
d.  prime implicants
After the specification of necessary and sufficient causal factors, QCA employs Boolean algebra 
[“BA”], a mathematical system that uses symbols and set theory to represent logical operations in 
algebraic form,879 to reduce several different combinations of causal factors productive of the same 
outcome(s) to what are known as “prime implicants.”880 In formal logic terms, an “implication” is formed 
when two statements are combined by placing the word “if” before the first and “then” between them, 
e.g., “If I drink this glass of water, then my thirst will be quenched.” In an implication, the component 
statement between the words “If” and “then” is known as the “antecedent” and, alternatively, as the 
“implicans;” the statement which follows the word “then” is known as the “consequent” and, 
alternatively, as the “implicate.” An implication asserts that its antecedent implies its consequent; thus, if
www.berkeley.edu/~census/521.pdf.  For example, although smoking is associated with increased rates of lung cancer and can be 
demonstrated through experimental research to cause lung cancer, alcohol consumption is not associated with increased rates of 
lung cancer, and smoking and alcohol consumption are associated (smokers drink more than nonsmokers).  Therefore, alcohol 
consumption is associated with increased rates of lung cancer although it does not cause increased rates of lung cancer.  Simply 
put, association does not imply causation.
876
 Boolean algebra [“BA”]  cannot accept interval data and mandates dichotomous scoring of constructs. An interval scale would 
enable more precise measurements of the dimensions of each decisionmaker on each personality construct.  See, e.g., FELDMAN 
& VALENTY, supra note 228, at 24 (scoring decisionmakers from 1.0 to –1.0 on each personality construct).  However, doing 
so would render the resulting analysis too complex for BA techniques.
877 See J.J.M.M. RUTTEN ET AL., MATHEMATICAL TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING CONCURRENT AND 
PROBABILISTIC SYSTEMS 97-100 (discussing Boolean analysis of probabilistic statements and organization of data).
878 See GLEN SATTY ET AL., COMPUTING AND LOGIC MATHEMATICS AND LANGUAGE 129-30 (1988) (discussing 
principles of necessity and sufficiency in formal logic and their application to research).  For example, to produce the outcome of 
starting an automobile it is a necessary causal factor for the gas tank to contain gasoline, but it is not a sufficient causal factor: 
one may not have keys, the battery may be discharged, or the engine may be damaged.  On the other hand, in order to achieve the 
desired outcome of preventing the automobile from starting it is a sufficient causal factor to simply either empty the gas tank, 
lose the keys, or discharge the battery.
879 See generally GEORGE BOOLE, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT ON WHICH ARE FOUNDED 
THE MATHEMATICAL THEORIES OF LOGIC AND PROBABILITIES (1854) (elaborating the theory of BA).  Until 
recently, applications were limited to the fields of formal logic, design and analysis of computers, and pure mathematics, but BA 
has recently been imported into social science to study, e.g., trade union growth and decline and explanations for revolutionary 
successes and failures.  See_ INT’L J. COMP. SOC. (1991)
880 See RAGIN, supra note 868, at 59.
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the statement “I drink this glass of water” is true, it is also true that “my thirst will be quenched.”  In 
short, the essential meaning is the relationship asserted between the antecedent and the consequent: if the 
antecedent is true, the consequent is also true.
Implication does not suggest, in the case of the example, that it is not possible to satisfy thirst in 
any other manner, nor does implication imply that there may not be other outcomes attendant to the 
drinking of the glass of water: in fact, beer may satisfy my thirst, or the water may be poisoned, and thus 
although it serves the function of quenching thirst it may also produce death.  Nonetheless, implication 
does establish a definitive relationship between the antecedent and the consequent.
A “prime implicant” is special type of implication in which the antecedent is the minimum 
combination of causal factors which together are either 1) sufficient to cause a particular outcome or     
2) necessary to cause a particular outcome across the universe of possible cases and the consequent is the 
particular outcome.  Thus, for any given outcome y for which there is a prime implicant x , if x  is a true 
statement of existing causal factors then either 1) y  must occur as a result of the existence of x  or 2) x  is 
a prerequisite for the production of y.  A prime implicant for any given outcome can be identified by (1) 
surveying the universe of cases in which that outcome is expressed and eliminating each of the “n” causal 
constructs for which there is more than one possible value from the causal construct combinations 
associated with that particular outcome.  Those constructs that remain in every case in which the outcome 
is expressed together constitute the prime implicant for that outcome.  Through determination of prime 
implicants it is possible to isolate the particular necessary and/or sufficient causal factors, if any, which 
produce the given outcome(s) over the universe of available cases.
e.  probabilities: hypothetical analysis
When the historical record fails to exhaust all possible combinations of causal factors it is 
impossible to specify necessary and sufficient causality in respect of particular outcomes.  Under such 
circumstances QCA directs the investigator to analyze preliminary hypotheses regarding the relationships 
between causal factors and outcomes to derive probabilistic propositions than can serve as points of 
departure for experimental research.  For example, consider the phenomenon of “successful social 
revolution,” which has occurred three times in history. In all three cases the causal factor of a “collapsing 
monarchy” was present, but in only two—the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Chinese Revolution of 
1949—was the causal factor of “strong charismatic leadership” present.  In the third—the French 
Revolution of 1789—it was absent.881  Accordingly, while “collapsing monarchy” is a necessary condition 
for social revolution, “strong charismatic leadership” is not.  However, the preliminary hypothesis, “The 
stronger and more charismatic the leader of the revolutionary element, the more successful the resulting 
social revolution,” is supported or affirmed by 2 of 3, or 66.7%, of cases, as is the probabilistic statement, 
“A successful social revolution will be led by a strong and charismatic leader.”
4.  QCA Applied to the Association of Personality Constructs and ASD Outcomes
a.  personality constructs as causal factors
881 See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS (1979) (identifying and analyzing the French 
(1789), Russian (1917), and Chinese (1949) revolutions as the sole instances of social revolution in history).
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The four personality constructs, each of which is a causal factor and an independent variable, are 
labeled as follows:
1.  militarism:  A (presence of construct/factor) or a (absence of construct/ factor);
2.  anomism:  B (presence of construct/factor) or b (absence of construct/factor);
3.  hostility:  C (presence of construct/factor) or c (absence of construct/factor);
4.  adventurism:  D (presence of construct/factor) or d (absence of construct/factor).
Table 1, “Personality Profiles,” aggregates the personality construct scores to create personality profiles 
for each HD in each of the ten historical cases.
b.  association of outcomes with personality profiles
The presence of each outcome/DV in a particular historical case is scored as “1,” while its 
absence is scored “0.” Table 2, “Personality Profiles with Associated ASD Outcomes,” associates the 
presence or absence of each of the ten outcome with each personality profile.  As Table 2 illustrates, the 
incidence of particular outcomes associates with the following personality profile(s), the first step in the 
determination of prime implicants:
(1) consideration of ASD as an option: ABCD, ABCd, aBCD, abcd, aBcd, Abcd, and ABcD;
(2) selection of ASD: aBCD, abcd, ABCD, Abcd, and ABcD;
(3) defense of an exercise of ASD: aBCD, abcd, ABCD, Abcd, and ABcD;
(4) defense of an exercise of ASD on legal grounds: aBCD, abcd, ABCD, Abcd, and ABcD;
(5) other actors regard an exercise of ASD as lawful at the time of its exercise: Abcd;
(6) other actors regard an exercise of ASD as legitimate at the time of its exercise: aBCD, Abcd, and 
ABcD;
(7) state engaging in ASD is subject to legal sanctions: ABCD;
(8) other actors regard an exercise of ASD as lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect: aBCD, abcd, ABCD, 
Abcd, and ABcD;
(9) decisionmaker who ordered his/her state to engage in or refrain from ASD would make the same 
decision again in hindsight: ABCD, ABCd, aBCD, abcd, Abcd, and ABcD; and
(10) exercise of ASD can fairly be said to have contributed to world order: ABCD, ABCd, aBCD, abcd, 
Abcd, and ABcD.
c.  prime implicants of ASD outcomes
The “other actors regard an exercise of ASD as lawful at the time of its exercise” outcome and the 
“state engaging in ASD is subject to legal sanctions” outcome are each associated with a single 
personality profile, Abcd and ABCD respectively.  Therefore, each profile is a prime implicant for its 
associated outcome.  However, for the eight other outcomes it is not possible to identify a prime 
implicant, as for each personality construct the presence and absence of the construct associates with each 
outcome in at least one personality profile.  Furthermore, given the limited number of cases of ASD it is 
premature to conclude that any construct(s) are sufficient, rather than simply necessary, conditions for the 
production of any given ASD outcome.  The sole exception is the hypothetical instance of an outcome for 
which there is a single personality profile as the prime implicant across the entire range of 24, or sixteen, 
possible personality profiles, yet in the universe of historical cases of ASD, only seven personality 
profiles—ABCD, ABCd, aBCD, abcd, aBcd, Abcd, and ABcD—have been associated with ASD 
outcomes.  Where, as here, the history of ASD has not exhausted all possible combinations of causal 
factors and it is therefore impossible to specify necessary and sufficient causality with regard to particular 
outcome, QCA directs the investigator to undertake hypothetical analysis to derive probabilistic 
statements and outcome maximizing combinations.
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d.  hypothetical analysis
An initial qualitative analysis yields little to confirm or reject most of the PHs.  As Table 3, 
“Analysis of Preliminary Hypotheses,” illustrates, no PH is affirmed by all or zero of the ten cases.  
Nonetheless, if there were no relationship between any of the personality constructs and any of the 
outcomes, chance would predict that each hypothesis would be affirmed by fifty percent of cases and 
rejected by fifty percent of cases.882  To affirm a particular PH for purposes of this study, an arbitrary 
determination is made that it must be supported by at least sixty percent of cases in which the outcome is 
expressed;883 in order to be able to reject a particular PH, and to affirm the alternate hypothesis expressing 
the inverse relationship of the causal factor and outcome in question,884 it must be affirmed by forty 
percent or fewer of the cases in which the outcome is expressed.  This requirement establishes a 
sufficiently significant improvement over chance such that some measure of confidence can be placed in 
those PHs affirmed or rejected at this threshold. As Table 3, illustrates, of the forty PHs,, nine are 
affirmed by sixty percent or greater of cases (#s 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 29, and 32), and six are affirmed 
by forty percent or fewer (#s 12, 14, 22, 30, 35, and 39).
The following reformulated hypotheses, stated as working propositions [“WPs”], as well as their 
obverses (negation of both personality construct score and outcome score), are offered at this stage of 
theoretical development:
WP #1 (hypothesis #1): A militaristic decisionmaker will consider ASD; 
WP #2 (hypothesis #2): A militaristic decisionmaker will engage in ASD;
WP #3 (hypothesis #9): A militaristic decisionmaker will be satisfied with his/her decision regarding 
whether to engage in ASD;
WP #4 (hypothesis #10): A militaristic decisionmaker will make a decision in regard to whether to engage 
in ASD that supports world order;
WP #5 (hypothesis #11): An anomistic decisionmaker will consider ASD;
WP #6 (hypothesis #12): An anomistic decisionmaker will not engage in ASD;
WP #7 (hypothesis #13): An anomistic decisionmaker will defend the exercise of ASD;
WP #8 (hypothesis #14): An anomistic decisionmaker will defend the exercise of ASD on legal grounds;
WP #9 (hypothesis #15): An anomistic decisionmaker’s decision to engage in ASD will not be regarded as 
lawful by other actors;
WP #10 (hypothesis #22): A hostile decisionmaker will not engage in ASD;
WP #11 (hypothesis #29): A hostile decisionmaker will be satisfied with his/her decision regarding whether 
to engage in ASD;
WP #12 (hypothesis #30): A hostile decisionmaker will make a decision in regard to whether to engage in 
ASD that supports world order;
WP #13 (hypothesis #32): An adventuristic decisionmaker will engage in ASD;
WP #14 (hypothesis #35): An adventurist’s decision to engage in ASD will not be regarded as lawful by 
other actors; and
WP #15 (hypothesis #39): An adventuristic decisionmaker will be satisfied with his/her decision regarding 
whether to engage in ASD.
i. analysis of associative relationships
882
 For a discussion of the theory of probability and the role of chance, see CHARLES M. GRINSTEAD & J. LAURIE SNELL, 
INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY (2nd ed. rev. 1999).
883
 On some DVs no outcome is expressed in several cases: i.e., where a decisionmaker does not elect to engage in ASD, no
question of the lawfulness or legitimacy of the decision is raised, and thus no score is expressed on either outcome.  Thus, rather 
than establish a specific number of cases in which the hypothesized relationship must obtain, a percentage is used in recognition 
of the fact that fewer than ten cases are available in regard to several of the dependent variables.
884
 For example, suppose the hypothesis “The more sunny the day is the fewer people on this beach will experience sunburn” is 
determined to be true in 1 of 10, or 10%, of cases studied (perhaps because on the one sunny day only Bahamians were on the 
beach, while on cloudy days Norwegians were in attendance). The alternate hypothesis, “The more sunny the day is the more 
people on this beach will experience sunburn” is accepted as true in 9 of 10, or 90%, of cases.
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a. militarism and ASD
WPs 1 and 2, both affirmed by 60% of cases, seem intuitively obvious.  We anticipate that 
nationalistic patriots with military experience and a favorable view of power who are keenly ambitious, 
inflexibly committed to a view of the international system as a zero-sum competition for survival, unable 
or unwilling to integrate contrary information or to seek and heed the counsel of others, and convinced 
that foreign policy is an arena in which they must aggressively battle to prove their worth to consider and 
elect options, including ASD, that involve the use of force against rivals perceived to threaten the 
interests of the states at their command, even if such options are controversial and even if the nature or 
magnitude of the threat is uncertain.  Information that confirms the nature and magnitude of a threat is 
consistent with the worldview of the militarist and is credited as valid, whereas information that would 
discredit the threat or suggest a non-conflictual or less conflictual response is discarded.  The militarist 
must defend the patria from attacks, which loom everywhere and which afford his reason for being, and 
any means, even if considered by other actors as unacceptable, unlawful, or disproportionate, is legitimate 
to this end. 
WP 3 is somewhat more surprising.  To the extent that extreme militarists are incorrigibly 
convinced that the international system is an arena of perpetual conflict, incapable of considering non-
military instruments of policy, and unable to refrain from tasking the national armed forces to serve their 
ambitions and prove their worth, it stands to reason that they would evaluate their decisions to engage in 
ASD uncritically and learn little if anything from military failure, political criticism, or legal sanctions.  
However, that militarists tend to be satisfied in the rectitude of their decisions in regard to the exercise of 
ASD, and that non-militarists tend to regret their decisions, suggests that in circumstances where an 
arguably imminent threat has arisen it may indeed be prudent to respond with ASD, and militarists are 
more prone to do so than non-militarists. 
WP 4, affirmed by 70% of cases, is even more unanticipated.  The restrictivist camp regards IHL 
as very much a prohibitory regime and treats the use of force as ipso facto unlawful unless authorized by 
the Security Council;885 the entire framework of the UN Charter, a document born out of the horror of 
World War II and intended to create a more peaceful and just international system,886 is erected upon the 
moral premise that armed conflict is a scourge as well as the legal commitment to the principle that force 
is no longer to be used to resolve disputes.887  That force, applied in anticipation of armed attacks, should 
actually prove supportive of international order and justice, and that militarists, for whom force is the 
preferred instrument of policy, should make a greater contribution to this end than non-militarists seems, 
at least on its face, to pose a challenge to the moral philosophy and legal theory underlying restrictivism.
b. anomism and ASD
WP 5 is, as anticipated, affirmed by 70% of cases.  Decisionmakers who are ignorant and even 
disdainful of law and legal authorities and bereft of an internal moral code will naturally regard 
international legal regulations on the resort to force in purely instrumental terms and afford them little if 
885 See supra at pp._ (describing the restrictivist position with regard to ASD).
886 See UN Charter, supra note 440, at art. 1 (1-3).
887 See id. at Preamble, art. 2(3).
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any independent weight in the decisionmaking regarding whether to engage in ASD.  If ASD can 
conceivably protect their states from an external threat, anomistic decisionmakers will consider ASD 
whether consistent with or contrary to the law.  Similarly, that anomists’ decisions to engage in ASD 
would be regarded by other actors as unlawful, as WP 9 states and as 71.4% of cases affirm, is 
unsurprising.  Anomists’ disregard for law, authority, and moral considerations are expressed not only in 
the substantive content of their decisionmaking but in the process whereby they negotiate and interact 
with other actors and explain and justify their decisions.  An anomist’s decision to engage in ASD, as 
well as his or her explanation and justification for that decision, is likely qualitatively distinct from a 
similar decision and the accompanying explanation or justification offered by a non-anomist.
WP 6, however, is completely counterintuitive.  An anomist is precisely the personality expected 
to engage in ASD notwithstanding any legal prohibitions to the contrary, and the finding, supported by 
60% of cases, that anomists do not engage in ASD, is difficult to explain.  By contrast, although WPs 7 
and 8, both affirmed by 71.4% of cases, are also counterintuitive, it bears noting that all decisionmakers, 
regardless of personality profiles, defended their actions when resorting to ASD, and all made legal 
arguments; it it is at least as plausible to suggest that all decisionmakers reflexively seek to justify their 
actions on a legal basis when engaging in the use of force as it is to suggest that anomism is associated 
with the legal defense of the exercise of ASD.
c. hostility and ASD
It might be expected that self-absorbed, delusional, amoral decisionmakers who distrust and 
dislike humanity and reject any limits on the means that may be used to defend against the welter of 
threats they believe surround them would be strongly inclined to lash out with force against outsiders 
regardless of provocation or of the consistency of such a response with legal obligations.  Strangely, 60% 
of the cases affirm WP 10, which states that a hostile decisionmaker will not engage in ASD.  It is 
difficult at this stage of theory development to specify why this may be so: it may be that hostility is no 
absolute bar to the exercise of prudent discretion, or that other actors are more cautious in their dealings 
with hostile decisionmakers and refrain from conduct that might be perceived as threatening.  If the latter, 
it might be questioned whether the manifestion of hostility has the effect of inoculating decisionmakers, 
at least to some degree, against the machinations of other actors who choose on that basis not to make 
states led by hostile decisionmakers the targets of their designs.
WP11, just as WP 3, is curious.  Although sixty percent of cases affirm that a hostile 
decisionmaker will be satisfied with his or her decision regarding whether to engage in ASD, it might 
have been anticipated that the self-absorption, unmotivated distrust, detachment from reality, and hatred 
for others that govern ideal-typic hostile decisionmakers would warp their judgments and yield decisions 
they would ultimately come to regret.  However, considered in conjunction with WP 10, which states that 
hostile decisionmakers, in contrast to militarists, refrain from engaging in ASD, the high degree of 
satisfaction indicated by WP 11 may be explained on the ground that hostile decisionmakers are somehow 
able to prevent their hostility from coloring their decisionmaking.  In the same vein, proposition 12, 
which links hostility with decisions regarding ASD that support world order, may simply be a reflection 
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of the tendency of hostile decisionmakers to refrain from engaging in acts of ASD that, if they were to 
give rein to their hostility, would otherwise not be predicated upon genuine threats to their states but 
would rather be malignant expressions of their narcissism, ethnocentrism, Machiavellianism, or other 
subconstructs of their hostility.
d. adventurism and ASD
WP 13, affirmed by 60% of cases, states rather plausibly that anxious, impulsive gamblers who 
reposit great faith in their capacity to assert their will upon events are willing to undertake a military 
strategy that affords the prospect of significant benefits while nonetheless presenting significant risks in 
terms of the political consequences should other actors regard the resort to ASD as a violation of law.  For 
adventurists, the risks associated with ASD are outweighed by the potential gains.  WP 14, however, 
affirmed by 71.4% of cases, implies that other actors are disinclined to regard the adventurist favorably, 
and that the risk-taking propensity of the adventurist may be perceived as inherently and diametrically 
opposed to the predictability that many members of the international community hope to secure by way of 
the rule of law.  Still, WP 15, affirmed by 60% of cases, suggests that there are important gains to be had 
even if they come at a price: although adventurists may be regarded as law-breakers when they engage in 
ASD, they regard their decisions to do so as having been correct under the circumstances.  Success in 
international relations, particularly if defined as the defense of the state against external threats, may well 
require some risk taking
ii.  Outcome Maximizing Combinations
Although only two ASD outcomes are linked to prime implicants, several other outcomes are 
associated with a number of personality profiles that, although they cannot be reduced to prime 
implicants, share at least one personality construct score across at least 60% of the profiles associated 
with those outcomes.  For example, PH #10, “The more militaristic a decisionmaker, the more likely 
his/her decision with regard to ASD can fairly be said to have contributed to world order,” is supported by 
seven of ten, or 70%, of cases, while six of eight, or 75%, of personality profiles associated with the 
presence of the outcome “contributed to world order” contain the personality construct “A,” “militaristic,” 
and thus reinforce PH #10.888  As Table 4, “Personality Constructs with Associated ASD Outcomes,” 
illustrates, twenty-two associations satisfy the 60% confidence level.
An “Outcome Maximizing Combination” [“OMC”] can be determined for each ASD outcome.  
Each OMC represents that construct or aggregation of constructs that yields the greatest probability, 
relative to all other constructs or aggregates, of an association with a particular outcome.  Each construct 
for which hypothetical analysis yields at least a 60% probability of association with a particular outcome 
is included in the OMC for that outcome.  For example, for “consider ASD,” PH #1, “The more 
militaristic a decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD,” is supported by 60% of cases, 
and PH #11, “The more anomistic the decisionmaker, the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD,” is 
supported by 70% of cases.  Therefore, the presence of the constructs “militarism” and “anomism,” 
indicated by the score AB, is part of the OMC.  However, PH #21, “The more hostile the decisionmaker 
888
 Cases in which the outcome is not expressed are not included in modified QCA.
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the more likely s/he will be to consider ASD,” is supported by only 50% of cases—the equivalent of 
chance—as is PH #31, “The more adventuristic the decisionmaker the more likely s/he will be to consider 
ASD.”  Consequently, neither the presence nor absence of either hostility or adventurism is included in 
the OMC for “consider ASD.”
The following are the OMCs for each of the ten ASD outcomes:
(1) consider ASD: AB;
(2) engage in ASD: AbcD;
(3) defend exercise of ASD: b;
(4) defend exercise of ASD on legal grounds: b;
(5) exercise of ASD regarded as lawful by other actors: bd;
(6) exercise of ASD regarded as legitimate by other actors: none;
(7) exercise of ASD met with sanctions: none;
(8) exercise of ASD regarded as lawful or legitimate in retrospect: none;
(9) decisionmaker is satisfied with the outcome of the ASD decision: ACD; and
(10) ASD decision promoted world order: AC.
e.  Probabilistic Statements of Association
A “Probabilistic Statement of Association” [“PSA”] is a synthetic statement of association 
between a personality construct or profile and ASD outcome(s) demonstrated to be true across a 
minimum of 60% the ten historical cases in hypothetical analysis as well as across a minimum of 60% of 
the cases in which the outcome(s) is/are expressed [“outcome occurrences”] in QCA.  Although PSAs 
establish to a reasonable degree of confidence the existence of relationships of association between 
personality constructs and ASD outcomes, they do not imply the absolute truth or validity of the 
associative relationship, nor do they identify the microprocesses that “produce” associated outcomes.  A 
given instance of ASD can yield outcomes divergent from the explanations and predictions offered by 
PSAs.  Nonetheless, given current methodological and theoretical constraints, PSAs are perhaps the 
fullest extent to which rigorous analysis can be extended.
The five PSAs are as follows:
(1) A militarist is more likely to consider ASD than a non-militarist; this PSA is supported by 6 of 10 cases 
(60%) in hypothetical analysis and by 6 of 10 outcome occurrences in QCA for an average probability of .600; 
(2) A militarist is more likely to be satisfied with his/her decision regarding whether to engage in ASD than 
a non-militarist; this PSA is supported by 8 of 10 cases (80%) in hypothetical analysis and by 6 of 8 (75.0%) 
outcome occurrences in QCA for an average probability of .775; 
(3) A militarist is more likely to make a decision in regard to whether to engage in ASD that supports world 
order than a nonmilitarist; this statement is supported by 7 of 10 cases (70.0%) in hypothetical analysis and by 6 of 8 
(75.0%) outcome occurrences in QCA for an average probability of .725;
(4) A non-anomist’s decision to engage in ASD will be more likely to be regarded as lawful by other actors 
than an anomist’s decision to engage in ASD; this statement is supported by 5 of 7 cases (71.4%) in hypothetical 
analysis and by 1 of 1 (100%) outcome occurrences in QCA for an average probability of .857; and
(5) A non-adventurist is more likely to make a decision regarding whether to engage in ASD that is 
regarded as lawful by other actors than an adventurist; this statement is supported by 5 of 7 cases (71.4%) in 
hypothetical analysis and by 1 of 1 (100.0%) outcome occurrences in QCA for an average probability of .857.
The five PSAs assess explanatory and predictive probabilities for four of the ten outcomes; for 
example, PSAs 4 and 5, taken together, indicate that in the event that a non-anomistic and non-
advenuristic decisionmaker engages in ASD, the probability that the decision will be regarded by other 
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actors as lawful is 85.7%, whereas the likelihood that the exercise of ASD by an anomistic and 
adventuristic decisionmaker will be judged lawful is 14.6%.  No PSAs can be deduced on the basis of 
existing data for the remaining six ASD outcomes.
C. Combined Theoretical Model
In Figure 1, “Formal Theoretical Model,” the solid, single-headed arrows indicate an associative 
relationship between personality constructs and ASD outcomes.  An attempt is made to distinguish the 
strengths of the associative relationships by labeling each arrow with a coefficient ranging from -1.00 to 
1.00: a relationship of perfect positive association is accorded a coefficient of 1.00 whereas a relationship 
of perfect negative association is accorded a coefficient of -1.00.  This measurement of coefficients is 
analogous to the correlational coefficients used in statistical analysis; however, true measurement of 
correlation is not feasible given the very small “n” available to the current study.  Consequently, 
relationships of association are employed in the manner of correlation coefficients to much the same end. 
In the case of an arrow connecting a construct to an ASD outcome that is labeled with a positive 
coefficient, the presence of the personality construct associates with the ASD outcome to which it is 
connected (the obverse of this stated relationship is also true).  For an arrow labeled with a negative 
coefficient the absence of the personality construct associates with the ASD outcome to which it is 
connected (again, the obverse of this relationship is also true).  Note that only those associative 
relationships with coefficients that round to greater than or equal to .6 or lesser than or equal to -.6 are 
included in the formal theoretical model; the complete absence of any associative relationship would 
dictate an coefficient of .5 for the linkage between the U.S. Presidential personality construct and the 
unrelated outcome as well as -.5 for the linkage of the absence of the personality construct and unrelated 
outcome.
“Coefficients of associative relationships” are measured by calculating the average of the 
percentage of the cases in hypothetical analysis supporting a particular associative relationship between a 
personality construct and a particular ASD outcome and the percentage of outcome occurrences in QCA 
in which the associative relationship is evidenced between the construct and the outcome.  Coefficients 
are illustrated in Table 5, “Coefficients of Associative Relationships.” 
D.  General Observations and Caveats
Perfect explanation and prediction of human decisionmaking in a complex situation characterized 
by stress and lack of information transcends not only the reality of the current state of science but also the 
expectations of all but the most optimistic.  The present theory is intended to offer some tools for 
explanation and prediction, but attempts to read the proverbial crystal ball for insight into concrete future 
outcomes in instances in which the prospect of ASD arises will prove less than completely satisfying at 
best.  Despite the identification of numerous associative relationships, it is important to stress the limited 
and conditional nature of the causal significance of personality.  Each and every decisionmaker in the 
present study considered, and seven of ten elected, ASD. These findings suggest that the personality 
constructs under analysis may be less significant than other variables, whether unidentified personality 
constructs, objective analyses of external threats, the absence of reliable multilateral institutions that can 
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be enlisted to maintain peace in lieu of self-help, or the lack of credible and effective legal sanctions to 
deter unilateral and unauthorized action, in inducing decisionmakers to contemplate and elect ASD.
Moreover, all decisionmakers who engaged in ASD defended their decisions, and all grounded 
their justifications upon legal arguments.  This finding calls into question whether personality plays a 
significant role in determining whether, and on what basis, states justify their resort to ASD, and may 
suggest instead that the defense of ASD on legal grounds is simply a rational strategic accompaniment 
that all but the clinically insane offer as a veneer for their actions, however thin, to minimize attendant 
political and legal costs.  Furthermore, the resort to ASD is almost uniformly regarded by a 
decisionmaker’s contemporaries as unlawful: in only a single instance—41’s intervention in Panama—
was an act of ASD contemporaneously adjudged as lawful.  That ASD should be deemed unlawful in 
nearly all instances suggests that the legal judgment of the international community may be unrelated to 
the personalities of the decisionmakers, a group of individuals endowed with a range of diverse 
personality profiles, electing the strategy.  Similarly, the general failure to sanction acts of ASD points 
toward factors other than personality, such as the incapacity or unwillingness to organize collective 
military sanctions or uncertainty as to the precise substantive content of the formal legal rules, as 
responsible for the failure to require compliance.
Six of seven instances of ASD are regarded in retrospect as lawful and or legitimate, and eight of 
ten decisions regarding whether to engage in ASD left decisionmakers satisfied and contributed positively 
to world order.  These findings suggest that the international community has, with the passage of time, 
come to regard a practice it considered unlawful upon commission to be not merely lawful but, in effect, 
the proper strategy under the circumstances.  This in turn suggests not that personality is irrelevant but 
rather that legal judgments regarding ASD may perhaps be so amenable to contemporaneous politicized 
interpretation and contestation that the existing legal regime, to the extent it inhibits the exercise of ASD 
by decisionmakers who, whether as a consequence of the influence of their personalities upon their 
decisionmaking or for some other reason, would have engaged in ASD, is dysfunctional.
IV. Criticisms, Responses, and Directions for Future Research
Despite grounds for caution, this study has identified several associative relationships between 
personality and various ASD outcomes, and one should not be too quick to discount the causal 
significance of personality to IHL compliance at this juncture.  Nonetheless, there are sure to be criticisms 
of the present theory on any number of bases.
A.  Criticisms
1.  Reductionism
Those with intellectual commitments to theories that regard other levels of analysis as more 
fundamental to the explanation of the behavior of states may dismiss personality as little more than “a 
magic slogan to charm away the problems that [their] intellectual tools don’t handle.”889  Others, without 
categorically rejecting its causal significance, may take exception to the claim that personality, rather than 
the role of the foreign policy or military bureaucracies, domestic interest groups, the political or cultural 
889
 HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1947).
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nature of the state, or the distribution of military or economic power in the international system, is central 
to explanations for state decisions concerning compliance with IHL; for these critics, personality 
constructs are simply “noisy” variables, and the reductionism of personality-based theories is invariably 
sacrificial of explanatory and predictive power.890
2.  Lack of Parsimony
Still others, even if convinced that personality is relevant to the explanation of state compliance 
with IHL, may fault the present theory on the ground that it is insufficiently parsimonious to be accessible 
to a wide array of researchers that would otherwise wish to replicate and build upon its conclusions.  
Personality theories are difficult to subject to empirical testing, and researchers must expend a great deal 
of labor, time, and resources to acquire specific knowledge about the subjects of investigation as well as 
requisite training in psychobiographical research, qualitative methodology, and formal modeling.891
3.  Ecologically Fallacious
Finally, some may simply find the present theory perilously close to committing the ecological 
fallacy of presuming that associative, or even causal, relationships that obtain within a very small “n” of 
cases are generalizable to the universe of potential decisionmakers.  Indeed, there may be another set of 
personality constructs that generates better explanatory and predictive power, and it is possible that other 
researchers engaged in replication studies will score decisionmakers differently and reach contrary 
findings.  Moreover, the prospect that a future clarification of the law regarding ASD may render the legal 




The “perfect” model of compliance with the IHL regime governing ASD might well treat state 
behaviors as resulting from a combination of causes and in turn amalgamate insights and variables from 
all pretheories and all levels of analysis.  However, such a model would be so cumbersome and so 
difficult to conceptualize and apply that some reductionism would be necessary to permit other 
researchers to engage in the critical tasks of replication and falsification.  However, neither the naïve view 
of IHL compliance as the mere projection of personalities nor the belief that decisionmaking is entirely 
insulated from the effects of personality enjoys empirical support.  If state behaviors could be explained 
solely by reference to the personalities of decisionmakers there would be no discernible pattern of 
behavior at variance with predictions derived from the analysis of those personalities.  The data do not 
890 See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 70, at xxi (suggesting that the “core determinants” of decisions to engage in war, and behavior 
during war, are not “somehow psychological or personal, but rather a[re] the locus of meaningful operation of the powerful 
determinants operating to affect incentives at the governmental and international system levels.”).  The predominant pre-World 
War II view was that the primary causes of war and peace were to be found in the personalities of statesmen.  See E.H.CARR, 
TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS ix (1939) (taking exception to this predominant paradigm).  Because much of international relations 
scholarship over the past six and one-half decades has been oriented, however indirectly, toward disproving the causal 
significance of personality, the resurrection of personality as the fundamental level of analysis in international relations is bound 
to provoke criticism.  Scholars in other legal issue-areas are similarly resistant to the notion that explanations for behavior lurk in 
individual personalities.  See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social 
Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1391 (2003) (cautioning against overestimation of the extent to which 
personality determines compliance with criminal law).
891 See SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 257 (explaining reasons for reluctance to explore personality-based approaches).
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support this conclusion, and the present study does not make this assertion.  By the same token, 
personality is not epiphenomenal to IHL compliance: although there may be some circumstances in which 
any decisionmaker facing the precise set of conditions will decide identically, decisions as to whether to 
engage in ASD appear to be influenced, if not entirely determined, by personality.  Because personality is 
causally relevant to the explanation and prediction of IHL compliance, the proposed theory is not remiss 
for taking personality seriously.
Whether, however, a theory of IHL compliance can fairly be branded as overly reductionist for 
focusing narrowly upon the causal significance of personality to the neglect of variables from other levels 
of analysis remains an open question.892  While it is possible to incorporate multiple levels of analysis 
within a single theory, it is also possible, by building too many variables drawn from too many levels of 
analysis into a model, for theoretical eclecticism to become hobgoblin to explanatory and predictive 
power.  Explanations of phenomena grounded in a single level of analysis are not reductionist per se, and 
reductionist explanations are not necessarily unhelpful: it is only when explanatory and predictive power 
is sacrificed to accommodate the objective of theoretical simplicity that this criticism is warranted.  
Rather than blindly commit to spareness in the abstract, the responsible scholar “evaluates the relative 
utility—conceptual and methodological—of the various alternatives open to him, and . . . appraise[s] the 
manifold implications of the level of analysis finally selected.”893  Research in the newly-coined field of 
law and neuroeconomics894 suggests that the ultimate locus of decisionmaking is the series of 
neurochemical processes in the human brain that drive individuals to seek “rewards” and avoid 
“punishments” at least partially independently of their cognitive or affective perceptions and beliefs.895  If 
neural mechanisms are indeed responsible for theoretically significant aspects of human behavior, then 
the argument that IHL compliance decisions can be explained and predicted by investigation of 
personality alone is not a convenient reductionist gambit but rather a sound conceptual and 
methodological commitment that can only benefit from an even more micro-level analysis of the 
biological constituents of personality.
2.  Lack of Parsimony
No theory attempting to offer policy-relevant explanations and predictions of compliance with the 
IHL regime governing ASD, a contextually-bound phenomenon of great complexity, is likely to be 
described as parsimonious.  This is particularly true of a theory the development and testing of which 
requires the acquisition of substantive and methodological training that imposes entry barriers to research 
and renders it less accessible and replicable than theories predicated upon more familiar levels of analysis.  
If parsimony, rather than explanatory and predictive power, is the measure of success, there would be 
892 See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 70, at 42-43 (suggesting that although “[w]e should keep before us . . . the . . . probability” that 
theories designed to explain state behaviors with regard to armed conflict “might be further usefully refined by adding 
psychological profiles of particular leaders, and systematically applying findings of cognitive psychology[,]” the incorporation of 
psychological variables should be supplementary to, rather than instead of, variables derived from the structure of states and from 
the international systemic distribution of power).
893
 J. David Singer, The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations, 14 WORLD POL. 77, 77 (1961).
894 See Terrence Chorvat, Kevin McCabe, & Vernon Smith, Law and Neuroeconomics, SSRN WPS #501063 (2004) at 3 (coining 
the term “law and neuroeconomics,” concluding that neural mechanisms are responsible for behavior, and suggesting that 
neurochemistry delineates the limits of law to alter behavior).
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grounds for concern.  However, “[w]hen all other things are not equal, as is usually the case, we prefer an 
accurate complexity over an inaccurate parsimony.”896  If the present theory harnesses as much 
explanatory and predictive power as can be corralled at present, it behooves those who would challenge 
its lack of parsimony to instead commit to the development of the research and experimental techniques 
that will enable greater collaboration in the field of PT.
3.  Ecologically Fallacious
Generalizing inductively from a very small number of cases is inherently problematic, for 
anomalous individual cases are more likely to drive findings than they will in larger populations.  
However, because the data employed herein constitutes the universe of historical instances of ASD it is 
not a sample, and thus no inferences need be drawn that might build upon skewed data.  Moreover, the 
propositions, findings, and conclusions of the present study are conditional and intended to serve as an 
explanation for a very limited number of context-dependent cases of ASD and even more importantly as 
the point of departure for further research, rather than as a final and authoritative statement of the 
relationship between personality and IHL compliance.  Personality profiles remain unexhausted, and only 
future experimental research and the passage of time can remedy this defect.  The external validity and 
usefulness of any theory will ultimately be judged by subsequent efforts at replication and falsification, 
and by history.897  At present we must content ourselves with a rigorous yet methodologically imperfect 
initial investigation that yields probabilistic and conditional findings.    
4. Comparison to Other Theories
Perhaps the best defense of the proferred personality theory of IHL compliance against criticism 
is a comparison of the explanations it offers in regard to the empirical data with the explanations and 
predictions derived from the alternative pretheories.  If PT is more congruent with observable patterns of 
decisionmaking than alternative pretheories, then notwithstanding its reductionism or lack of parsimony 
there is cause to believe that the theory that will ultimately render the most sophisticated explanations and 
predictions will, at the very least, incorporate personality.
a. realism
Because nothing but the relative distribution of power is theoretically significant to realism and 
neither law nor personality bears upon the behavior of self-interested states in an anarchic system, realism 
explains all decisions regarding compliance with IHL in terms of power. ASD permits a state to maximize
its defensive power, and in the absence of a central executive with the capacity to enforce order, even 
weak states, when threatened by other states, will always engage in ASD either singly or jointly with 
other, more powerful allies to whom they promise services and benefits in exchange for their assistance.  
895 See, e.g., Piotr Winkielman & Kent Berridge, Irrational Wanting and Subrational Liking: How Rudimentary Motivational and 
Affective Processes Shape Preferences and Choices, 24 POL. PSYCH. 657, 673 (2003).
896
 WALZ, supra note 47, at 113 n.13 (defending a theory of international relations grounded in variables drawn from the 
systemic level of analysis against the potential charges of reductionism and lack of parsimony).
897
 “Replication” is process whereby future researchers employ independently collected data to study the same empirical 
phenomenon and compare results to the findings of the earlier study, while “falsification” is the process whereby scholars employ 
inductive reasoning to disprove core premises or assumptions of a theory.  See Paul S. Herrnson, Replication, Verification, 
Secondary Analysis, and Data Collection in Political Science, 28 PS POL. SCI. & POL. 452 (1995).  For a discussion of the 
importance of replication to the enterprise of empirical legal scholarship, see generally Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal 
Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N. C. L. REV. _ (2004, forthcoming).
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Realism thus predicts, contrary to empirical observations, that in every instance, or 100% of the time, 
regardless of the personality of the HDs at their helms, states will consider and engage in ASD yet feel no 
compulsion to defend their decisions on legal or other grounds.
b. ET
ET, although it maintains that an appropriate package of sanctions can in theory be crafted to 
deter states from threatening their neighbors and thereby obviate the resort to ASD, concedes that states 
will engage in ASD unless the threat of sanctions is sufficient to deter them.  Because the Security 
Council is singularly ineffective as a collective security mechanism, and because only the U.S. has the 
sort of hegemonic power that is necessary to enforce IHL, ET would seem to yield not only the general 
prediction that threatened states are obligated in every instance—100% of the time—to resort to ASD 
independently of the personalities of their HDs but that the U.S., and states to which the U.S. extends 
guarantees of defense assistance, will never be subject to the sort of threats that will render ASD 
necessary.  Both predictions are controverted by empirical evidence.
c. liberalism
Liberalism assumes that the nature of the state is dispositive of patterns of compliance with law 
and that liberal democracies are much more likely to comply with the regime governing ASD than non-
liberal states.  If true, one would expect that at least a significant number of instances of resort to ASD 
would be undertaken by illiberal states, and one might predict that when liberal states engage in ASD 
their decisions to do so will be more likely to be regarded as lawful or at least legitimate.  The data do not 
support any of these hypotheses.  The U.S. and Israel—two liberal democracies—are the sole states to 
have engaged in ASD; put differently, no illiberal state has ever engaged in ASD, and 100% of the states 
that have done so—compared to liberalism’s prediction of 0%--have been liberal democracies.  
Moreover, in only one of seven instances—14.3% of the cases—was an exercise of ASD by either of 
these two states deemed lawful by the international community, an outcome that runs counter to the 
liberal prediction that democracies would comply with the law and, at least as importantly, be adjudged to 
be in compliance as a general rule.
d.  RCT
RCT predicts simply that if ASD is the battle strategy most likely to yield the greatest benefits to 
a threatened state, the state, through its HD, will choose to engage in ASD regardless of his individual 
personality; conversely, if ASD is less likely than another strategy to maximize relative wealth and 
power, states will refrain.  Under objectively threatening conditions of a certain magnitude, every HD, 
according to RCT, will elect ASD.  Should a HD refrain from ASD, RCT assumes that the threat was not 
sufficiently severe and that an alternative battle strategy was more effective.  Although each instance of 
ASD is historically unique and thus difficult for RCT to organize into a coherent and consistent 
explanation, retrospectively RCT can only conclude that whether a state engaged in or refrained from 
ASD it was rational for the HD to have made the decision; in other words, RCT offers no testable 
predictions.  RCT, due to its presumption of inherent rationality, is even less equipped to offer insight into 
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why states defend the exercise of ASD, how other actors evaluate the exercise of ASD, or whether an 
exercise of ASD contributes to world order.
e.  managerialism
By presuming that states are inherently interested in cooperation, MT is auto-relegated to near-
irrelevance in the development of theories of IHL compliance, as utterly uncooperative a venture as is 
imaginable.  To the extent that MT is of any utility to theorizing in the issue-area of ASD, perhaps it can 
explain the fact that all decisionmakers defend their exercise of ASD on legal grounds as simply an 
expression of the universal desire of states to cooperate, and to appear to be cooperative, in their relations 
with other states (a core prediction of RT) as well as a generalized commitment to law as the medium 
wherein to facilitate cooperation.
f. RT
RT, which assumes that states value a reputation for compliance as an independent end, is largely 
irrelevant as well, for states threatened with extinction privilege their survival above all else.  RT is, along 
with managerialism, better suited to other issue-areas of international relations.  To the extent that RT is 
taken seriously as the basis for prediction of state behaviors in regard to ASD, one might anticipate that 
those states most generally committed to the rule of law—a group that includes the Western liberal 
democracies and Israel—would be those least inclined to run afoul of the IHL regime governing ASD.  
That the U.S. and Israel are the only two states that have engaged in ASD suggests that whatever 
reputational costs are incurred through resort to ASD are minimal in relation to the gains and that 
reputation is of limited significance in the issue-area of armed conflict.
g. TLP
TLP predicts that state compliance with IHL is a function of the degree of incorporation of IHL 
within the domestic legal regimes; those states that best internalize IHL obligations within their municipal 
law will demonstrate the highest levels of compliance.  Accordingly, because it is the most sophisticated 
military powers that have developed the most detailed and comprehensive codes of military regulations to 
incorporate IHL obligations, TLP predicts that the leading martial states, including the U.S. and Israel, 
should be far less likely than states with little military prowess and little formal domestic military 
regulation to engage in ASD; yet quite the opposite is true: the only states that have engaged in ASD—the
U.S. and Israel—are among a very small and select group of states that have precisely-elaborated military 
codes and well-articulated institutions of military justice.898
h.  LT
LT offers no testable theory of IHL compliance: it is simply a general statement that states tend to 
comply with IHL because law is perceived as legitimate.  If, however, LT is correct in asserting that states 
comply with laws that they perceive as legitimate, then instances of non-compliance must be treated as 
symptoms of legal illegitimacy.  Because no state or individual officially regards the formal regime 
898 See Christopher Greenwood, Military Rule-Making: Military Manuals and Other Administrative Rules Relating to Armed 
Conflict, Report to International Colloquium at Bad Hamburg, Germany (June 17-19, 1988), in NATIONAL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 193-96, 197 (Michael Bothe, ed. 1990) (offering comparative assessment of 
degree of internalization of IHL by various states in their military manuals and distinguishing a core group of Western liberal 
democracies as significantly more advanced than all other states).
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governing ASD as illegitimate, however—states and individuals adopt varying interpretations of 
obligations arising under the Charter and under customary IHL, but none disclaim the legitimacy of the 
regime—LT must either predict perfect compliance with the regime or account for which individuals 
and/or states regard IHL as illegitimate and why they do so, craft a more subtle explanation for the 
linkage between compliance and legitimacy sympathetic to multiple interpretations of legal obligation 
and correspondingly differential standards of compliance with the law giving rise to that obligation, and 
explain how differential perceptions of legal obligation and legal legitimacy translate into outcomes.  
History disproves the prediction of perfect compliance, and LT as presented limits an expanded account 
that considers degrees of legitimacy while prescribing agnosticism regarding the cognitive, affective, and 
perceptive milieux of individuals.
i. constructivism
Constructivism presumes that compliance follows ineluctably from the dissemination and 
inculcation of norms favoring compliance within the preference structure of states and key individuals 
and the codification of these norms in the content of legal regimes.  Accordingly, constructivism predicts 
that HDs will adhere to widely-shared normative understandings of appropriate behavior regarding the 
resort to force, with cooperative and rule-governed conduct prevailing over power and self-interest.  
However, even if one accepts that cooperative norms trump self-interest to the extent they succeed in 
(re)constructing state and individual preferences, constructivism does not offer any account for how 
norms transform preferences, for which norms are best descriptive of widely-shared preferences at any 
given decisional point or, more importantly, for why some individuals fail to embrace a particular code of 
normative content and why some act contrary to legal prescriptions and proscriptions even when they 
purport to accept the normative basis for a given legal regime.  Constructivism simply predicts, contrary 
to empirical evidence, that individuals can be induced to prefer to comply and thus will in fact comply 
with law generally and with the IHL regime governing ASD specifically; it does not offer a theory that 
can be subjected to traditional methods of analysis or to experimental research.
j. OCT
The use of force in anticipation of an attack is a battle strategy that has always been perfectly 
consistent with the normative structure of the martial code.899  If IHL compliance is a function of the 
degree of congruence between the formal rules of relevant legal regimes on the one hand and the 
organizational culture of the military bureaucracy on the other, as OCT theorizes, then, because a 
pragmatist interpretation of the formal rules is available that permits the exercise of ASD, OCT predicts 
that states will consider and engage in ASD each and every time they are credibly threatened with attack 
regardless of the personalities of their HDs.  However, although in each case ASD was considered, there 
have been three cases where decisionmakers in states with military organizational cultures favorable to 
the exercise of ASD elected not to make the decision to preempt attack.  Moreover, if OCT provided an 
adequate account of state and individual preferences, decisions to engage in ASD ought not be 
contemporaneously regarded by other states as unlawful and illegitimate, as so often they have been.  
114
Because OCT predicts that (1) decisionmakers will engage in ASD at a 100% rate and that other actors 
will almost invariably and contemporaneously regard each exercise as (2) lawful and (3) legitimate—
predictions at odds with empirical data indicating rates of 70%, 14.3%, and 42.9% respectively—a theory 
that transcends the cultural level of analysis to develop the fine thread of personality running through the 
OCT explanation is necessary.
5. Summary
Although the probabilistic statements of association and linkage between personality constructs 
and ASD outcomes offered in the present study are necessarily tentative at this stage of theoretical 
development, PT, although arguably reductionist and non-parsimonious, harnesses greater explanatory 
and predictive power and offers a more complete and consistent account for a range of ASD outcomes 
than existing pre-theories of international legal compliance.
C.  Directions for Future Research
1. Experimental Research
a.  experimental personality profiles
Although it would be premature to draw conclusions about causation on the basis of the 
associative relationships identified across ten historical cases of ASD decisionmaking, a clear agenda for 
future research emerges.  As Table 6, “Universe of Personality Profiles,” illustrates, there have been a 
total of only seven distinct combinations of the four personality constructs identified in the present study 
as causal factors of ASD outcomes.  However, as QCA indicates, these four personality constructs 
generate a total of 24, or sixteen, possible combinations.  Consequently, as Table 7, “Experimental 
Personality Profiles,” illustrates, there are nine combinations of the four constructs that exist theoretically 
within a sufficiently numerous population but cannot as yet be identified, analyzed, placed in a truth table, 
and incorporated in the present theory.  When, as here, the historical record fails to exhaust all possible 
combinations of causal factors it is impossible to specify necessary and sufficient causality in respect of 
any particular outcome unless the historical record can be augmented either the passage of time and the 
availability of additional real-world crises wherein the question of ASD arises, or by the production of 
additional cases in an experimental setting.  Data associated with experimental profiles and derived from 
simulation research can then be integrated with historical data and subjected to QCA.
b.  experimental typologies
Much might be learned from the analysis of these experimental personality profiles, which, as 
Table 8, “Experimental Profiles with Predictions of Associated Outcomes,” illustrates, are assigned the 
following typologies to reflect the associative relationships anticipated in respect to each:900
899 See William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-September 11th Proposal to Rationalize the Laws of War, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. _ (forthcoming).
900
 The seven combinations that comprise the historical record can also be assigned the following typologies: (1) ABCD (“The 
Barbarian”), (2) ABCd (“The Counterpuncher”), (3) aBCD (“The Reluctant Barbarian”), (4) abcd (“The Moralist”), (5) aBcd 
(“The Ostrich”), (6) Abcd (“The Sheriff”), and (7) ABcD (“The Friendly Barbarian”).  For a discussion of the use of typologies 
to classify decisionmakers on the basis of their personality construct combinations, see, e.g., FALKOWSKI, supra note_, at 19-21 
(describing characteristics of the “expansionist,” the “active independent,” the “influential,” the “mediator,” the “opportunist,” 
and the “participator”).; Winter et al., supra note 263, at 223 (describing characteristics of the “opportunist” and the 
“developmental” personalities).
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(1) AbCD (“The Soldier”): The Soldier will consider, engage in, and defend ASD on legal grounds, and 
will be satisfied with his/her decision regarding ASD, which will in turn contribute to world order.  There is 
insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the decision of the Soldier to engage in ASD will be regarded as lawful 
or legitimate either contemporaneously or in retrospect and whether the decision will be sanctioned;
(2) AbcD (“The Merchant”): The Merchant will consider,901 engage in, and defend ASD on legal grounds, 
and will be satisfied with his/her decision regarding ASD.  There is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the 
decision of the Merchant to engage in ASD will be regarded as lawful or legitimate either contemporaneously or in 
retrospect, whether it will be sanctioned, and whether it will contribute to world order;
(3) aBCd (“The Malcontent”): The Malcontent will consider but will not engage in ASD, and s/he will not 
be satisfied with this decision.  There is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the decision not to engage in 
ASD will contribute to world order;
(4) abCD (“The Mediator”): The Mediator will neither consider nor engage in ASD.902  Whether or not s/he 
does engage in ASD s/he will be satisfied.  If s/he does engage in ASD, s/he will defend the exercise of ASD on 
legal grounds, but there is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether other actors will regard the decision as lawful 
or legitimate either contemporaneously or in retrospect, or whether the decision will contribute to world order;
(5) ABcd (“The Independent”): The Independent will consider ASD, but there is insufficient evidence to 
anticipate whether s/he will engage in ASD and whether the decision will contribute to world order.  If s/he engages 
in ASD s/he will not defend the decision, and there is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the decision to 
engage in ASD will be regarded as lawful either contemporaneously or in retrospect, or whether the decision will be 
sanctioned.  S/he will not be satisfied with the decision.
(6) AbCd (“The Sentry”): There is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the Sentry will consider or 
engage in ASD, but if s/he does engage in ASD s/he will defend the decision on legal grounds, and the decision will 
be regarded as lawful and legitimate contemporaneously and in retrospect.903  No sanctions will be applied to the 
Sentry’s decision to engage in ASD.  Whether or not the Sentry engages in ASD, s/he will be satisfied with the 
decision, and the decision will contribute to world order;
(7) aBcD (“The Jellyfish”): There is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the Opportunist will 
consider ASD, but s/he will not engage in ASD.  S/he will not be satisfied with the decision to refrain from ASD, 
which will not contribute to world order;
(8) abcD “The Follower”): The Follower will neither consider nor engage in ASD.  S/he will not be 
satisfied with the decision to refrain from ASD, which will not contribute to world order;
(9) abCd (“The Hermit”): The Hermit will neither consider nor engage in ASD. S/he will not be satisfied
with the decision to refrain from ASD, which will not contribute to world order.
The results of further research should reinforce or undermine the predictions regarding 
associations between personality and ASD outcomes, enable the elaboration of a formal theoretical 
901
 Although the results of OMC analysis do not shed light on whether The Merchant is likely to consider ASD, because each and 
every historical decisionmaker considered ASD, and because The Merchant is likely to engage in ASD, it is assumed that s/he 
will have considered ASD before electing it as a policy decision.
902
 Although the results of OMC analysis suggest that there is insufficient evidence to anticipate whether the Mediator will engage 
in ASD, because the Mediator will not consider ASD it is logically impossible that s/he will engage in ASD.
903
 Although OMC analysis indicates that there is insufficient evidence to anticipate that the decision of the Sentry to engage in 
ASD will be regarded as legitimate, because the decision will be regarded as lawful, and because lawfulness is presumed to be a 
more difficult burden to meet than legitimacy, it is presumed that the decision of the sentry to engage in ASD will be regarded as 
legitimate.  Moreover, although there is insufficient evidence to anticipate that the Sentry’s decision to engage in ASD will be 
regarded as lawful and/or legitimate in retrospect, because as the historical record indicates the perception of lawfulness and 
legitimacy is more likely to arise in retrospect than contemporanously, the presumption is that an exercise of ASD judged lawful 
and legitimate contemporaneously will remain so in retrospect.
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model, and serve as a springboard to yet further, and perhaps even more generalizable, research.  
Simulation research offers a potentially fruitful route to this end.
2.  Simulate Data
a.  simulation research
In brief, “simulation” is the dynamic modeling of central features, relationships, and social 
processes of the natural world that facilitates the direct observation and rigorous testing of complex 
systems that are difficult or impossible to access with other methodologies.904  By rendering otherwise 
inaccessible systems susceptible to investigation, simulation is indispensable in the linkage of historical 
and experimental research in the development and testing of theories across a broad range of diverse 
social and natural science subfields.905  Although simulation does not allow for direct examination or 
incorporate all aspects of the referent system and is thus not a true experimental methodology, it has 
tremendous heuristic value.906  Variables can be readily identified and manipulated, substantive 
propositions of theoretical importance can be derived and tested, and data can be rapidly generated for 
incorporation with other data sets and subsequent analysis.907
In the typical international relations simulation, human subject participants, selected on the basis 
of some discrete personality or experiential characteristics determined through psychological profiling,908
are assigned to national teams909 and placed in a setting where constraints and incentives resemble the 
referent world.  A scenario—a detailed account of the sequence of political, military, and legal events 
leading up to a specific crisis or confrontation910—is used to goad participants to manipulate resources and 
make decision in pursuit of their exogenously and endogenously defined objectives.911 Only the 
independent variables are prescribed through the selection of participants on the basis of their 
psychological profiles, their assignment to specific teams, and the allocation of specific political, 
economic, and military capabilities to each team through the scenario.  The decisions of the participants 
in response to the scenario and to the decisions of other participants—the dependent variables—are 
904 See generally HAROLD GUETZKOW, SIMULATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  (1963) (defining and 
discussing simulation as an experimental research heuristic and developmental methodology); URS LUTERBACHER & 
MICHAEL D. WARD, EDS., DYNAMIC MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 252 (1985) (noting that simulation is 
ideally suited to the rigorous analysis of “complex decision problems in concrete settings”).
905 See Robert Mandel, Political Gaming and Foreign Policy Making During Crises, 29 WORLD POL. 610, 614 (1977) 
(theorizing that high-level decisionmaking during conditions of stress is univestigable save for by simulation); SANDOLE, supra
note 322, at 46 (describing simulation as the “best format for the controlled investigation of behavior”); E.W. PAXSON, WAR 
GAMING 33 (1963) (stating that simulation offers scholars the opportunity to “make major contribution[s] to the pressing 
questions which cannot await refinements in methodology.”).
906 See, e.g., GUETZKOW, supra note 905, at 7 (stressing that most simulations should be incorporated into the discovery phase 
of science building as simulation is difficult to validate).
907 See HERMAN, supra note 336, at 167 (describing utility of simulation as a method for generating data and testing theories); 
SANDOLE, supra note 322, at 48 (noting utility of simulation research to replication and validation studies).
908 See GUETZKOW, supra note 905, at 92-94 (describing assignment of participants on the basis of psychological profiles); 
HERMANN, supra note 243, at 4-11 (discussing selection and assignment of simulation participants on the basis of participant 
responses on psychological instruments); KNUTSON, supra note 288, at 327-35 (discussing creation of psychological 
instruments to test, select, and assign participants on the basis of research protocols).
909
 The number of participants and teams, and the determination and assignment of specific roles to team members, is determined 
by the research question.  See CHARLES HERMANN, CRISES IN FOREIGN POLICY 46, 46 n.14 (1963).
910 See HARVEY A. DEWEERD, A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION 3 (1973) (describing the 
role of the scenario in simulation research).
911 See CHARLES WALCOTT, ED., SIMPLE SIMULATIONS II: A COLLECTION OF SIMULATION/GAMES FOR 
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 1-3 (1980).
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entirely unregulated, and together with the personality profiles of the participants these decisions, and 
their consequences, constitute the experimental data.  
Comparisons between the behaviors of “real world” decision makers and simulation participants 
are essential in establishing confidence in simulation as a research method in the study of international 
legal compliance.912  While for some the “leaps to the laboratory” from real world settings may seem 
“nonsensical,”913 most scholars accept that validity is a function of the degree to which simulation 
research produces experimental data isomorphic to the referent world.914  Complete isomorphism is 
impossible—an exact one-to-one relationship would require that the simulation be as large and complex 
as the reality it represents—and because some aspects of any given phenomenon are irrelevant to a 
particular research question a simulation need capture only the key features of the referent system or 
process.  Still, a high degree of isomorphism is necessary if simulations are to motive participant 
decisions that have “real world” character, and although it is inevitable that some features of the “real 
world” will be excluded, if the results of a simulation and either the informed intuitive expectation of a 
future event or the results of a historical event have a similar structure and form, that simulation stakes a 
prima facie claim to validity.915  In fact, extensive evidence suggests that simulation research does indeed 
produce results highly isomorphic to reality.916
b. Project CLAW
In brief, Project Compliance with the Laws of War [“ PROJECT CLAW”] is a scenario-driven 
simulation of a politico-military crisis designed by the author to generate additional cases of 
decisionmaking with regard to the ASD outcomes under analysis in the present study.  Participants will be 
selected on the basis of their personality profiles, as determined by an assessment instrument, and other 
relevant criteria.  Participants will be assigned to roles on several national teams, including one which 
will be subjected by the scenario to an imminent military threat and whose HD will possess one of the 
nine experimental personality profiles.  Nine simulation runs will be conducted during the spring and 
summer of 2005, and the resulting experimental data will be integrated with the historical data and 
subjected to QCA analysis and, where appropriate, “harder,” more quantitative methods.  By exhausting 
all possible personality profiles and integrating analysis of simulate and historical data, PROJECT CLAW 
will generate greater confidence in the validity of the resulting associative relationships between 
personality and ASD outcomes, enable the specification of necessity and conditionality, and permit the 
912
 HERMANN, supra note 336, at 167; see also Joyner, supra note 304, at 332 (describing use of simulation of international 
legal decisionmaking as an educational method and indicating that the success of the exercise depends upon the degree to which 
participants assume their roles and the extent to which their decisionmaking is isomorphic with the decisionmaking of real world 
participants in the foreign policy decisionmaking process).
913
 H. GUETZKOW & J.J. VALDEZ, SIMULATED INTERNATIONAL PROCESSES: THEORIES AND RESEARCH 326 
(1981).
914
 GUETZKOW, supra note 905, at 136.
915
 GUETZKOW & VALDEZ, supra note 914, at 63, 256.
916 See, e.g., WALCOTT, supra note 912, at 121 (finding significant isomorphism between decisionmaking in simulation and in 
actual historical cases); Dina A. Zinnes, A Comparison of Hostile Behavior of Decision-Makers in Simulate and Historical Data, 
18 WORLD POL. 474, 496 (1966) (finding that “the simulate and historical worlds are comparable, or isomorphic[,]” in studies 
of decisionmaking).  For a detailed discussion of simulation methodology generally and as applied to the development and testing 
of theories in international relations, see generally Guetzkow, supra note 915. 
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development of a theory that can explain and predict ASD outcomes in causal terms as the product, in 
some important measure, of the personalities of decisionmakers.917
3.  Additional Dependent Variables
Investigation of the associative relationships between personality and compliance decisions in 
regard to the IHL regimes governing aspects of the jus in bello, including the treatment of prisoners-of-
war [“POWs”] and the use of chemical weapons [“CWs”], will offer the prospect that the proposed theory 
can be validated not only as regards the resort to armed force but across a broader span of substantive 
issue- areas that transcend the jus ad bellum.  By positing explanations predictions of compliance 
decisions regarding the treatment of POWs and the use of CWs, the utility of the personality theory of 
IHL compliance to scholars and practitioners will be much enhanced.
4.  Additional Independent Variables
The substance and process of foreign policy decisions are in effect intervening variables to which 
greater theoretical significance may be attributed in future iterations of this research.
5.  Quantitative Analysis
Generation of sufficient numbers of simulated cases of ASD will allow the introduction of 
quantitative analytical methods, including multivariate statistics, content analysis, and pathways analysis, 
to complement QCA.  The strengths of each method will compensate for the weaknesses of the other, 
enabling more detailed analysis and greater explanatory and predictive power.  Quantitative analysis may 
permit integration of variables drawn from other levels of analysis to determine the causal significance of 
personality-level variables relative to inputs from the international system, the political character of states, 
and the nature of decisional units; such research will prove valuable in validating the causal significance 
of personality in IHL compliance decisionmaking.
6.  Micro-Level Theorization
Ultimately, a more powerful theory requires the investigation and specification of the neural 
processes whereby personality is formed and translated into decisions.  If so, future research will require 
not only additional analytical methodologies but the incorporation of insights from cognitive 
neuroscience, which in turn will require collaboration across several disciplinary boundaries.918
VI.  Conclusions
Although compliance is the most central issue in the international legal academy, at least one 
scholar, despairing that existing theories are ill-suited to issue-areas of high politics, has quit a corner of 
the field and conceded that scholarship “may have a greater impact on human well being when it focuses 
on areas in which international law can alter outcomes more reliably, including economic, environmental, 
917
 Little experimental research has been conducted within the field of international law, and yet a new generation of scholars, 
many of whom work in subfield of compliance, recognize that progress will require the development and testing of theories of 
causation and that this project will in turn require natural experimentation to guide the development and testing of theories.  See, 
e.g., Raustiala, supra note 27, at 397-98 (stating that evaluating and improving compliance with international law will require a 
theory of causation that can be subjected to counterfactual analysis and natural experimentation, “a rare but wonderful aid to 
analysis[.]” ).  For a detailed description of the use of simulation to test a theory of foreign policy decisionmaking, see William C. 
Bradford, U.S. Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in Arab-Israeli Crises: The Association of U.S. Presidential Personality 
Constructs with Political and Military Crisis Outcomes 234-71 (1995) (doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, 1995).
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and labor issues.”919  If most observers remain committed to the proposition that international law matters 
by virtue of its positive (and perhaps normative) influence upon state behavior, empirical patterns of 
inconsistency in IHL compliance may be attriting their ranks, or at least claiming from them some of the 
terrain upon which the debate is raging.  
 However, surrender, and even retreat, is at the very least premature.  IHL is neither 
epiphenomenal to nor dispositive of the conduct of warring states.  Moreover, the greatest impediment to 
more effective legal regulation of war is not a demonstrable pattern of noncompliance but rather the 
ongoing incapacity to explain and predict this pattern and offer policy-relevant guidance to the legal 
architects charged with making those modifications necessary to enhance compliance.  Undertheorization, 
and not the inherent immiscibility of law and war, is the bane of IHL compliance, and it is to empirical 
studies of the relationships between rules and behaviors that energies must be dedicated if armed conflict 
is to be held within the domain of global governance.
This program need not exclude any particular school-of-thought or methodology.  Although this 
Article assumes that human agency is crucial to the production of the phenomenon of IHL compliance 
and concludes that individual-level variables are therefore indispensable to explanations and predictions, 
the most sophisticated model will likely incorporate insights from all pre-theories and variables from 
multiple levels of analysis, including the nature of the foreign policy structures, the nature of the state, 
dyadic interactions with other states, and the international system.  Just as “[t]here is emphatically no 
royal road to knowledge in the study of international relations[,]”920 there is no single method or paradigm 
that will enable researchers to harvest all that is knowable about IHL compliance.  Each method will 
inform the others regardless of its own pretensions, and conflicts will generate dialectics that lead to 
creative synthesis.921
Still, although the present account of the relationship is inchoate, the salience of personality to 
IHL compliance is an existential reality.  Dimensions of personality, including militarism, anomism, 
hostility, and adventurism, are more effective in explaining data than are existing pre-theories, and an 
adequate explanation is a necessary condition precedent to systematic predictions of future compliance 
decisionmaking as well as to the purposive reconfiguration of the rules of IHL.  Without an account of the 
linkages between rules and behaviors, any attempt to enhance IHL compliance by altering the existing 
regime will succeed only through the intervention of good fortune without which any tinkering is at least 
as likely to degrade compliance as it is to bolster it.
Moreover, because personality matters, the bearers of personality matter, and the collective 
energies and creativities of the international legal academy can no longer be devoted exclusively to the 
918 See Chorvat et al., supra note 895, at 3-12 (describing insights from cognitive neuroscience gleaned from sophisticated 
medical technologies that highlight the neural mechanisms involved in human decisionmaking regarding legal rules and establish 
the limits of law to alter human behavior).
919
 Guzman, supra note 4, at 1829.
920
 Michael Banks, A.J.R. Groom, & A.N. Oppenheim, International Crisis Gaming: The Conex Experience, 1 IRRA STUD. 
PEACE RES. 85, 98 (1968-1969).
921 See, e.g., ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 87 (1999) (suggesting that in 
an era characterized by contestation between divergent normative systems and increasing complexity it is especially important 
that scholars commit to interdisciplinary and intertheoretical cooperation if answers to many of the intractable problems in 
international relations are to be realized).
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production and defense of state- or systemic-level theories without knowingly sacrificing significant 
explanatory and predictive power.  Although it is tempting for the man who has lost his keys at night in a
parking lot to search for them in those areas illuminated by street lights, his best strategy for finding his 
keys is to search in the areas where reason and memory informs him that he is most likely to have 
dropped them.  The analogy is apt for scholars of IHL compliance: if personality variables harness greater 
explanatory and predictive power than those drawn from other levels of analysis, pre-theories that 
underemphasize personality or relegate it to irrelevance, whether due to unfamiliarity with the literature 
and techniques that inform PT research or out of slavish commitments to their core assumptions, are 
prioritizing illumination over a successful search.
Furthermore, personality is of significance not merely from a positive perspective.  Enhanced 
IHL compliance is a moral imperative and a crucial step in the deepening of international civil society.  It 
is therefore essential to identify the most propitious point-of-entry into the decisionmaking process in 
order to facilitate the sorts of interventions that can serve this teleological mission.  This Article suggests 
that, because much of the variation in compliance is attributable to personality, manipulation of the legal 
rules may well be a fruitless venture without simultaneously manipulating the personalities of HDs, either 
through training or through the incorporation of analysis of compliance propensities in the matrix of 
considerations governing their selection by domestic constituencies.922  If “history is a race between 
education and catastrophe,”923 and if decisionmaking with regard to IHL compliance carries with it the 
possibility for the latter, our prayers and best efforts should ride with the former.  Crafting the most 
effective IHL regime is not merely a matter of the conjuration and codification of proper rules and 
institutions, although these are vital steps924: it is to the selection and training of the right people to 
administer, interpret, and implement the normative content animating rules and institutions to which 
stakeholders must also direct their attention.  All those who would secure compliance with IHL must 
abandon the “comforting seclusion from reality that the pure theory of law once provided[.]”925
The ultimate determinants of IHL compliance lurk in the minds of the individuals who must 
decide whether to comply.  Although competing pretheories offer complementary insights that will 
advance knowledge, it will be difficult to supplant personality theory as the paradigm that models the 
variables that most directly tap the phenomenon in question.  Although the broader arenas of social 
922 See D’Agostino, supra note 325, at 282 (suggesting the use of training to insulate against decisional pathologies rooted in 
personality). Potential decisionmakers who possess personality profiles indicating they are prone to IHL noncompliance, 
particularly where such noncompliance may be likely to yield outcomes inconsistent with national interests, might be apprised of 
this information and given the opportunity, through simulation or other training, to test particular decisional strategies, internalize 
an accounting of associated costs, and mitigate their decisional propensities accordingly.  Whether it is possible even for willing 
subjects to moderate personality constructs, which tend to form and become solidified in early adulthood, is perhaps a dubious 
proposition that requires investigation in another context, as does the suggestion that voters might require of candidates for the 
highest offices that they publicize their personality profiles to allow for the consideration of their expected patterns of IHL 
compliance as one factor in mass voting behavior.
923
 Attributed to H.G. WELLS.
924 See Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism, in Making the Voice of Humanity Heard 268 (L. 
Lijnzaad, J. van Sambeek, & B. Tahzib-Lie, eds. 2004) (“[T]he main problem today [with IHL] is not a lack of rules, but the 
proper implementation of existing ones.”); see also id. at Yves Sandoz, Prospects for Future Developments in IHL, 339, 354 
(“”[I]t would be dangerously misleading to think that [problems in IHL compliance] can be solved simply by modifying the law . 
. . [T]he solution is not to change the law, but to find new ways of ensuring compliance[.]”).
925
 INTERATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL CRISIS: AN ANALYTIC CASEBOOK xiii (L. Scheinman & D. Wilkinson 
1968) (alluding to the title of the positivist tome, HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (1934)).  
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science and humanities are hospitable to PT, advocacy of PT is a de facto call for a major re-envisioning 
of the discipline of international legal compliance.  During paradigmatic shifts, resistance and tension 
brew within the discipline undergoing transformation.926 However, the mutual object of theorists in any 
field should be the discovery and promulgation of new knowledge whatever its source and whatever the 
method that reveals it.
Armed conflict is not some disembodied and unfathomable process that holds humans captive to 
their own history.  Rather, we are, to some important extent, authors and judges of, and therefore 
responsible for, our future.  Wars, and the acts and omissions undertaken therein, begin “in the minds of 
men.”
927
  As the field of international legal compliance unfolds in a heretofore deeply conflictual 
millennium, it behooves scholars to recall the insight of English literary giant Alexander Pope, who three 
centuries ago, while pondering the divers paths down which Enlightenment scholars were treading in 
pursuit of universal and infinite truths regarding the relationship of humanity to nature and to God, 
reminded his peers that “[t]he proper study of mankind is man.”928 The study of IHL compliance is no less 
than the study of mankind in a decisional crucible of his [and her] own making, and thus it is proper that 
our focus be brought to bear upon the relevant dimensions of the personalities of the men and women 
upon whom ultimate responsibility for compliance rests.  
926 See generally THOMAS KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1961).
927 See supra at *.
928 Alexander Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle ii. Line 1 (1733).
